NATO OTAN

Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre

NATO's Lead Agent for Joint Analysis

PROJECT FACTSHEET

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE

Report Published on 13 October 2014

PROJECT OVERVIEW

US PATRIOT battery, outside the city of Gaziantep

The evolution of NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Command and Control (C2) doctrine has been rapid. Although a NATO *Theatre* BMD capability has existed for several years, it was only at the Summit in Lisbon in 2010 that the Alliance decided to develop a NATO BMD capability. Within just two years from the date of that summit, at the Chicago Summit in 2012, the Alliance was able to declare an Interim BMD capability.

Taking this rapid evolution into consideration, and recognizing the fact that NATO continues to evolve its BMD capabilities at a fast pace—two further levels of capability are already foreseen—it makes sense in terms of the timeline of BMD C2 evolution to pause and review related NATO doctrine.

In view of the crisis in Syria, and within the framework of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Turkish Government called upon the Alliance in 2012 to augment Turkey's air defence capabilities to defend the population and territory of Turkey. In response to Turkey's request some NATO Nations have deployed Patriot missile batteries to contribute to the defence of territories at risk. As this is the first time NATO is using available C2 capabilities to control a mission of this type, SHAPE saw benefit in analysing Lessons from the mission to support the refinement of relevant doctrine.

PROJECT EXECUTION

Research for this study started in February 2014 with a review of existing policy, doctrine, direction, guidance, and standing defence plans. The team then deployed in Turkey for one week in March 2014 in order to interview all key leaders in the field. Staff Officers and subject matter experts were interviewed from SHAPE, HQ Allied Command Transformation, and HQ Air Command.

The project team identified C2 arrangements for generic missile defence missions. The project team then examined the specific C2 arrangements in place for the augmentation of Turkish air defence capabilities. Finally, the project team synthesized what was learned in the first two steps, identifying areas for potential improvement and proposing appropriate recommendations.

The JALLC project team with PATRIOT units representatives at INCIRLIK TUR Airbase, during Data Collection in March 2014

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Main Findings and Recommendations

NATO policies and guidelines go to great lengths to differentiate between two types of missile defence–BMD and Theatre BMD (TBMD). With regard to roles and C2 arrangements, they are indeed quite different. However, many of the technical capabilities of BMD and TBMD are quite similar. Analysis indicates that the efforts to define the BMD and TBMD as different capabilities have been counter-productive, leading to a recommendation in this report that NATO recognize missile defence as a single set of capabilities that can be used in different roles.

For obvious reasons, the formal set of Allied Joint Doctrine for any functional area will sometimes not reflect the most recent NATO policy and concepts. For most functional areas, though, the processes for updating doctrine work well. Although major policy decisions on missile defence have been made and agreed by the Nations in recent years, there is a paucity of Allied Joint Doctrine for missile defence. To find current NATO thinking and guidance for missile defence, one must peruse a great number of political-level documents, never being 100% certain that the latest information has been found. Therefore Allied Joint Doctrine for missile defence should be brought up to date, possibly supplemented by an Allied Command Operations publication to reflect major decisions that are too sensitive, either in terms of timing or topic, to be reflected in doctrine.

When NATO augments a nation's air defence capabilities, the overall C2 arrangements for air defence become split between NATO (for those elements being deployed by NATO) and the nation (for those elements belonging to the nation). Although there will undoubtedly be unity of effort in these situations, close coordination of respective C2 functions is paramount to the success of any such augmentation. Therefore future Concepts of Operations for missile defence should clarify the C2 and coordination relationships between NATO and Host Nation commanders for peacetime missions.

Project Team

Project manager

Lieutenant-Colonel Laurent Zych, French Army

LTC Zych has served in the French Army since 1987 as an air defence operations specialist, with several deployments under NATO, the UN, and National banners. He was in command of an artillery battalion before being posted as a staff officer and then as a military analyst to JALLC in 2011.

Project Team

Lieutenant-Colonel Andreas Espenhahn, German Air Force

Major Celal Duzenli, Turkish Army

Major Jean Nuez, French Army

Mr David Ross, US Civil Analyst

Mr David Jones, GBR Operational Research Analyst

NATO LL Portal Tracking Area Items

2054 – Optimizing BMD C2 Arrangements
2055 – Establishing BMD Doctrine
2056 – BMD Operations - BMDCC
2057 – The Role of National AOCs
2058 – NATO AMDC CONOPS Arrangements
2059 – NATO planning for Air Defence Augmentation
2060 – Civil Protection Coordination

JALLC

Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
Avenida Tenente Martins – Monsanto
1500-589 Lisbon
Portugal

Phone: +351 21 771 7007/8/9
Fax: +351 21 771 7098

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