

ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

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PROJECT OVERVIEW

The Strategic Commands identified a need to increase efficiency and streamline Intelligence efforts. Arising from this a JALLC task was developed to examine NATO Intelligence Structures, working groups, bodies and functions. Agreement was then reached to amend the project to cover Intelligence structures and processes within Allied Command Operations (ACO), with a view to providing input to a report by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to the Director General, IMS.


The requirement was to analyse the roles and responsibilities of ACO Intel structures, within SHAPE and the JFC Knowledge Centres, their basic processes, workflows and how they interact, and the role of the intelligence Fusion Centre, with the aim of optimizing the Intelligence processes to support operations:

- Identify the desired Intel contribution to operations and to the planning process as described in SHAPE's trial [and later the interim] Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive under the 2010 Peacetime Establishment (PE) structure.
- Within the new JFC structure and processes, identify Intel roles, functions, duplications, and missing capabilities.
- Analyze the role of IFC with the aim to optimize its contribution to operations in the light of the 2010 PE ACO Intel Structure.



Imagery analysis plays an important role in intelligence gathering and knowledge development process.

MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS



Representational view of the contributions of Intel and KD to a commander's holistic understanding. Blue is what KD sees Intel as contributing, red is Intel's own view of its contribution. Red also corresponds to the current contribution of the JFCs' KD structure. Green is the theoretical contribution hoped for by the KD Concept: the "Intel Plus".

Two key findings were developed from the report. The first is that Knowledge Development (KD) and Intel are inseparable. The COPD and other current documents do not delineate a relationship between Intel and KD or what Intel is to contribute to planning. However, the Knowledge Development Concept recognizes Intel as a crucial contributor to KD with the addition of a broader scope for analysis focus, methods, and sources. KD transforms Intel into "Intel Plus." Thus far, KD has only been implemented at the JFC level and its full capability is still being developed. Even so, the report finds that the overall situational understanding at the JFCs comes from both traditional Intel and rest-of-KD sources. The JFC KD structures—regardless of the title of the section, branch, or individuals working on information and intelligence—provide a consolidated and seamless contribution to the commander's understanding. The key difference between a traditional Intel structure and a Knowledge Management Directorate, and the greatest potential value of KD, is one of Mindset. KD recognizes a need for a broader analysis focus and greater sharing and collaboration.

The second key finding is that the introduction of KD within NATO was flawed by a lack of change management and inadequate direction and guidance, which has directly hindered the expected benefits of KD—the Plus in Intel Plus—from materializing. There is a need for formal MC endorsement of the KD concept, updates to policy and doctrine

PROJECT FACT SHEET





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MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONT'D)

relating to Intel and KD, the creation of full KD structures and related mechanisms and procedures, and the introduction of related training. Until these actions are achieved, NATO will struggle to achieve the full benefits that KD was meant to bring.

PROJECT EXECUTION

Research was conducted from April 2010 to April 2011, at NATO HQ, SHAPE, JFC Brunssum, JFC Lisbon, JFC Naples, the IFC, FC Madrid and the JALLC. The JALLC analysis team undertook passive research by examining relevant policy and concept documents covering Intel, KD and Information Management; the Bi-SC KD Pre-Doctrinal Handbook—Final Draft; the 2010 PE Review; the DJSE Concept; and the IFC. The Analysis Report on Multi-National Experiment 4 and the KD Enabler 09 Final Experiment Report were consulted, along with commercial publications covering change management, KD, and related issues. Active research was effected by interviews with personnel working in Intel, KD and operations posts at NATO HQ (IMS), SHAPE, the IFC, JFCs Brunssum, Lisbon, and Naples, and Force Command Madrid. The analysis was founded on the results of the active and passive research.

COLONEL JOSE PEDRO FERNANDES, PORTUGUESE ARMY

COL Fernandes served at JALLC as an INTEL Analyst from 2009 to 2010. COL Fernandes is an Infantry Officer with more than 30 years of service with assignments at the Infantry School, as Battalion Commander in a Portuguese Mechanized Brigade, and as teacher at the Portuguese Staff College. As a junior officer he attended the Basic and Advanced Methods of Instruction Courses in the UK and the Infantry Officer Advance Course in Ft Benning, USA. He served in Bosnia in the NATO SFOR mission, as the MNBG DCOS OPS and his last assignment before JALLC, was in the NATO Land Command Madrid HQ as the G2 Current OPS Section Chief.

LT. COLONEL ZSOLT HORNYAK, HUNGARIAN ARMY

LCOL Hornyak has been a JALLC analyst since July 2010. Trained as an Signals Intelligence Officer, his postings include Hungarian Defence Forces Staff, JFC Brunssum, and the UN Mission to Angola.

MAJOR PAULO DIAS, PORTUGUESE ARMY

Maj Paulo Rodrigues Dias has been a Staff Officer at the JALLC since April 2009, with particular responsibilities for C-IED and NATO Urban Operations issues. He has been a Platoon and Company Commander in the Portuguese Army, as a major he led the "Captains' Course, and has served in East Timor, S.Tome & Principe, and Cape Verde. In 2011 he deployed to ISAF as the JALLC Permanent Representative at HQ ISAF.

MR. NIGEL BRANSTON, CIVILIAN

Nigel Branston is a retired Royal Air Force officer, with tours in NATO's HQs in Naples and Brunssum. He has been involved in operations ranging from the Falklands War (1982), NATO's International Force (IFOR) in the Former Yugoslavia (1995-6), to ISAF, to Director of Staff of JFC Brunssum's Deployable Joint Task Force HQ within the NRF. Nigel joined the JALLC in 2007 as an Analyst. He has worked on projects including Managing Partnerships; Outreach; Intelligence; Dismounted Soldier Systems; Reconstruction and Stabilization; and more.

NATO LLDB ITEMS

ITEM #1136—CHANGE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME IN NATO

ITEM # 1137—KD AND INTEL ARE INSEPARABLE

ITEM # 1138—COPD UPDATES SHOULD INCORPORATE KD PRINCIPLES

ITEM # 1139—BENEFITS OF KD WILL ONLY BE SEEN WHEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED



JALLC

JOINT ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED CENTRE
AVENIDA TENENTE MARTINS – MONSANTO
1500-589 LISBON
PORTUGAL

PHONE: +351 21 771 7007/8/9
FAX: +351 21 771 7098

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