

## COUNTER- AND ANTI-CORRUPTION THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM NATO OPERATIONS

Report Published on 10 May 2013

### PROJECT OVERVIEW



The CAC Project JALLC team (left to right: Sq. Ldr Mike Greene, Mr. Nigel Branston, LTC Vasileios Tsamis, LTC Claudio Toro.

As a result of exposure to corruption in operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO has come to understand that corruption in post-conflict states can threaten force protection and affect mission success.

In October 2012, in response to a request from Commander International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF), the JALLC was tasked to analyse Counter- and Anti-Corruption (CAC) efforts in post-conflict states and to gather lessons and best practices on CAC. The purpose of the study was to inform NATO and COMISAF of the effects of corruption on operations, and what is being done and can be done to minimize those effects.

The JALLC project team collated, reviewed and analysed CAC lessons and best practices from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), previous conflicts and stabilization missions together with many papers produced by academia, governments, International Organizations (IOs) and NGOs. The JALLC team then identified the most significant and applicable of these lessons and best practices, drew conclusions and made

recommendations, in the context of ISAF and for future NATO operations.

### MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Five main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis: First, corruption is extremely complex, and there are no obvious, easy or quick remedies to corruption encountered during Crisis Response Operations. Second, corruption can pose a serious threat to such a mission and must therefore be addressed at the earliest opportunity in the planning process; it is much harder to fight corruption once it becomes established. This requires integration of CAC issues into relevant policies and doctrine. Third, corruption has not, until recently, been considered an area of expertise or activity for military forces. Military forces do not have the training, skills or resources to counter corruption alone. Fourth, it is essential to do everything possible to ensure that NATO and NATO-led operations are neither involved, nor perceived to be involved in, or supporting, activities that could be deemed to be corrupt. Finally, military forces do have a significant role to play, but dealing with corruption requires inter-agency cooperation and coordination, under a comprehensive approach, whereby information-sharing is key.

The enduring value of this study lies in the fact that lessons from ISAF's CAC experience have now been documented and the need for them to continue to be documented to feed future planning and operations is recognized.

The JALLC's recommendations from the analysis are grouped into eight categories, each with their own conclusions and recommendations: Policy and Doctrine, Training Own Forces, Planning, a Comprehensive Approach, Structures and Command, Finance, Procurement and Contracting, Mentoring the Host Nation, and Influence Activities.



NATO has come to understand that corruption in fragile and post-conflict states can threaten force protection and affect mission success.





NATO  
OTAN



## PROJECT EXECUTION

The analysis was carried out by the JALLC team, with the support of personnel from the US Joint Staff J7 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) and the permanent representatives of JALLC and JCOA in ISAF HQ. The project team consulted widely with recognized authorities on corruption as well as with civilian and military personnel (past and current) from ISAF, NATO and members of IOs and NGOs, such as Transparency International and the World Bank.

Additionally, several hundred related NATO, National, IO, NGO and academic documents were analysed. CAC related material that was not related to the military sector was discarded, leaving some 146 lessons and best practices which were grouped into the eight categories.

## PROJECT TEAM

### LT. COLONEL VASILEIOS TSAMIS, GREEK ARMY

LTC Tsamis was commissioned as an infantry officer in the Hellenic Army in 1991. He has completed assignments with various infantry units in Greece, Cyprus and Kosovo as well as in military academies and HQs. He was posted to the JALLC in August 2011, where he has made significant contributions to a variety of projects and was the Project Manager for the "Counter- and Anti-Corruption" and "A Decade of Conflict" projects. He holds a Master in international and strategic studies and a certification in the PRINCE2 project management method.

### SQUADRON LEADER MIKE GREENE, ROYAL AIR FORCE

Sqn Ldr Greene joined the Royal Air Force in 1996 as a Flight Operations Officer. He has worked in Air Transport Tasking and as Senior Operations Officer at bases throughout the UK including London's VIP airfield. Now in his sixth year with NATO, Sqn Ldr Greene has experience in the Air Component Command and in a Joint Force HQ, from two operational deployments (Gulf Region Combined Air Operations Centre and Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan) as well as extensive experience of Influence Operations and of the Comprehensive Approach in Operational Planning. He has been a military analyst at the JALLC since the beginning of 2013.

### LT. COLONEL CLAUDIO TORO, ITALIAN AIR FORCE

LTC Toro was posted to the JALLC as a military analyst in 2012. He has served in the Italian Air Force as an Air Defence Controller since 1991. Most of his career has been spent with Radar Squadrons as a Surveillance Co-ordinator, Ground Intercept Controller, Fighter Allocator, and Weapons Manager. In 1998, he was assigned to the US Balkan CAOC in Vicenza as Mission Director for the NATO Joint Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In 2007, he was assigned to the Italian Air Force HQ in Rome, where he had served until his current assignment to the JALLC.

### MR. NIGEL BRANSTON, CIVILIAN ANALYST

Nigel Branston is a retired Royal Air Force officer, with tours in Allied HQs in Naples and Brunssum. He has been involved in operations ranging from the Falklands War (1982), through the First Gulf War (1990) and NATO's International Force and Stabilization Force in the former Yugoslavia (1995-1996), to ISAF. Mr. Branston also served as Director of Staff of JFC Brunssum's Deployable Joint Task Force HQ within the NRF and joined the JALLC in 2007 as an analyst.

### NATO LLDB ITEMS

- 1562 - Planning to Deal with Corruption*
- 1563 - Dealing with Corruption within a Comprehensive Approach*
- 1564 - Counter- and Anti-Corruption Expertise / Training*
- 1144 - Contracting Support and Services in a COIN Operation*



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All JALLC Reports, the LL Portal, and NATO LLDB Items may be found in their entirety under the *Products* section on the NS WAN:

<http://www.jallc.nato.int>

Non-classified reports and LLDB Items, Project FactSheets, the Joint Analysis Handbook and Lessons Learned Handbook can be found on JALLC's Internet site at the same [address](http://www.jallc.nato.int).

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PROJECT FACTSHEET