The JALLC conducts analysis on a wide cariety of topics. Due to the nature of the information in the JALLC analysis reports, they are not made available to the wider public. Instead, you can read about the JALLC's analysis projects in our Project FactSheets linked below, which provide an overview of the project and its background, a summary of the main findings, and relevant recommendations.
JALLC Project Factsheets
NATO Involvement in Evacuation Operations - Lessons from Operation ALLIED SOLACE
In summer 2021, following the collapse of the Afghan government and the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces, NATO executed Operation ALLIED SOLACE (OAS) which was the NATO operation to receive NATO-affiliated Afghans evacuated from Afghanistan and to arrange their onward transport and resettlement in Allied territories. NATO recognized that there was potential to learn from OAS in order to ensure that future NATO involvement in evacuation operations could be executed with the benefit of the experiences from this operation and tasked the JALLC to analyse and report on NATO’s involvement in Evacuation Operations, focusing on lessons from OAS, and to assess the relevance of OAS lessons to future NATO involvement in evacuation operations.
The report, presents a number of Key Lessons identified from the JALLC’s study, including those relating to the importance of prior planning coupled with the need for flexibility and adaptability of NATO forces in crisis which you can read more about in this factsheet..
Military Strategic Assessment.
The primary document to provide critical feedback to the NATO Nations on the progress of an ongoing mission/operation is the Periodic Mission Review (PMR). PMRs are developed through Operations Assessment (OPSA) conducted at the Tactical, Operational, and Military-Strategic levels in order to inform the NATO End State and objectives for the respective mission/operation at the political level.
In the JALLC’s report on Military Strategic Assessment, published on 10 March 2023, the project team present key findings on their analysis of how PMRs are developed and SHAPE’s role in the process, and make recommendations to improve both aspects.
Train, Advise, and Assist Lessons from Resolute Support Mission.
The Resolute Support Mission (RSM) was a NATO-led mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions. At its height, several thousand military personnel from a wide variety of NATO Nations and Partners were involved in the Mission, aimed at assisting the establishment of resilient and modern Afghan Security Institutions. Within this context, at the request of SHAPE, the JALLC was tasked to produce an evidence-based report identifying the key strategic and operational lessons from NATO’s experience in training, advising, and assisting the Afghan security forces and institutions since 2015.
Published on 21 March 2022, the report provided a timely look into the collapse of the Afghan government, which culminated in August 2021.
NATO Standing Naval Forces: Determining Likely Root Causes of Shortfalls in Force Generation.
The recently published report on the NATO Standing Naval Forces (SNF) builds on a previous report on the viability of the SNF, published by the JALLC in June 2016. In the 2022 report, the Project Team analysed likely root causes of shortfalls in force generation, and tried to gain insight into what a future SNF might look like. The analysis of a broad spectrum of areas of improvement for the current SNF Model allowed the Project Team to identify key issues and potential solutions to address SNF shortfalls, while highlighting the many benefits Nations get from participating in the SNF.
Collaboration Tools in NATO.
The COVID-19 pandemic had a wide-reaching impact on working practices globally. Many nations implemented confinement plans or lockdowns where populations were either mandated or recommended to work in shifts, or work from home if at all possible. Similar policies were also implemented to varying extents by NATO entities. This new way of working presented many challenges for NATO staff, as well as revealing new requirements for tools to support routine work and decision making. NATO responded quickly to the increasing demand for these virtual collaboration tools, allowing its staff to work safely from home, while still ensuring that the Alliance could conduct business as usual.
Some of the tools introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic survived lockdown and have been integrated into the (new) normal Way NATO Works; some seem to have been specific to the COVID-19 pandemic, and some are still up for debate. The JALLC’s report on Collaboration Tools in NATO from December 2021—published during the pandemic—set out the key findings from the analysis of the various virtual collaboration tools implemented.
Lessons from the Strategic and Operational CIMIC Role in NATO’s COVID-19 Pandemic Response.
Only by identifying the Lessons from our experience during the pandemic can the Alliance understand what actions can ensure that CIMIC and NATO Staff are optimally prepared for future civil emergencies. The project team concluded that coordination, knowledge development and sharing, and dynamic preparation through education all contribute to the preparation of CIMIC staff. The team highlights that many significant improvements have been undertook since the beginning of the pandemic, yet further changes may still be needed.
Building Integrity in Operations.
On 22 October 2021 JALLC published a report on Building Integrity (BI) in NATO Operations. Corruption has a corrosive impact on peace and security, weakening the fabric of our societies, as well as undermining the operational effectiveness of NATO’s missions and operations. Endemic corruption can make it more difficult for NATO to achieve its goals of enhancing security in a country. The project team concluded that some of the early lessons on the impact of corruption in ISAF contributed to strategic policy and structural improvements within NATO, but there are still several challenges to overcome to begin translating these strategic level improvements into substantial changes at the tactical level.
Joint Fires in NATO: Analysis of the relationship between Joint Fires, Joint Effects, and Joint Targeting.
On 17 May 2021, the JALLC published its joint analysis report on Joint Fires in NATO: Analysis of the relationship between Joint Fires, Joint Effects, and Joint Targeting. The analysis, which was requested by SHAPE, Allied Command Operations, looked at how NATO doctrine, structures, and process could potentially be improved to better incorporate the latest thinking in these areas in order to be more effective and efficient. Contemporary warfare is no longer confined to the traditional battlefield. Instead, it encompasses a wide range and often complex array of actions; everything ranging from the use of lethal force to strategic communications. The complex analysis presented in this report is follwed by a number of conculsions and recommendations which you can read more about in this factsheet.
The origins of Air-Land Integration (ALI) can be traced back to the First World War when aircraft were used to spot targets for artillery forces on the ground. Defined by the ALI community as the focused orchestration and application of the full range of Air and Land capabilities within a Joint Force to realize and enhance effects, the topic of ALI has always been subject to debate across all NATO Nations, Air and Land components
NATO Exercise Big Data Exploration.
In an increasingly digital world, NATO's reliance on data, technology and connectivity is growing and generating a need for constant innovation. In this dynamic environment, it is vital for the Alliance to detect, record, learn, and share lessons at the speed of relevance. However, studies have shown that, particularly within NATO Exercises, relevant Lessons Learned information is often lost in Big Data - large volumes of diverse data generated at a fast pace
Every two years, logistics units from multiple nations gather together in order to exercise multinational logistics and to enhance interoperability among nations through the multinational exercise series, titled Exercise CAPABLE
LOGISTICIAN (CL). CL exercises are organized by the Multinational Logistics Coordination Centre (MLCC) and aim to train NATO and Partner Nations, NATO Command Structure (NCS), and NATO Force Structure (NFS), with participation varying according to nations’ willingness and availability.
In order to support Allied Command Operations’ (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation’s (ACT) continuous efforts to enhance the Alliance’s strategic adaptation to hybrid threats, the JALLC conducted a study to explore what measures NATO and the Nations have taken in recent years to counter hybrid threats and to draw strategic lessons from that analysis that can inform the Alliance’s future adaptation against hybrid threats.
New Technologies in Support of Lessons Learned.
Lessons Learned (LL) is becoming an increasingly important area of research for the Alliance, and one that could benefit from new and emerging technologies. At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to, “... identify advanced and emerging technologies, evaluate their applicability in the military domain, and implement them through innovative solutions.” As such, the NATO LL Capability is a potential area for the application of such technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence/machine learning, analytics, polyglot tools, etc.) in the military domain.
Exercise TRIDENT JAVELIN 2017 (TRJN17) was a Command Post Exercise (CPX) conducted as a joint operation larger than a Major Joint Operation (MJO+) using a new Article 5 exercise scenario. TRJN17 was the largest CPX conducted by NATO in a generation and represented a sea-change in the focus of exercises as NATO adapts and realigns to its Collective Defence core task.
Geospatial Support, comprising those activities necessary to meet the recognised need for Geospatial Information and its subsequent analysis and interpretation, is a key to NATO forces’ operational readiness and effectiveness. NATO's Common Geospatial Framework is the basis for geospatial interoperability and in essence ensures the principle of “operating off the same map” to be implemented in NATO planning, training, exercises and deployments. In this report, the JALLC identifies the measures that may further develop NATO's capability for Geospatial Support to the Land component of the VJTF (VJTF(L)).
Transformation is critical to enhance the Alliance’s credibility in the face of today’s security environment. Constant global economic pressures, the potential diversity of Alliance operations, and current events that threaten to transcend to crisis, highlight an ever-present need for NATO to be prepared and equipped with effective capabilities. As part of this transformational effort, HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (HQ SACT) is developing a Sustainment Capstone Concept that sets out the vision of how NATO will project forces and sustain operations across NATO's core tasks.
The changing security environment, the use of diverse and innovative technologies, and the changes in the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure are challenges that require NATO to modernize its Command and Control (C2) strategy, principles and procedures. As such, and in light of NATO's C2 Vision 2030, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) directed the HQ SACT Capability Development Command & Control, Deployability & Sustainability Division to develop the NATO C2 Capstone Concept to support the implementation of the C2 Vision 2030.
In June 2016, NATO Heads of State and Government highlighted in their Warsaw Summit Declaration the importance of comprehensive intelligence arrangements and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR) capabilities for NATO's timely and informed political and military decision making.
As head of Allied Command Operations (ACO), responsible for overall command of NATO military operations and the provision of advice to NATO's Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has a distinct requirement for Situational Awareness. The ability of ACO's strategic level HQ, SHAPE, to provide SACEUR with timely and effective Indications and Warning (I&W) and JISR capabilities to enable this is of particular importance in this regard.
Interoperability is critical to every aspect of Communication and Information Systems (CIS) capability development; from initial concept through to operational use. Consequently, CIS IV&V is a prerequisite in achieving the appropriate level of interoperability to ensure the effectiveness of Alliance Forces—and in particular the NATO Response Force (NRF)—across the full spectrum of Alliance operations and missions. In this context, several events are available to NATO and Partner nations that afford CIS IV&V opportunities. Effective coordination and synchronization of these events is necessary to permit the effective exploitation of their outcomes to the benefit of NATO, the Allies, and Partners.
Knowledge Management (KM) is central to Allied Command Operations’ (ACO) mission to prepare for, plan, and conduct military operations to meet NATO's political objectives. KM serves to safeguard against the loss of knowledge, which is especially important in a context where one third of ACO military staff rotate out of their positions every year. KM also supports the creation and acquisition of the knowledge ACO needs to meet current and emergent security challenges.
At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed upon a framework for a new NATO Command Structure (NCS), designed to be leaner and more affordable. In accordance with this new framework, NATO would rely on NATO Force Structure (NFS) HQs, in addition to its traditional use of the NCS, to provide NATO's full Deployable Joint Command and Control Capabilities and thereby meet the Alliance’s declared level of ambition. Doing so would require NFS HQs to be used as Joint Task Force (JTF) HQs for commanding Smaller Joint Operations (Land Heavy).
At the Wales Summit in September 2014, Allied leaders approved a Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to ensure the Alliance will be ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security threat environment. In conjunction with the implementation of the RAP, NATO's Exercise Programme was revised to take into account the preparation of higher readiness forces as well as contributing to assurance measures. In the lead up to the Warsaw Summit 2016, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff were interested in determining whether the NATO Exercise Programme was meeting Alliance Requirements from a strategic perspective. In this context he JALLC was tasked to analyse how the NATO Exercise Programme is delivering against Alliance Requirements with respect to Readiness, Responsiveness, Interoperability, Assurance, and Deterrence
During the 2010 Lisbon Summit the Regional Focus (RF) Initiative emerged as NATO's approach to advance the exploitation of regional expertise. The JALLC conducted analysis in order to provide a thorough evidence-based description of the Regional Focus Initiative’s intent and mechanism in order to ascertain whether a regional dimension is being effectively incorporated into current NATO activities such as the Readiness Action Plan (RAP); probably the most prominent NATO activity with a regional dimension not only today but also for the foreseeable future.The project team identified three key conclusions which relate to the RF Initiative’s Intent, the RF Initiative’s Mechanism, and the RAP-RF Initiative Alignment.
For more than 11 years, under the mandate of several UN Security Council Resolutions, NATO has committed resources and considerable effort to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop the Afghan security forces to ensure the Afghanistan would never again be a safe haven for terrorists. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Mission in Afghanistan terminated on 31 December 2014. The many challenges that have arisen in Afghanistan have provided fertile ground for NATO to learn, resulting in meaningful lessons to further the Alliance’s transformation. To ensure these valuable lessons would not be lost, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation tasked the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) with the analysis of the strategic lessons from ISAF mission. The goal of this study was to facilitate strategic military inputs to the on-going initiatives that are transforming NATO today.
NATO developed the TRIDENT JAGUAR (TRJR) series of exercises, designed to exercise, evaluate, and certify the Graduated Readiness Forces (Land) (GRF(L)) HQs in the Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ role. In May 2015, the JALLC reported on the findings from analysis of the first of the TRJR exercises (Exercise TRJR14). As a follow on to this study, during Exercise TRJR 2015 (TRJR 15), it was NRDC Italy’s (NRDC-ITA) and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps’ (ARRC) turn to be exercised and evaluated in the JTF HQ role. During the exercise they were required to plan and conduct a Crisis Response Small Joint Operation (Land Heavy) (SJO(L)) in a high intensity, complex military civilian, and asymmetric, failing state environment, involving warfighting in the early stages. The exercise was staged at the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), Stavanger, Norway in April and May of 2015.
During the lifetime of the NATO E-3A (NE-3A), the changing security environment and technological developments over the last 30 years have resulted in the NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control (NAEW&C) Force’s role expanding to support a wide range of challenges NATO has faced over the last three decades. As a result of the JALLC's research into the lessons learned from three decades of NAEW&C Force, the project team observed that the changing strategic environment, technological advances, key events, missions, and operations that took place during this period have impacted and expanded the NAEW&C Force’s role over time to meet the increasing operational requirements. As a result of this expanding role, there have been certain key consequences for the NAEW&C Force, which the project team summarized under six main areas in the JALLC Research Paper.
In October 2014, in response to the decline of NATO assets in the Standing Naval Forces (SNF), NATO's two Strategic Commands, with Allied Command Operations (ACO) in the lead, supported by Allied Command Transformation (ACT), were requested to provide an action plan pertaining to the reinvigoration of the SNF. The JALLC supported this work by conducting a study into the viability of the SNF in order to identify factors that impact the Allies’ participation in the SNF and to make recommendations on how to improve/change the current SNF model. The analysis of a broad spectrum of areas of improvement for the current SNF Model identified the three keys issues that, if addressed, may indeed serve to improve the current SNF Model.
In order to help ensure that NATO can efficiently prepare and facilitate a Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) capability, the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) was tasked by HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) to conduct an analysis of key policy and doctrine relating to the JLSG concept, relevant lessons, and observations collected during operations and exercises. The findings are presented in the report published by the JALLC entitled “Enabling Successful Multinational Logistics with NATO’s Joint Logistics Support Group.” The JLSG concept has been in place for a period of approximately ten years, but the JLSG HQ has only been fully executed twice (once during an exercise and once during an operation) and partially implemented on other occasions. Therefore, there are limited numbers of observations, lessons, or best practices relating to the JLSG HQ that cover the full spectrum of JLSG tasks.
At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed upon a framework for a new NATO Command Structure designed to be leaner and more affordable. As a consequence, where in the past NATO Command Structure HQs were able to provide NATO's full Deployable Joint Command and Control Capabilities, from 2011, on NATO would also rely on NATO Force Structure (NFS) HQs for such capabilities to meet the agreed NATO Level of Ambition. To identify best practices and capture lessons on implementation of the NFS Joint Task Force (JTF) concept, the JALLC was tasked to conduct a study based on an analysis requirement submitted by the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC).
Attack the Networks (AtN) is one of the three pillars of NATO's Counter-Improvised Explosives Device (C-IED) concept. However, despite being recognized as an essential capability for the Alliance, according to the Military Committee, progress to develop the AtN pillar of C-IED has been slow. An earlier JALLC study on AtN, conducted in 2013, contributed to the revision of NATO's C-IED Action Plan by analysing NATO operational and strategic lessons in order to generate a broader and deeper rationale supporting AtN. This followon study, jointly requested by the Deputy Assistant General of the Emerging-Security Challenges Division of the International Staff and the Director of the Intelligence Division of the International Military Staff in 2014, was intended to identify the military requirements for a future AtN capability in NATO by analysing "NATO and national AtN military lessons and information collected at all levels, in order to identify the military requirements for NATO AtN."
Exercises and training are an important part of NATO's transformation and of ensuring that NATO trains as it fights and fights as it trains. Lessons Identified (LI) and learned during an exercise must be captured and institutionalized within NATO effectively and efficiently so that the Alliance can obtain maximum benefit from each exercise. To enhance information sharing in the exercises and training field, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation tasked the Joint Analysis and JALLC to analyse NATO's Exercise Reporting Process used within the Exercise, Training, Reporting, and Analysis ( EXTRA) Community of Interest ( CoI).
Exercises and training are an important part of NATO's transformation and of ensuring that NATO trains as it fights and fights as it trains. Lessons Identified ( LI) and learned during an exercise must be captured and institutionalized within NATO effectively and efficiently so that the Alliance can obtain maximum benefit from each exercise.
In this respect, to enhance the information sharing in the training and exercises field, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation tasked the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre ( JALLC) to develop and promote the NATO Exercises, Training, Reporting and Analysis Portal ( EXTRA) Information sharing platform. The EXTRA Portal is to be the focal point for sharing exercise and training related knowledge and lessons.
Transformation is critical to enhance the Alliance's credibility in the face of today's international security environment. The diversity of Alliance operations spanning the last twenty years, constant global economic pressures, and current events highlight an ever present need for NATO to be prepared and equipped with effective capabili-ties, facilitated through a multinational and comprehensive Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) mind-set. Strategic concepts and initiatives, and other strands of work within NATO - such as Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative - are instruments through which the Alliance is transforming in an increasingly uncertain future threat environment. Such transformation is the essential ingredient to ensure and enhance the Alliance's readiness and combat effectiveness, thereby driving to-wards achieving the end state.
In response to the rapidly growing cyber threat targeting both NATO and Allied networks, Heads of State and Government at the 2010 Lisbon Summit took the decision to bolster NATO's cyber defence efforts. Significant progress has since been made in this respect, but it is important to recognize the emerging challenges to cyber defence that NATO faces.
The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre ( JALLC) was tasked by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation ( SACT) to conduct a study analysing Cyber Defence Situational Aware-ness and Information Sharing within NATO in order to improve the ability of the NATO Command Structure ( NCS) to respond to Cyber Threats and share Cyber Defence lessons...
The evolution of NATO Ballistic Missile Defence ( BMD) Command and Control ( C2) doctrine has been rapid. Although a NATO Theatre BMD capability has existed for several years, it was only at the Summit in Lisbon in 2010 that the Alliance decided to develop a NATO BMD capability. Within just two years from the date of that summit, at the Chicago Summit in 2012, the Alliance was able to declare an Interim BMD capability. Taking this rapid evolution into consideration, and recognizing the fact that NATO continues to evolve its BMD capabilities at a fast pace two further levels of capability are already foreseen it makes sense in terms of the timeline of BMD C2 evolution to pause and review related NATO doctrine...
The 2011 NATO Command Structure Review resulted in the creation of HQ Allied Maritime Command ( MARCOM). The HQ MARCOM mission is broader than those of the former Maritime Commands ( MC) at Naples and Northwood, encompassing the requirement to serve as Maritime Component Command under a Joint Task Force and also to be capable of planning and running a maritime-heavy small joint operation ( SJO(M)), all the while serving as NATO's principal maritime advisor. COM MARCOM requested an analysis to support his progress towards Full Operational Capability ( FOC) by identifying the required capabilities that need to be available for MARCOM to effectively exercise Command and Control ( C2), at the operational and tactical levels.
From 2008 until 2012, CERASIA was the only major, joint, crisis response exercise setting used for NATO collective training. Despite the CERASIA success and practical applicability, it was recognized that NATO's training and response preparation needed to evolve to keep pace with emerging threats, redefined NATO missions, and the evolution of the NATO Command Structure.
In 2009, SHAPE issued Direction and Guidance to develop a new, semifictitious setting, geographically superimposed on the Scandinavian/Baltic region of northern Europe ("high north") -SKOLKAN- and emphasized that, among other things, both Article 5 Collective Defence and Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO) were important training contexts it must be able to present...
Towards a Comprehensive Response to Health System Strengthening in Crisis-Affected Fragile States (full study)
JALLC, Harvard Medical School and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative are cooperating on a long term project, the overall aim of which is to infer elements of a strategic framework for health system strengthening in crisis-affected fragile states. Such health system strengthening depends on an effective comprehensive response by all participating actors particularly among the actions of the humanitarian & development and security communities ...
The Allied Command Operation ( ACO) Targeting Action Plan ( ATAP) was published early in 2012 to resolve a variety of joint targeting lessons identified during Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR ( OUP). However, after the ATAP was published, progress on implementing the ATAP recommended solutions stalled. SHAPE J2, owner of the ATAP, looking for ways to expedite implementation of the plan, requested a study that would advise on possible improvements.
A Decade of Conflict - the Lessons from ten years of JALLC analysis and the six themes that bind them together
NATO has probably faced greater change in the last decade than it did in its previous 50+ years of existence. For example, the number of Allies in the Alliance has increased by nearly 50%, the NATO Response Force (NRF) has been created, and the NATO Command Structure radically restructured. All of this change has happened in an environment of falling defence budgets, meaning NATO really has had to do more with less. In 2012, to celebrate JALLC's tenth anniversary, Commander JALLC decided that a review of the knowledge contained in the some 130 JALLC analysis reports and the 1500 submissions to the NATO Lessons Learned Database was called for.
As a result of exposure to corruption in operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO has come to understand that corruption in post-conflict states can threaten force protection and affect mission success. In October 2012, in response to a request from Commander International Security Assistance Force ( COMISAF), the JALLC was tasked to analyse Counter-and Anti-Corruption ( CAC) efforts in post-conflict states and to gather lessons and best practices on CAC. The purpose of the study was to inform NATO and COMISAF of the effects of corruption on operations, and what is being done and can be done to minimize those effects.
Information generated during an operation is critical to a reliable assessment of any operation; both during the conduct of operations and after their completion. Collection of information, conversion of information into records, and the transfer of those records to the NATO Archives, are all important parts of NATO’s Record Handling process. Despite a revised NATO Records Policy and the new Directive on Management of Records Generated on Operational Deployment, NATO Archivists, who form part of the NATO International Staff, had concerns about whether there had been significant improvement within the NATO Command Structure when it came to the handling of records relating to operational deployment. Also, the NATO Archivists were looking for recommendations to further improve NATO’s records processes, structures and tools.
During the spring of 2012, a "Food for Thought" Paper was distributed by Canada and the Netherlands that describes the Lessons Identified as a result of their redeployment of fighting forces from Afghanistan. The NATO Logistics Committee, on behalf of the NATO Military Committee ( MC), sponsored this report to assist ISAF Troop Contributing Nations ( TCN) preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan. The need to share lessons from redeployment was discussed at the April 2012 meeting of the MC, where the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation ( SACT) stated that he would task the JALLC to collect, collate and summarize lessons about redeployment.
The Public Diplomacy Division ( PDD) of the NATO International Staff identified the need to improve the way the effectiveness and impact of NATO's public diplomacy activities are evaluated so that they could more objectively report on the effectiveness of NATO's public diplomacy and enhance their public diplomacy activities. In April 2012, the JALLC was tasked by the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, at the request of the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, to develop a comprehensive public diplomacy evaluation framework. The JALLC researched and analysed various methods and approaches to evaluating the effectiveness and impact of public diplomacy and public relations used by both NATO and non- NATO organizations. The Public Diplomacy Evaluation Framework (referred to as the Framework) was then developed.
During Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR ( OUP), NATO forces' performance with regard to avoiding damage to cultural property in Libya was well received by academia and in the media. Staff at HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation ( SACT) Strategic Plans and Policy Branch believed that NATO's successful efforts at Cultural Property Protection ( CPP) in Libya could form the basis for strengthening NATO's approach to CPP for future operations. The JALLC was subsequently tasked, through the 2012 Programme of Work, to analyze how CPP was conducted and successfully addressed during OUP and make recommendations for incorporating the resulting lessons into NATO's operational planning and execution.
READ MORE ON CULTURAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
Over the past few years of NATO enlargement, new member Nations have identified the challenge of having a separate Ministry of Defence ( MoD) and General Staff ( GS). Some Nations expressed interest in receiving data on how these bodies could be merged or restructured to create more efficiency and suggested a collective approach for further analysis. At the 2011 Chiefs of Transformation Conference ( COTC), it was agreed that NATO would provide support to the Nations in this respect as a matter of priority for Allied Command Transformation.
Media monitoring ( MM) and Media Analysis ( MA) are important for effective communication and information activities during operations. During Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, existing MM and MA capabilities were increased with outsourced services to meet the needs of the operation. SHAPE requested the JALLC to analyse the suitability of existing MM and MA capabilities to support future operations. The Analysis Requirement was "What are the current MM and MA capabilities within NATO and to what extent are the services they provide suitable to meet the possible requirements of future operations?".
The NATO Security Committee published the Supporting Document for Information & Intelligence Sharing with Non- NATO Entities ( NNE) in 2009 granting greater authority and providing special guidance to facilitate partnering with NNE. This Supporting Document was augmented within the NATO Command Structure with a Bi- SC Handbook that provides guidance for implementing the new provisions for sharing authorized in the Supporting Document. The representatives to the Bi- SC Information and Intelligence Sharing ( I&IS) Task Force foresaw the need to further examine the success of the Supporting Document and Handbook in meeting the Strategic Commanders' needs when partnering and operating with NNE.
Combined training events are planned and conducted to achieve goals that individual training events cannot, allowing participants to benefit from shared or pooled resources contributed by the entities executing the training. NATO recognizes that cooperation with the United Statesâ€™ military, the largest force provider to the ISAF mission, provides mutual benefits for both parties in training future ISAF HQ staff members and similar collaborations could be applied for other missions. The JALLC conducted an analysis into the complexities of a combined training event executed by the NATO Command Structure and another entity outside that structure, such as a NATO Nation's training body. The analysis was performed by examining the planning and execution of the NATO- US multi-tier ISAF Training Event 12-1 / Unified Endeavor 12-2 ( TE 12-1 and UE 12-2) at the Joint Multinational Simulation Center in Grafenwoehr, Germany, which took place from 18 March to 06 April 2012.
JALLC, Harvard Medical School and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative are cooperating on a long term project, the overall aim of which is to infer elements of a strategic framework for health system strengthening in crisis-affected fragile states. Such health system strengthening depends on an effective comprehensive response by all participating actors particularly among the actions of the humanitarian & development and security communities.
In November 2011, the JALLC was tasked by the Supreme Allied Command Transformation to produce an analysis report on Lessons Identified during Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR from national military perspectives. When this tasking was assigned, each of the Headquarters involved in the NATO chain of command for OUP had either already published its own report of lessons or was in the process of preparing one. As a result, this study is a complementary report that is focused on the ongoing Lessons Learned process conducted by Nations during OUP. The JALLC collected the observations and lessons identified relevant to NATO from all of the nations that contributed forces to the Combined Joint Task Force UNIFIED PROTECTOR.
Operation ALTHEA is part of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy support to Bosnia and Herzegovina. DSACEUR is the Operation Commander and, under the Berlin Plus arrangement, he requested, via HQ SACT, the JALLC's assistance to provide analysis support to Operation ALTHEA. The analysis requirement was to "Examine the Operation ALTHEA in-theatre Command and Control ( C2) architecture in order to inform the Operation Commander's decision-making process and ensure effective alignment of in-theatre C2 structures to deliver the revised tasks...
As stated by the NATO Secretary General in his 2011 Annual Report, “NATO's Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR ( OUP) was one of the most remarkable in NATO's history. It showed the Alliance's strength and flexibility. European Allies and Canada took the lead; the United States provided critical capabilities; and the NATO command structure unified all those contributions, as those of our partners, for one clear goal.” NATO's intervention to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 was swift, OUP was brought to a successful conclusion exactly seven months later on 31 October 2011. NATO acted in full accordance with the UN mandate and consulted closely throughout with other International Organizations and other international partners...
The success of NATO operations, as described in SHAPE's Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), is predicated on an Operations Assessment capability at each level of Allied Command Operations that can determine progress toward an operation’s objectives and make recommendations to decision-makers. In late 2010, SHAPE ex-pressed concern over possible shortcomings in ACO's Assessment capability created by the variations in Assessment structures and manning at the different levels in ACO and, to assuage this concern, requested JALLC to analyze the Operations Assessment capability in ACO.
As reported by ISAF and in other Alliance operations and missions, the current NATO-wide Crisis Response Operations Urgent Requirements ( CUR) process does not seem to adequately meet operational needs. It is widely considered to be inflexible and unable to meet the tempo of NATO-led operations and to be falling short of delivering capabilities when needed, to the right level, and to a measurable degree of performance.The JALLC was tasked to analyze the NATO-wide CUR approval process, with emphasis on meeting ISAF operational needs, in order to make recommendations to improve the performance of the CUR approval process (the Requirement Identification and Requirement Authorization stages). The project had the following analysis objectives ...
Counter Piracy ( CP) operations are being conducted off the Horn of Africa and in the Indian Ocean by many separate naval forces operating under a variety of command arrangements. NATO's involvement began in late 2008 under a UN remit to protect hu-manitarian assistance vessels and expanded during 2009 to be-come Operation OCEAN SHIELD ( OOS) with the task to combat piracy and build regional capacity to combat piracy. Upon initial NATO involvement, DSACT observed considerable confusion, duplication of effort and poor coordination among CP forces. Out this concern arose a JALLC task with the following analysis requirements ...
The Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre ( JALLC) has released a Report on Information Exchange in a Joint Headquarters.
A previous JALLC analysis that examined the information flow in a JHQ characterized it as a complex system of three systems: Operational Reports & Returns; the formal information flow system under the Information Management ( IM) regime; and informal information exchange. This previous JALLC analysis concentrated on the first two systems. The intent of the analysis carried out during STEADFAST JUNO ( SFJO) 10 was to complete this work and address the third system: informal information exchange. In the report you'll find recommendations for the need of Directives, more Cross-JFC IM Standardization...
In the Political Guidance following NATO's new Strategic Concept, Allies have expressed a desire for a simple set of defence measurements to foster political will to improve defence capabilities. The Nations already report key input and usability metrics that give an overview of their financial commitment to defence as well as the potential uses of their defence capabilities. However, although Allies report data regarding how they allocate their resources and where they use their defence capabilities, there are no agreed output measures to summarize this data. In response to a tasking from the Secretary General, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation tasked JALLC to provide the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning with a proposed set of output metrics to meet the need expressed in the Political Guidance.
After a fratricide incident in Afghanistan in 2006, the Strategic Commands ( SC) established a Bi- SC Analysis Lessons Learned ( BALL) Team to conduct a study focusing on fratricide prevention. HQ SACT formed a Team the following year charged with implementing the recommendations from this report. In 2009 the SCs published a further, final report highlighting 19 issues influencing fratricide prevention; each issue addressed the implementation status of one or more associated corrective actions recommended from the initial report.
Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams ( POMLT) are teams of up to 20 military and civilian police who deploy to Afghanistan to work with Afghan National Police ( ANP) in the field, helping to build their skills as a professional police force. NATO initiated POMLT specific pre-deployment training in 2010 at two training centres, the US-run Joint Multinational Readiness Center ( JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, and the French Centre National d'Entrainement des Forces de Gendarmerie ( CNEFG) in St Astier, France.
JALLC was tasked to analyse ways to improve NATO-led POMLT Pre-deployment Training ( PDT) for POMLTs deploying to ISAF. The task was requested by Joint Force Command ( JFC) Brunssum. The agreed Analysis Objectives were ...
The Strategic Commands identified a need to increase efficiency and streamline Intelligence efforts. Arising from this a JALLC task was developed to examine NATO Intelligence Structures, working groups, bodies and functions. Agreement was then reached to amend the project to cover Intelligence structures and processes within Allied Command Operations ( ACO), with a view to providing input to a report by Supreme Allied Commander Europe ( SACEUR) to the Director General, IMS.
This report proposes that now is the right time to open a new chapter in civil-military medical interact ion whereby civilian and military actors are seen as complementary in achieving long-lasting peace and stability and the comprehensive approach becomes a reality in this field. Central to achieving this is the creation of medical comprehensive approach mechanisms between NATO and other organizations. Specifically, a new Joint Civil-Military Medical Coordination Board should be established to support civil-military medical coordination at the strategic level.