Final evaluation
Netherlands contribution to ISAF, 2006 – 2010

23 September 2011
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First of all, the government would like to express its respect for those who did not return from the Netherlands’ deployment for ISAF. The deployment for ISAF has cost the lives of 25 Dutch military personnel.

- On 26 July 2006, Sergeant Bart van Boxtel and Lieutenant Colonel Jan van Twist were killed when the transport helicopter that carried them crashes in eastern Afghanistan.
- On 31 August 2006, Captain Michael Donkervoort was killed in an air accident with his F-16 northeast of Uruzgan.
- On 11 October 2006, a serviceman in the rank of sergeant took his own life at Kamp Holland in Tarin Kowt.
- On 6 April 2007, Sergeant Class 1 Robert Donkers was killed in an accident involving an armoured vehicle during a patrol north of Tarin Kowt.
- On 20 April 2007, Corporal Cor Strik was killed by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) during a foot patrol in the province of Helmand.
- On 15 June 2007, Private Class 1 Timo Smeehuijzen was killed in a suicide attack during a patrol in Tarin Kowt.
- On 18 June 2007, Sergeant Major Jos Leunissen was killed in a mortar accident during fighting around Chora.
- On 12 July 2007, First Lieutenant Tom Krist died in the Central Military Hospital in Utrecht from injuries sustained two days before in a suicide attack during a patrol in Deh Rawod.
- On 26 August 2007, Sergeant Class 1 Martijn Rosier was killed by an IED during a patrol north of Deh Rawod.
- On 20 September 2007, Private Class 1 Tim Hoogland was killed during a firefight north of Deh Rawod.
- On 3 November 2007, Corporal Ronald Groen was killed when his reconnaissance vehicle hit an IED.
- On 12 January 2008, Private Class 1 Wesley Schol and Corporal Aldert Poortema were killed by friendly fire during an operation in Deh Rawod.
- On 18 April 2008, Private Class 1 Mark Schouwink and First Lieutenant Dennis van Uhm were killed when their vehicle hit an IED north of Tarin Kowt.
- On 7 September 2008, Private Class 1 Jos ten Brinke was killed in an IED attack north of Tarin Kowt.
• On 19 December 2008, Sergeant Mark Weijdt was killed by an IED near Chora.

• On 6 April 2009, Private Class 1 Azdin Chadli was killed in a missile attack on Kamp Holland.

• On 6 September 2009, Corporal Kevin van de Rijdt was killed in a firefight near Deh Rawod.

• On 7 September 2009, Sergeant Major Mark Leijsen was killed by an IED near the forward post ‘Tabar’.

• On 17 April 2010, Corporal (Marine Corps) Jeroen Houweling and Marine Class 1 Marc Harders were killed by an IED near Deh Rashan.

• On 22 May 2010, Corporal Class 1 Luc Janzen was killed by an IED in the area of Deh Rawod.

• In the night of 16-17 November 2010, Lieutenant Colonel Fons Dur died in his sleep in Tarin Kowt.

The government would like once again to express its sympathy with the families and friends of these servicemen.

In addition to the servicemen who lost their lives, a total of almost 150 Dutch military personnel suffered mild to very serious injuries during combat action or attacks in the past years, some of which resulted in permanent physical disability. Over 50 Dutch military personnel suffered injuries of such a nature that repatriation to the Netherlands was required. The deployment to Afghanistan in many cases also constituted a psychological burden, for the homefront as well. The government of the Netherlands owes a debt of gratitude to all military and civilian personnel who performed this important work under very difficult circumstances, especially to those who sustained psychological or physical injuries in the performance of their duties, and to their homefront. These men and women, military and civilian, deserve our permanent attention and care.

The government extends its condolences to the relatives of all casualties suffered by the coalition partners in Uruzgan and by the Afghan army and the Afghan police. The government expresses its sympathy with all Afghan civilian victims of combat actions.
1 Introduction

The government would, first of all, like to express its gratitude and appreciation to all the people who in the past years have made a contribution, under very difficult and dangerous circumstances, to improving the situation in Afghanistan and, particularly, in the province of Uruzgan. The professionalism, commitment and involvement of military personnel, diplomats, development workers and others have proved to be invaluable in the past years.

Since late 2001, the international community has made great efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan. Strengthening the Afghan authorities will help them become capable of ensuring security, stability and reconstruction independently in the long term. The UN-mandated ISAF mission constitutes the military component of the large-scale international efforts in Afghanistan. The Netherlands’ mission in the province of Uruzgan from 2006 to 2010 and the results achieved must be viewed in the context of this broad international effort. In assessing these results, the Netherlands government takes a modest and down-to-earth approach.

**Aim and evaluation process**

As stipulated by the 2009 Review Protocol for Decision-making for the Deployment of Military Units Abroad (hereafter: Review Protocol), the conclusion of Dutch deployment in a military operation must be followed by a final evaluation, to be developed under the responsibility of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and covering both military and political aspects. The aim of this evaluation is to assess, on the basis of the focal points in the Review Protocol, whether and to what extent the objectives of the Dutch participation in ISAF, as formulated in the two so-called Article 100 letters, have been achieved. It follows from this aim that the evaluation was conducted from the perspective of the Dutch deployment. Another goal is to draw lessons from the Dutch deployment.

The Dutch activities during the ISAF mission were characterised by the use of military, diplomatic and development resources. The aim of this policy was to create cohesion between the result areas of security, good governance and socio-economic development. This approach became known as the 3D (Defence, Diplomacy & Development) approach. The final evaluation covers the period in which the Netherlands bore ISAF lead-nation responsibility for Uruzgan, from 1 August 2006 to 1 August 2010, and it also covers the military elements of the Deployment Task Force (DTF) in 2006 and the Redeployment Task Force (RDTF) in 2010 and 2011.

The evaluation focuses on both the civilian and military contributions to ISAF, including the Netherlands’ diplomatic efforts in support of the mission. The financial section of this evaluation comprises the funding from the Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS) pertaining to the contribution to ISAF and the funding from the regular Defence budget, including the so-called Van Geel and Bos funds. Rather than making a statement on the decision-making underpinning the participation in ISAF, this evaluation takes the arguments for participation as worded in the Article 100 letters as its starting point.

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1 Parliamentary Document 31 200, no. 16.
For the Ministry of Defence, this evaluation also functions as a policy assessment. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has scheduled a policy assessment of the operational objective of ‘promoting regional stability’, with a special focus on conflict prevention and peace-building, for 2012. This final evaluation of ISAF will be used as input for this broader assessment of the activities of Foreign Affairs.

A qualitative research methodology was used for this evaluation. Data collection was done by means of archive and literature study. Like any other methodology, this research method has its limitations. Prior to the mission, it proved difficult to establish concrete indicators which could be used to measure the results of the mission. Partly as a result of this, monitoring the progress of the mission in an unambiguous manner remained a challenge throughout the entire period. This issue is also a point of concern at the international level. Afghan reports on the situation in Uruzgan are often not available or less reliable due to a lack of concrete facts, and reports from international organisations rarely deal specifically with the situation in Uruzgan. Dutch reports about the situation generally limit themselves to those parts of Uruzgan where there was a (permanent) Dutch presence.

However, the reports, analyses and additional studies that were used combined to build a realistic picture of the progress and results of the Dutch contribution. Therefore, conclusions can be drawn and lessons can be identified with enough certainty.

This evaluation has drawn its information from public as well as non-public sources, such as ISAF reports, reports from commanders of Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) and reports from the Netherlands Embassy in Kabul.

Given the special nature of the mission in Afghanistan, it was decided to, in addition to the usual evaluation procedures stipulated by the Review Protocol, have the evaluation monitored and assessed by a commission of independent experts. Doing so also meets one of the conditions for designating this evaluation as a Defence policy assessment. At the start of the evaluation process, the commission reviewed the plan of action and assessed the result. The commission then monitored the evaluation process by testing it against the plan of action and by critically reviewing the draft versions in the light of their evaluation aspects, thoroughness and objectiveness. The commission evaluated various draft versions. The final conclusion of the commission will be presented together with the evaluation itself.

The commission of independent experts was composed as follows:

   Prof. A. de Ruijter (chairman)
   Jhr. P.C. Feith
   Mr J. Gruiters MSM
   Lieutenant General (ret’d) M.L.M. Urlings
The structure of the final evaluation reflects the research questions and sub-questions stated below, preceded by an introduction and a summary of the background against which the participation in ISAF took place. The final evaluation ends with a number of conclusions and lessons.

The government considers it very important that the participation be reviewed thoroughly. What results were achieved by all our efforts and what can be learned from our participation? To answer these questions, the following research questions were formulated.

The main research questions of the final evaluation are:

- To what extent have the objectives of the Netherlands’ contribution to ISAF during the period 2006-2010 been achieved, given the parameters and assumptions?

- What lessons can be drawn from the Netherlands' participation in ISAF?

The sub-questions are:

- What was the policy underpinning the Netherlands’ participation in ISAF in the spheres of security, good governance and socio-economic development?

- How was the Netherlands’ policy in the spheres of security, good governance and socio-economic development implemented in practice?

- What has been achieved with respect to the objectives in the spheres of security, good governance and socio-economic development?
2.1 Afghanistan after 11 September 2001
On 11 September 2001, the terror network Al-Qaeda carried out attacks in the United States. The government of the United States then demanded the extradition of Al-Qaeda's leader Osama Bin Laden, who was thought to be operating from an area in Afghanistan which was under the control of the Taliban. Since 1996, the Taliban had controlled large sections of Afghanistan and established a strict regime based on religious laws. When the Taliban refused to extradite Bin Laden, the United States, together with a number of allies and assisted by the Northern Alliance (a coalition of Taliban opponents) invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 and ousted the Taliban. This operation was named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The US justified this operation by calling upon the right of self-defence as laid down in Article 51, Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

The occupation by the Soviet Union, a civil war and the Taliban regime had left deep scars in Afghanistan. In 2001, Afghanistan was one of the poorest countries in the world, with extremely high child and maternal mortality rates. Access to education and health care was almost non-existent. The position of women and girls in Afghanistan was poor and millions of Afghans had fled to neighbouring countries.

The lack of administrative capacity in Afghanistan made it difficult for the Afghan government to address these problems. Ministries were largely or completely ineffectual. In 2001, Afghanistan was still led by a fragmented array of militia groups that had largely developed along tribal lines. There were hardly any Afghan soldiers or policemen under the central authority. Large-scale reconstruction with prolonged support from the international community was therefore necessary. Part of the reconstruction effort was filling the power vacuum that had emerged in Afghanistan. After the fall of the Taliban, the international community gathered in Bonn, Germany, in November 2001 to make agreements with Afghan leaders about the future. It was agreed to deploy an international peace force to Kabul. Furthermore, the United Nations (UN) were given responsibility for coordinating the reconstruction effort. To this end, the UN Security Council (UNSC) established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The international donor community made financial aid available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, totalling approximately USD 4.5 billion for a period of five years.

In addition to the decisions about the international presence in Afghanistan, the Bonn conference also resulted in agreements about the country’s internal political situation. During the conference, the Afghan interim government was established with Hamid Karzai as its head. He continued to head the transitional government in the years that followed. In the first democratic elections of 2004, he was elected President, and he was re-elected in 2009. In 2004, Afghanistan adopted its own Constitution and voted in an elected parliament.

In the following years, the international community's focus of attention did not shift away from the country. International conferences were held almost every year to discuss the developments in Afghanistan: in Berlin in 2004, in

In 2006, during the first London conference on Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Compact was adopted. This document served as the comprehensive framework, including objectives and timelines, for cooperation between Afghanistan and the international community.

From 2009 onwards, more and more emphasis was being placed during the international conferences on transferring responsibilities from the international community to the Afghans. During the NATO summit in Lisbon of November 2010, this culminated in agreements between NATO and the Afghan government about the transition process, which stated, among other things, that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) would bear independent responsibility for the country’s security by late 2014.

2.2 ISAF
Following the decision in Bonn, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was launched in December 2001. The ISAF mission is defined as follows:

“ISAF, in support of GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan], conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and the will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population”.

UNSC Resolution 1386, which was unanimously adopted in December 2001, mandated ISAF under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This resolution stated that the situation in Afghanistan constituted a threat to international peace and stability. International efforts were aimed at combating terrorism and were to contribute to the development of Afghanistan as a country where the population would be safeguarded from oppression and terror. Individual countries would hold command of the ISAF operation on a rotational basis. NATO assumed command of the operation in August 2003. Resolution 1386 empowered ISAF to make a contribution to the security of Kabul and its environs, thus enabling it to assist the Afghan interim government in maintaining public order.

The Bonn agreement of 2001 made further expansion of the ISAF mission to the rest of Afghanistan possible. The UNSC, at the request of the Afghan government, decided to make use of this possibility through the adoption of Resolution 1510 in October 2003. On the basis of that resolution, NATO adapted its operation plan for ISAF. The plan provided for the step-by-step deployment throughout Afghanistan in four stages. In stage I, ISAF was to expand to the north, in stage II to the west, in stage III to the south and, finally, in stage IV to the east. According to the revised operation plan, stage III would be launched from the first half of 2006, expanding the mission to include the six southern provinces of Afghanistan.

In the following years, ISAF was assigned more tasks as well as more troops. The initial strength of ISAF in 2002 amounted to approximately 4,800 military personnel. This strength had increased to over 119,000 troops by 1 August 2010. This increase was partly due to the expansion of ISAF’s area of responsibility from Kabul and its immediate surroundings to the whole of Afghanistan. It was also due to the fact that the fight against

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2 See also paragraph 3.3
3 ISAF Mission Statement; http://www.isaf.nato.int
insurgents in, particularly, the east and south of Afghanistan had intensified.

ISAF policy was based on the principles of counterinsurgency (COIN), in which the goal is to eliminate the influence of insurgents. Opposing insurgents is not only a military task, but is also done through political efforts and the use of development resources. It is essential, however, that all elements act in a coordinated fashion following the same agenda. The COIN doctrine does not distinguish between “fighting” missions and “reconstruction” missions; both elements complement each other.

The COIN doctrine can be applied in practice as an ink blot strategy. The ink blot strategy is aimed at creating zones of – relative – security in order to enhance the security and freedom of movement of the population and to accommodate the roll-out of reconstruction activities. Under ISAF, these zones were known as Afghan Development Zones (ADZs). The Netherlands also applied this approach, as is described in Chapters 3 and 4. The operational approach had four distinctive phases: Shape, Clear, Hold and Build. The first phase (Shape) involved mapping out an area, weakening the insurgents present in that area, and preparing the population for the arrival of ISAF and the Afghan government. Next, the area was cleared of insurgents through military actions (Clear). After the area was secured, a permanent presence of ISAF or Afghan security troops had to be ensured to prevent the insurgents from returning and to protect the population against any actions or reprisals by the insurgents (Hold). Subsequently, the reconstruction work could begin (Build). In one province, all four phases could occur simultaneously in different geographical areas.

NATO’s revised operation plan was based on the lead-nation concept. For each province, one of the ISAF nations would take up the leading role. Within the provinces, a special role was given to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Although a generic concept for PRTs existed within NATO, the various lead nations interpreted them in their own ways, basing them partly on the specific situation in the province. This led to significant differences between provinces.

The ISAF strategy from 2002 was subject to a number of developments that can partly be traced to the persons in command of ISAF in that period. Whereas the focus in the initial years was on the military defeat of the insurgents, a shift towards protecting the population occurred in 2008 under General McKiernan, and even more so from June 2009 under General McChrystal. In his Initial Assessment⁴, General McChrystal defines his strategy as “focus on the people”. After General McChrystal’s succession by General Petraeus in July 2010, this strategy was continued, but as a result of the so-called surge of American troops and the focus on transition, in combination with the strong build-up of the Afghan security forces, fighting with the insurgents has again intensified.

2.3 Operation Enduring Freedom

After the fall of the Taliban, the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) continued to be active in Afghanistan. The most important goal of this operation was to combat international terror networks. Another part of OEF was aimed at building up the Afghan army. The latter activity was brought under the responsibility of ISAF in 2009 and incorporated into the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A).

⁴ http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf
The ISAF leadership included a US subordinate commander who, along with his function in ISAF, was in command of the deployment of OEF units. After NATO had taken over command of ISAF and its area of operations was expanding across Afghanistan, it became essential to coordinate and deconflict OEF’s and ISAF’s activities. Particularly the security of the participating units was important. The OEF units did not fall under the command of NATO, but nonetheless operated within ISAF’s area of responsibility. From 2001, the Netherlands made several contributions to OEF in Afghanistan, for different periods of time and with various compositions, participating with special units, transport helicopters, F-16 fighter aircraft, a tanker aircraft, a transport aircraft, a maritime patrol aircraft, and liaison officers at various locations.\(^5\)

2.4 Netherlands and ISAF

The Netherlands has been involved in ISAF from the start. Initially, this involvement consisted of an infantry company and support, a Commando Corps platoon, contributions to international staffs, the deployment of an F-16 unit and financial contributions. In 2003, the staff of the German-Netherlands Corps formed the core of the ISAF headquarters in Kabul. In 2004 and 2005, the Netherlands supplied an Apache detachment. From 2004 through 2006, the Netherlands supplied a PRT in the province of Baghlan in the north of Afghanistan. In 2005, the Netherlands provided an Election Support Force for the elections that were held in September of that year, and from the same year it supplied an F-16 detachment, supported by a KDC-10 tanker and transport aircraft. From 2006, as ISAF deployed to southern Afghanistan, the Netherlands took up command of ISAF operations in the province of Uruzgan. Uruzgan came under the area of responsibility of ISAF’s Regional Command South (RC-S), along with the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Daykundi and Zabul. The other lead nations in the south were Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. Prior to and during the mission, consultations with these partners about what approach should be taken in RC-S were held at administrative and ministerial levels.

\(^{5}\) Parliamentary Document 27925 No 28 of 6 December 2001, and following.
In December 2005, the Netherlands government decided in favour of making a substantial contribution to ISAF. The government informed the House of Representatives of this decision pursuant to Article 100 of the Constitution in its letter to Parliament of 22 December 2005. The government decided in late 2007 that the Netherlands’ responsibility in assisting the Afghan authorities in Uruzgan would be extended by a period of two years, until 1 August 2010. The House of Representatives was informed of this decision in the Article 100 letter of 30 November 2007. These letters define the grounds for the Netherlands’ deployment in Uruzgan.

As stated in the letter of 30 November 2007, the Netherlands was to end its leading military responsibility in Uruzgan as per 1 August 2010. The debate about possible deployment after 1 August 2010 led to the fall of the government in February 2010. The withdrawal of the Dutch military personnel and the transfer of responsibilities in Uruzgan began on 1 August 2010.

3.1 The Netherlands’ policy

The Article 100 letter of 2005 contained the following passage:

“In accordance with the ISAF mandate, the Netherlands detachment will focus on promoting stability and security by increasing support for the Afghan authorities among the local population and by weakening support for the Taliban and related groups.

Promoting good governance, an efficient police and army and the rule of law, performing CIMIC and reconstruction activities, and promoting reconstruction activities by others are important elements of this approach.

In view of the security situation, it is necessary to ensure that the PRT and its personnel are well protected. In certain areas it may also be necessary to conduct offensive actions in order to enable the PRT and the Afghan government to be active in those areas.”

It was agreed with Australia that the Netherlands would be lead nation in Uruzgan and that the two countries would form a combined task force under Dutch leadership.

The Netherlands’ policy was founded on the 3D approach, although it was not explicitly designated as such in the Article 100 letter of 2005. The 3D approach is sometimes also referred to as the comprehensive or whole-of-government approach. For the comprehensive approach to work, it was crucial that the political, military and development goals were reconcilable and complementary.

In the 3D approach, military, diplomatic and development efforts are connected as much as possible and integrated where possible and desirable to achieve the final goal. The underlying thought is that security, good governance and development are inextricably linked. The complex problems in Afghanistan could not be addressed by one single ministry. Efforts in the three main areas (the three Ds) therefore had to be tuned in to one another and had to strengthen one another where possible. The Article 100 letter of 2005 stated that activities in the areas of all three Ds would be undertaken,
which was in line with the lessons learned during the posting of a PRT to Baghlan in 2004 - 2006.\(^6\)

The 3D approach of the Dutch did not come about in isolation. It shows similarities with NATO’s Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine.\(^7\) Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a type of deployment in conflicts where the aim is to diminish the influence of insurgents and to protect the civilian population. Fighting insurgents is not the exclusive domain of military units, but also involves political efforts and the use of development resources; it is therefore a 3D operation by definition. It is essential, however, that all elements act in a coordinated fashion following the same agenda.

Critical success factors in COIN are:\(^8\)

- The primacy of a political rather than a military solution to the conflict.
- Separation of the insurgents from the population so that the insurgents are isolated from their logistic base.
- Providing protection to the civilian population.
- Use of a minimum of force.
- Civil-military cooperation involving civil governance, police and military personnel.
- Availability of adequate and timely intelligence.
- Strategic patience, i.e. accepting that lasting results will only become visible after an extended period of time. This requires a long-term investment in resources and presence.

Along with security, building good governance and structural socio-economic development played an equally important role in the Netherlands’ policy, which was not always the case in the ISAF interpretation of the COIN doctrine.

The government stated the following in the Article 100 letter of 2005:

“\textit{In the south and the north of Afghanistan, it will take many more years before the Afghan government will be independently capable of ensuring security and stability. It is therefore not realistic to expect that after two years, security, stability and positive economic development will be able to prevail in Uruzgan without outside assistance.}”

“\textit{It is possible, however, for the Netherlands to make a substantial contribution to creating a situation in Uruzgan in which the Afghan authorities will have expanded their influence and authority in the province and are increasingly capable of ensuring security and stability independently. The Netherlands will do this by contributing to improving the security situation and improving governance.}

\textit{Improving the effectiveness of the Afghan security organisations, i.e. the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the police, forms part of this.}

\textit{As the security situation improves and stability increases, the economy will also have the opportunity to develop. In addition, the Netherlands can actively provide an impulse to reconstruction and to improving the living conditions of the population. Immediately following the deployment, CIMIC activities will be initiated, aimed at strengthening popular support for the}

\(^{6}\) Parliamentary Document, 29 521, No. 40  
\(^{7}\) ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) – AJP-3.4.4  
\(^{8}\) Dr T.W. Brocades-Zaalberg: “‘Hearts & Minds’ or ‘Search & Destroy’”, Militaire Spectator 7/8-2007
Netherlands’ presence. Furthermore, work on reconstruction projects will begin as soon as possible following the deployment.”

“The government emphasises, however, that striking results will require some time to be achieved and will not be visible right from the start. The government expects, however, that there will be visible results towards the end of the intended deployment period of two years.”

“In the longer term, the Afghan government in Uruzgan, as in the rest of Afghanistan, will be better capable of providing the basic needs of the population, offering the prospect of a better future and preventing the country from again becoming a safe haven for international terrorist networks.”

The policy framework of the Netherlands’ efforts in the areas of good governance and socio-economic development in Uruzgan, as described in the Article 100 letter of 2005, was set out more concretely in the Afghanistan Compact and the civil assessment (see box below).

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**Civil assessment of the province of Uruzgan**

To gain a better understanding of the social and civil situation in the province, in the summer of 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in collaboration with the Netherlands Embassy in Kabul, the Defence Intelligence and Security Service (DISS) and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade/AUSAID, developed a so-called civil assessment, on the basis of extensive consultations and with the help of the Afghan organisation The Liaison Office (TLO). This assessment was partly based on the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS), the Afghanistan Compact and the national sectoral programmes. The I-ANDS functioned as a provisional Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and contained, among other things, objectives to be achieved at the provincial level. The I-ANDS formulated an overall strategy that was founded on three pillars, namely: (1) security, (2) good governance, rule of law and human rights and (3) socio-economic development.

The assessment attempted to identify and analyse the various dynamics in society and governance and how they affect the region and the population. The assessment revealed that Uruzgan was one of the poorest and most conservative provinces of Afghanistan. It was also established that formal government structures in the province were non-existent or weak. Government organisations were able to perform their tasks in a very limited part of the province only. The governance that did exist suffered from a lack of legitimacy, so that the population traditionally harboured a distrust of government institutions and had low expectations of them. The civil service apparatus was very weak in manpower in Uruzgan. In addition, most officials were illiterate and did not possess sufficient knowledge to perform their tasks adequately. Informal power structures exerted a great deal of influence in the province.

Ethnic, tribal, economic, criminal and power-political factors were very important at the local level, so that there was no effective local government in place. There were many conflicts in Uruzgan that were defined along tribal lines. The Popolzai tribe was over-represented in government positions. Other tribes hardly had any share in power and influence. The provincial governor at the time, Jan Mohammad Khan, favoured his own Popolzai tribe and frequently used force in his dealings with other tribal groups. The Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army
(ANA) were understaffed and underequipped. Many policemen and military personnel had ties with informal local leaders and they were loyal to the central authority to a limited extent only.

In terms of human development, Uruzgan occupied the 30th position among the 32 provinces of Afghanistan. The poor security situation, insufficient local capacity and poor infrastructure had caused the province to become isolated and hindered reconstruction and development. The possibilities for economic growth of the province were very limited. Uruzgan remained practically untouched by national Afghan development programmes. At the start of the mission, there were only five local NGOs (ADA, AHDS, ANCC, ARCS and CADG) operating in the province. The presence of government services such as education and health care was minimal. In 2006, there were only two qualified doctors active in all of Uruzgan. Women and girls had virtually no access to schools and hospitals. Child and maternal mortality rates were extremely high, as was the illiteracy rate. Approximately 20% of the children between 7 and 13 years old went to school, 97% of whom were boys. There was a great shortage of female teachers. No official primary and secondary schools existed in the province. The population was largely dependent on small-scale agriculture. Productivity of local agriculture had dropped sharply in the preceding years as a result of the long period of conflict and drought.

In order to enable the Afghan authorities to provide more stability and security to the population, the Netherlands directed part of its efforts at increasing the effectiveness of governance in Uruzgan. It was expressly decided to operate via Afghan government structures and to make investments in acquiring knowledge and understanding of the local circumstances.

The Article 100 letter of 2007 contained the following passage:
“A number of important new emphases will be placed in the new mission:
• more resources will be devoted to supporting and promoting the reconstruction effort by the Afghan government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In addition, the support for and coaching of the development of adequate governance will be intensified;
• the training and coaching of Afghan security organisations will be intensified, in order to help the Afghan army and the Afghan police establish effective control over the main inhabited areas and connecting roads.”

3.2 Combat mission or reconstruction mission?
Particularly during the initial stage of the mission, there was a great deal of debate in the Netherlands about the question whether the Netherlands’ contribution constituted a “combat mission” or a “reconstruction mission”. The Article 100 letters did not refer to the mission in either of these terms. The letters did make clear, however, that the mission would not focus solely on promoting security and stability but also on creating the conditions for administrative and economic development. As the mission progressed, it became increasingly clear that combat duties had to be performed with frequency in order to further improve security in the province and provide better protection to Afghan citizens. At the same time, it was strongly believed that reconstruction activities and diplomacy were also necessary for the sustainability of any contribution to improving stability and security.

The Article 100 letter of 2007 contains the following statement:
“The objectives of this stabilisation and support mission, which is aimed at the transfer of tasks, are a combination of security and development. After all, development cannot be rooted in an insecure environment, and security increases if the population has prospects for development and is governed with integrity. This approach continues to be ruled by the maxim: ‘reconstruction where possible and military action where necessary’."

The investments in tribal dialogue and cooperation in the area of good governance were also to a great extent intended to enhance stability and security of the province. The numerous investments in socio-economic development were aimed at convincing the population that the Afghan central government, assisted by the international community, acted in the people’s interest and that it was developing as a reliable, competent and service-providing government. Eventually, the role of insurgents should become irrelevant to Afghan citizens, which in turn would improve security further. The mission was based on the assumption that there could be no reconstruction without better security, and that sustainable improvement of the security situation depended on the progress made in the area of reconstruction.
3.3 **Afghanistan Compact**

On 31 January 2006, the Afghanistan Compact was adopted in London. This agreement established a mechanism for coordinating the Afghan and international assistance efforts for a five-year period. The Afghanistan Compact supports the Interim Afghan National Development Strategy of the Afghan government (I-ANDS), which sets out the vision and the investment priorities of the Afghan government. The I-ANDS is a reflection of the national consultation process, which forms the basis for the benchmark points in the Afghanistan Compact and the target figures of the Millennium Goals for Development in Afghanistan. This I-ANDS functioned as a temporary Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and contained, among other things, goals at the provincial level.

The main objectives of the Compact were: improving the security situation, improving governance, and promoting social and economic development, in a comprehensive way and in collaboration with the Afghan government. The compact contained, among other things, benchmark points for good governance and reconstruction, including capacity-building in government services and civil society, the fight against corruption, and regional cooperation. A summary of the Afghanistan Compact is included in Annex A. The objectives were defined in broad terms for the whole of Afghanistan and could therefore not be made to apply literally as specific objectives for the province of Uruzgan.

3.4 **Security**

This paragraph deals with a number of military aspects of the 2009 Review Protocol, after which the practical aspects of the ink blot strategy are discussed.

3.4.1 **Security assessments and risks**

At the end of 2005, the Afghan authorities had little to no influence in large parts of Uruzgan, while the insurgents had extensive freedom of action. The insurgents in Uruzgan were characterised by their great diversity. They not only consisted of Taliban, but also included ethnic groups with their own sets of interests and criminal networks who protected their interests by force. The Taliban itself comprised several different groups. The hard core of Taliban fighters came mainly from outside the province and even from abroad; helpers and sympathisers were often paid for taking up arms against the Afghan government and ISAF or did so for opportunistic reasons. In addition, local conflicts about matters such as land and water were a source of violence. As a result, there was a multitude of armed groups operating in the region. They had in common their refusal to accept the presence of ISAF and their armed resistance against the Afghan government and ISAF. This multitude of opponents are collectively referred to as ‘insurgents’ in this evaluation.

As the mission progressed, it was observed that the insurgents attached growing importance to creating support among the population. They tried to actively muster this support by offering the population their own, traditional type of justice and a form of shadow governance. The insurgents kept a close watch on corruption within the local government in Uruzgan and used it as their principal instrument for retaining or increasing their support among the population. Furthermore, they made an increased effort to limit the number of civilian casualties in their operations locally.
In December 2005, the Netherlands government decided to participate in ISAF in Uruzgan province. The first Dutch troops arrived in the province in the summer of 2006. The security situation had deteriorated in the meantime. This was caused by a combination of actions by the insurgents, abuse of power by regional and local governments, tensions between tribes and clans, and various criminal activities. The insurgents carried out attacks on patrols, logistic supply lines and bases of the coalition forces and the Afghan security organisations. It was also acknowledged that the local population had been exposed to propaganda by the insurgents. There was also a great deal of intimidation taking place. It was clear that the insurgents were able to move freely in parts of Uruzgan, where they enjoyed much support among the local population. Initially, the coalition forces and the Afghan government exerted only little influence in those areas. Therefore, the insurgents were able to use these areas as operating bases for their attacks and actions. Incidentally, the main point of activities of the insurgents in southern Afghanistan was in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar.

From the beginning of the Dutch participation in ISAF, the government recognised that there would be a real risk to Dutch personnel and that casualties among Dutch personnel were possible. It was assessed that the insurgents would attack patrols, bases and logistic supply lines (by air and by road). In addition, it was clear that not only the insurgents, but also drug-related crime, corruption and tensions between ethnic groups and local conflicts were potential risk factors. Furthermore, there were certain risks for the deployed personnel in relation to the timeliness of the medical evacuation chain and with regard to infectious diseases.

3.4.2 The ink blot approach
The Netherlands’ security policy in Uruzgan was based on the ink blot strategy which was also part of NATO strategy. As part of this, the Afghan Development Zones (ADZs), or ink blots, were created. These zones concentrated on the large population centres in Uruzgan (Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawod, Chora) and were to be gradually extended over time. Based on a military assessment and taking into account the financial and political parameters, the deployment of 1,200 Dutch military personnel to Uruzgan was initially foreseen.

Whereas the Article 100 letter of 2005 referred to the contribution to improving the security situation in general terms, the Article 100 letter of 2007 stated the concrete objectives as: “helping the Afghan army and the Afghan police establish effective control over the main inhabited areas and connecting roads”. It was also indicated that: “responsibility for security in the inhabited areas of Uruzgan is expected (…) to be transferred gradually to Afghan National Security Forces in the spring of 2010.”

From the moment the mission began, Dutch policy focused attention on strengthening the Afghan army and police. This aspect was intensified when the mission was extended. The Article 100 letter of 2007 contained the following passage: “With regard to the ‘stabilisation and security’ line of operation (Defence), this approach means an even stronger focus on Security Sector Reform, which includes strengthening and training the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Counter-Narcotics Police”, which is elaborated in more detail as:

“The training and coaching of Afghan security organisations will be intensified, in order to help the Afghan army and the Afghan police establish effective control over the main inhabited areas and connecting roads” and “Provided the development of the Afghan army and police (jointly known as the Afghan National Security Forces or ANSF) is carried through, responsibility for security in the inhabited areas of Uruzgan is expected to be transferred gradually to the ANSF in the spring of 2010.”

From the very start of the mission, close cooperation with the Netherlands embassy in Kabul was foreseen and civilian staff personnel were posted in Uruzgan.

Beyond the ‘ink blot’ zones, so-called under-the-radar projects, directed by the embassy in Kabul, were conducted to benefit the population, especially ethnic minorities. This turned out to be a special and effective form of assistance, in which the Dutch involvement was not made public, so as not to draw the attention of the insurgents. TLO describes the projects as having an approach that can be considered as a ‘mini-National Solidarity Programme’ (NSP). The difference was that the Netherlands worked with existing shuras of villages that were asked to compile lists of projects. Thanks to their roles in the decision-making process, communities developed a strong sense of responsibility for these projects. The programme had a positive effect on the local economy because of the temporary employment it created.

3.5 Good governance
In the Article 100 letter of 2005, capacity-building, promoting transparency and integrity in governance and improving representation were named as the three main pillars of the policy aimed at improving local governance. In addition, increasing the involvement in the province of Uruzgan of the national government in Kabul was a policy priority, because that involvement will ultimately be required in order to improve the effectiveness of local governance permanently.

The Article 100 letter of 2007 elaborated the policy items for improving governance in more detail. In this letter, the government stated that the support for and coaching of the development of governance would be intensified:

“The ‘government’ line of operation (Diplomacy) requires intensification, both in Kabul and Uruzgan. The emphasis must be on the policy regarding appointments, integrity (combating involvement in corruption, the drug trade and tribal patronage), thereby giving priority to the strengthening of the administrative apparatus. The main focus is on enhancing both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government (key figures and services).

This letter also noted that:

“Expectations in the area of reconstruction must remain modest, however difficult this may be in the light of the efforts being made by the Netherlands and the international community. Afghanistan has a long way to go. It will take a long time to build a civil-service apparatus which is on a par with those in the other countries in the region.

The long-term objective remains enabling the Afghan government to provide security, effective governance and development in southern Afghanistan, and Uruzgan province in particular, largely under its own steam.
The expectation is that meaningful improvements will be achieved during the currently planned deployment period, which will lay the foundation for further reconstruction activities. In 2010 the Netherlands hopes to look back on a successful Uruzgan mission, whereby government authorities gained a firm foothold in one of the very poorest and least developed provinces in Afghanistan, thereby making basic government services available to civilians.”

And:

“In the judgement of the Netherlands’ government, the success of the mission is primarily dependent on the government and provincial administration of Afghanistan gaining legitimacy, on human rights playing a greater role, on dealing with corruption, on democracy gaining more room for manoeuvre, and on the peace dividend becoming visible for the population.”

3.6 Socio-economic development
In the Article 100 letter of 2005, the policy framework for socio-economic development was defined as follows:

“The policy framework for the Netherlands’ efforts in the area of reconstruction in Uruzgan will be provided primarily by the «Afghanistan Compact», to be adopted during the London conference and which will provide benchmark points for good governance and development, and secondarily by the Interim Afghan National Development Strategy which will be presented during the London conference and which will serve as a «Poverty Reduction Strategy»”

Particularly the I-ANDS, the national sectoral programmes and the civil assessment based on these were important during the conduct of the mission. In 2000, the member states of the UN agreed that by the year 2015 significant progress had to be made in the areas of poverty, education, health and the environment. To this end, the UN established eight concrete objectives: the so-called Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In 2005, the Afghan government translated these MDGs into its own national goals and incorporated them in the I-ANDS.

More specifically, the Article 100 letter of 2005 states:

• Links with national Afghan programmes will be sought in Uruzgan.
• Major initial areas of attention will be:
  o reform of the judiciary and the police;
  o implementation of the DIAG disarmament programme;
• Reconstruction projects in the areas of good governance and socio-economic development are conceivable.
• Strengthening local governance can focus on a number of areas, such as increasing the effectiveness of governance through capacity-building, enhancing the representativeness of governance and promoting the transparency and integrity of governance.
• The sectors most suitable for socio-economic reconstruction will be selected in close consultation with the national and local governments and the population, preferably as part of a provincial development strategy. Preference will be given to areas where the Netherlands could provide added value, possibly education for women and girls, water management and cattle farming.
• In addition, the PRT will encourage, and where possible, facilitate reconstruction activities of NGOs.
• Efforts will be made to cooperate as much as possible with Dutch NGOs that are active or want to become active in Uruzgan.
Drawing from the knowledge gained in the intervening period, the Article 100 letter of 2007 contains the following passage:

“Reconstruction will focus on five sectors: health care, education, legal system (including the prison service and transitional justice), productive development (especially agriculture and alternatives to poppy cultivation) and infrastructure, with capacity-building, legitimacy and gender as across-the-board themes. These sectors are included in the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategies (I-ANDS). The strategy is to enhance the implementation of the national programmes in these sectors, supported by NGOs, international organisations and private companies. In addition, special attention is required for the integrated implementation of the Afghan counternarcotics strategy. Quick and Visible Projects (QVPs) will also be continued owing to their positive effects on stability, the growing confidence in the Afghan government and the visible improvement in the circumstances of the Uruzgan population.”

3.6.1 Quick and Visible Projects
Dutch policy focused on small-scale and quickly visible activities as part of CIMIC and ‘Hearts & Minds’ projects, as well as on sustainable development and capacity-building in the national and local governments. Quick and Visible Projects (QVPs) served as first moves towards sustainable development activities. QVPs promote social cohesion and help to identify village community workers, who are then trained to play a role in future development projects. To be able to achieve this, it is necessary to have funds available quickly, to produce quick results, and also to conduct a political dialogue (outreach) with local stakeholders. These small-scale projects are also an instrument to test the accessibility and capability of NGOs and national programmes to operate in Uruzgan. QVPs have a different objective from CIMIC activities. In the Article 100 letter of 2005, the government stated that in the initial stage of the mission the emphasis would be on small and short-term reconstruction projects. These programmes could be implemented quickly and were highly visible to the local population.

**Quick and Visible Projects (QVPs):** quick and visible activities aimed at specific village communities, which served as first moves towards sustainable development activities. The implementation and coaching was done by Afghan NGOs. Village community workers were identified after careful consultation in order to determine which projects merited first priority. For example, QVPs were aimed at repair of roads and irrigation channels, health care, communication and rural development.

**Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC):** activities to win the hearts and minds of the population in order to strengthen support for the military presence among the population. These activities consisted of, among other things, establishing contacts among the local people, with the local government and NGOs, and carrying out small-scale aid projects. The basic principle was for all population groups to share equally in the positive results of these activities (‘the tribal balance’). Examples of CIMIC activities are installing water pumps, repairing mosques and supplying school furniture.

This bottom-up approach was necessary as a preparation for structural reconstruction. Over time, the combination of military intervention and QVPs will result in more possibilities for long-term development projects.
3.6.2 Implementation of national programmes in Uruzgan

The strategy followed by the Netherlands in the first moves towards more sustainable development in Uruzgan was based on the findings in the civil assessment (see paragraph 3.1). As in the rest of the country, the Afghan government had to be enabled to make progress on the MDGs in Uruzgan. The civil assessment identified the major sectors for development: health care, education, infrastructure, agriculture/rural development (including finding alternatives for poppy cultivation) and support for the provincial/local governance and legal system (including the prison service and transitional justice). These sectors were included in the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategies (I-ANDS). Three principles played a central role during the implementation: (1) local ownership was stimulated through extensive consultation with government organisations, local communities and NGOs, (2) assistance must be requirement-driven and take into account the tribal balance and (3) the civil organisations carrying out the projects must not be associated with the military ISAF mission. Projects had to be kept separate from the military presence and the PRT in order to keep them from being seen as a part of the conflict. The policy was to enhance the implementation of the national programmes in these sectors, supported by NGOs, international organisations and companies (including Dutch companies). The Netherlands was to invest mainly in sectors such as education for women and children, water management and cattle farming. Linking local development thus to national policy and programmes was to result in the sustainable development of Uruzgan.

The Article 100 letter of 2005 states as a general principle for the provision of assistance that local civilian organisations, employees and materials would be used for the implementation of such projects. The PRT was to encourage and facilitate reconstruction activities by NGOs. Efforts were also to be made to cooperate as much as possible with Dutch NGOs that were active or wanted to become active in Uruzgan. Along with capacity shortfalls and the poor security situation, poppy cultivation was a major obstacle to the development of the province, mainly because of the criminal activities it engendered. Starting up reconstruction projects aimed at generating alternative sources of income was considered in order to encourage farmers to abandon poppy cultivation.

After the mission was extended, the Netherlands continued its efforts to have national programmes implemented in Uruzgan. This would increase the Afghan government’s active presence and effectiveness in the south, and thus help foster its legitimacy. The Netherlands also wanted to attract more organisations to the province. The number of NGOs and the extent of their activities might have grown sharply since the beginning of the mission, but the actual implementation continued to be limited. There were only a few UN organisations (World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF – operating through local contractors – and, from January 2008, the FAO) active in the province. The Netherlands continued to press for the establishment of a UNAMA office in Uruzgan.
Policy as formulated in the Article 100 letter of 2005 developed during the implementation of the mission. The policy set out in the Article 100 letter of 2007 was roughly similar to that in the letter of 2005, although a number of new developments and adjustments could be identified. In addition to the implementation of the policy, this chapter discusses the results of the Dutch deployment in the sub-sectors.

Achieving cohesion between objectives, which in crisis-management operations such as the mission in Afghanistan are sometimes very diverse, continues to be a challenge. Moreover, the unpredictability of the situation in practice forces one to adopt a realistic and pragmatic attitude. Serious efforts were required to guarantee the cohesion between political, military and socio-economic measures and assets.

4.1 3D approach
The Netherlands’ deployment to Uruzgan was guided by the 3D approach from the outset, in accordance with Dutch policy as formulated in the Article 100 letters. Activities were developed in all three areas at once. From the start of the mission, Dutch efforts in the areas of security, good governance and socio-economic development were coordinated at three levels: at the ministerial level in The Hague, in Kabul, and at the operational level in Uruzgan. During the initial stage of the mission, the approach was not entirely comprehensive, however, especially not in The Hague. For instance, before the beginning of the mission, there was no interdepartmental mission design, i.e. a plan, agreed and coordinated by the various ministries, for the elaboration of the Article 100 objectives and the implementation of the mission. The ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs each issued their own set of instructions to the military and civilian elements of the mission, respectively. Improvements were made to working methods increasingly throughout the mission. This led to more coordination between the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs in The Hague. Coordination of the mission took place in the weekly Military Operations Steering Group (SMO), in which high-level representatives of the ministries of General Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Defence participated. The improved coordination, however, did not stem from structural periodic mission reviews.

In Uruzgan, the military leadership, diplomats and development cooperation advisers (OSADs) worked closely together from the start. From the very first rotation, the work in the mission was performed in an integrated way, and the military leadership, for instance, involved the diplomats and OSADs very closely in the planning of all military operations. By the same token, there was also intensive cooperation in the areas of development and diplomacy, and there was a prevailing sense that each investment in socio-economic development had to be coordinated with activities in the areas of security and good governance. For that reason, the comprehensive approach was gradually expanded and formalised. The civilian team of Foreign Affairs initially consisted of three officials (one political adviser (POLAD), one development cooperation adviser (OSAD) and one tribal adviser), but was expanded in the summer of 2007 to include a Civil Representative (CIVREP). Starting from 2008, the CIVREP assumed primary responsibility for all reconstruction activities and, with that, the formal leadership of the PRT. From the summer of 2008, the CIVREPs had two
political advisers, three development cooperation advisers and two tribal
advisers at their disposal. The civilian and military elements of the TFU
were integrated further in 2009. From that moment onwards, the CIVREP
and the commander of the TFU officially held joint command over both the
civil and military activities in the province. The long-term strategy, the
planning of activities and the decision-making process became highly
integrated as a result. Although the 3D approach was not unique to the
Netherlands, it became internationally known as the Dutch approach,
possibly owing to the specific Dutch interpretation of the concept, which is
characterised by a very high degree of integration of civil and military
planning.

Sub-conclusions on the 3D approach
The 3D approach developed in the course of the mission, and also
contribute to increased interdepartmental cooperation among government
officials in The Hague. This cooperation can be further enhanced by
formulating an interdepartmental mission design prior to every mission, by
issuing clear directives and guidelines to the mission leadership
(commanders and civilian staff) about the elaboration of Article 100
objectives and by conducting periodic mission reviews in the course of the
mission on the basis of which adjustments can be made to the
implementation.

4.2 Deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Team
The PRT constituted the core of the mission, as formulated in the Article
100 Letter of 2005:
“The core of the Dutch task force in Uruzgan will be formed by a Provincial
Reconstruction Team (…). The PRT assists the Afghan authorities in
strengthening their authority and promoting stability in the province, in
order to create the conditions that make reconstruction possible.”
Initially, the PRT was under military command. From late 2008, it was led
by the CIVREP. Its maximum size was 60 personnel. The PRT’s activities
focused on the reconstruction of Uruzgan. The PRT consisted of four mission
teams. They mixed with the population, identified needs and organised
assistance by acting as liaisons for local NGOs. This was done on a project
basis, in which the initiative and implementation were left as much as
possible to the Afghan population, particularly local administrators. In
addition, the PRT, assisted over the course of the mission by EU police
mission EUPOL, also played a central role in training the Afghan police and
contributed to governance-building. For instance, the PRT facilitated shuras
(meetings of village elders) throughout the province and stimulated
Provincial Development Councils and Provincial Security Councils.

The PRT consisted of military personnel, diplomats and development
workers. So-called ‘functional specialists’ were also assigned throughout the
mission. These were mostly civilian experts who were deployed as military
reservists for certain periods. Their specialisations concerned, for instance,
the banking sector, infrastructure, irrigation, agriculture or veterinary
medicine. This enabled the provision of very specific types of assistance to
the population of Uruzgan.

A central role had been assigned to the PRT in the Dutch policy for
participation in ISAF. It became clear in practice, however, that the
reconstruction tasks of the PRTs were hindered by the security situation.
Many PRT activities were affected by attacks. As a result, the mission teams
frequently needed force protection when they left the compound. This force
protection was supplied by the TFU Battle Group, which also had other
tasks to fulfil in the area of security. Force protection capacity was occasionally a limiting factor for the PRT’s activities.

During the Dutch PRT’s period of deployment, a large number of projects were carried out. These included small CIMIC projects to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population (such as water pumps, repair work on mosques, school furniture, facilitating women’s day), and where possible also structural and infrastructural improvements that were not only aimed at ‘hearts and minds’, such as a Provincial Coordination Centre for the Afghan police and army. The CIMIC projects conducted by the PRT amounted to a sum of EUR 4.2 million. A total of 882 projects were implemented in various fields.

These projects helped improve, *inter alia*, water management, electricity supply and the mobility of the population. In the course of the mission, the PRT efforts in each field were increasingly accompanied by projects by local NGOs, which, with the help of Dutch development-cooperation funding, provided, and are still providing, structural assistance. From May 2009, the UN was present in Uruzgan with a UNAMA representation and was thus able to take over part of the coordination of the various NGOs from the PRT. The improved security situation enabled the number of NGOs to grow to over 40 in total in 2010. They were, and still are, active in various sectors such as health care, infrastructure, and agricultural development, as well as capacity-building of the government.

Sub conclusions on PRT deployment
The PRT played a central role in the Dutch mission. This role evolved from steering activities with regard to the reconstruction effort into a coordinating position. The position of the CIVREP as head of the PRT was of great importance in this process. It can be said that the PRT projects contributed to the acceptance of the Dutch and ISAF presence in Uruzgan, and with it to the security of Dutch personnel, and also to the security situation in Uruzgan itself\(^\text{10}\).

4.3 Security

4.3.1 Composition of the Netherlands’ contribution and the required capability
The Dutch military contribution to ISAF primarily comprised a task force (Task Force Uruzgan; TFU), mainly made up of Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA) units\(^\text{11}\), and an air component (Air Task Force; ATF), for the most part made up of units of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF). As a complement to this contribution, the Netherlands also provided a Contingent Command (Contco); military personnel for various ISAF headquarters; medical specialists and facilities for the Role-3 field hospital at Kandahar Airfield; logistic support from Kandahar Airfield; a passenger and cargo transhipment facility (Forward Support Element; FSE) in the United Arab Emirates (UAE); and a decompression element on the island of Crete. In the 2009–2010 period, a detachment of special forces (Task Force 55; TF55) was deployed in Uruzgan and the surrounding area. From 2009 onwards, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee personnel in the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) in Afghanistan also came under command of ISAF.

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\(^{10}\) TLO: Four Years Later, 2010

\(^{11}\) With substantial participation of, among others, the Marine Corps of the Royal Netherlands Navy and military personnel of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee.
The Dutch contingent commander was the area representative of the Netherlands Chief of Defence (CHOD) and provided administrative support to Dutch ISAF troops. The Dutch contingent commander was also the designated ‘red card holder’, who was authorised to call a halt to the operations of Dutch troops in the event that the conditions for operations, as set by the Dutch government, had not been met. The contingent command was based at Kandahar Airfield.

In the Article 100 letter of 2005, the strength of the troops for Uruzgan had been set at 1,200. However, the number of troops taking part in the mission rose to 2,000 in 2009, owing to the expansion of the Afghan Development Zones (ADZs), the lack of reinforcement of the Afghan army and police force, the necessity for high enough numbers of troops in the ADZs in order to offer sufficient protection to the civilian population, increasing resistance from insurgents, and the need for more or new capabilities (counter-IED and air reconnaissance capabilities, for example). The demand for more troops was bound by financial constraints and the armed forces’ sustainment capability. Within this field of tension, there was continuous deliberation taking place at the Ministry of Defence in The Hague regarding the evident advantages of more troops, the division of troops into combat personnel and support personnel (manoeuvre and enabler elements) and the financial consequences related to the numbers of troops deployed. A total number of 20,000 Dutch military personnel took part in ISAF. The total number of Dutch civilian personnel acting within the TFU during the 2006-2010 period amounted to 130.

4.3.1.1 TFU
The Dutch military presence in Uruzgan was given the name of Task Force Uruzgan (TFU), and had an initial strength of 950 military personnel. At the start of the mission, the civilian component comprised three persons, increasing to twelve persons later on in the mission. The manning aspect of the TFU, and with it the civilian component, is explained further in paragraph 5.3.1.1. The TFU was structured as follows: a staff of approximately 100 personnel, a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) of a maximum of 60 persons, a Battle Group (BG, ground-based combat unit) comprising approximately 450 military personnel, and support elements. The emphasis of the deployment was on the PRT and its activities and on establishing the presence of Afghan government authorities, with the BG acting as a combat unit and the PRT acting in support of the Afghan authorities.

4.3.1.2 ATF
The Air Task Force (ATF) was tasked with supporting ISAF units by providing air support, including reconnaissance and surveillance, with F-16 fighter aircraft and Apache attack helicopters. The ATF also provided tactical air transport by means of its transport helicopters. The F-16s and the transport helicopters operated from Kandahar airfield, while the Apache attack helicopters were based at Tarin Kowt. The ATF was available to all ISAF units and not restricted to supporting Dutch units only. The strength of the ATF stood at approximately 150 personnel. In addition to the ATF, Dutch military transport aircraft made a major effort in providing strategic air transport between the Netherlands and Afghanistan.

4.3.1.3 Manoeuvre units and enablers
The nature of the terrain and the insurgents’ method of operation were an influence on the requirement regarding transport assets and support units, the enablers. Particulates, the rocky terrain and particularly the impact of IEDs on vehicles resulted in a requirement for a different type of vehicle,
such as the Bushmaster, that was better suited to operating under these conditions than the vehicles normally used by the Defence organisation, i.e. the YPR-765, the Patria, the Viking and the Mercedes-Benz terrain vehicle.

Tactical air transport with transport helicopters emerged as a good alternative for avoiding the threat of IEDs and moving troops around the whole mission area rapidly, while maintaining the element of surprise. The number of helicopters available for the task was, however, a restricting factor. The helicopters supplied by the Netherlands were assigned to the commander of Regional Command South (C-RC-S) and were not immediately available to the commander of the TFU.

The method of operation related to the COIN doctrine demanded many more enablers than are required during other types of operation; extra enablers were particularly required for counter-IED capabilities (which include, for example, engineer capability for detecting and clearing IEDs, electronic warfare resources for jamming IED detonators, air reconnaissance and surveillance assets and medical personnel). The number of available enablers formed a restricting factor for the deployment of the manoeuvre units of the BG, which meant constantly weighing up the importance of the planned operation against the efforts made in freeing up sufficient numbers of enablers for effective execution of the operation.

### 4.3.2 Command structure

The Deployment Task Force (DTF) deployed to southern Afghanistan (RC-S) in 2006 when the region was still under the responsibility of OEF. The DTF applied the rules of engagement of ISAF and did not fall under the umbrella of OEF.

After the start of the mission on 1 August 2006, the TFU came under RC-S in the ISAF command structure. RC-S itself was subordinate to the commander of ISAF in Kabul. In 2009, an extra level of command, ISAF Joint Command (IJC), was built into the command structure between the commander of the ISAF and the regional commanders. In addition to direction from ISAF, the Dutch mission was also directed from The Hague by the Military Operations Steering Group (SMO). The ATF’s F-16s were directly under command of ISAF headquarters in Kabul. The attack and transport helicopters were under operational command of the commander of RC-S.

The special units of Task Force 55 fell under command of the ISAF’s Commander of Special Forces (COMISAFSOF) in Kabul, who in turn came under the commander of ISAF.

The commander of the TFU had command of the BG and the PRT. In 2009, a change was made when the PRT came under civilian leadership of the civilian representative (CIVREP), a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official operating on an equal footing with the commander of the TFU.

The CHOD had full command of all Dutch military units at all times.

### 4.3.3 Rules of engagement

The robust Rules of Engagement (ROE) were set for ISAF by NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Netherlands had set in place a number of caveats for Dutch military personnel regarding the ROE. These concerned, among other things, the detention of persons and lending support to troops operating under the mandate of OEF.
4.3.4 Information and intelligence

Owing to the complexity of the environment, the success of the mission in Uruzgan was particularly dependent on strong intelligence. Big steps were taken in improving the intelligence organisation. NATO’s Joint Collection and Fusion Concept was introduced within the TFU. In the context of this concept, various Defence intelligence entities work together in the area of operations. All relevant information was brought together and targeted questions could be sent to relevant parties without first having to go through senior echelons in the Netherlands. The tasks and authorisations of the Defence Intelligence and Security Service (DISS), which are subject to the Intelligence and Security Services Act, formed an exception to this mode of working.

The DISS made a major effort in supporting commanders in the area of operations and decision-makers in The Hague right from the very beginning of the mission. In addition to a National Intelligence Cell in Kabul, the DISS set up two National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs), based in Kandahar and Tarin Kowt. The NISTs in Uruzgan were largely integrated with the TFU intelligence cell in Tarin Kowt. In The Hague, the DISS set up a large-scale Afghanistan Team in support of the mission. By gathering both local and national information, and by intensive cooperation and exchange of information with various ISAF partners active within RC-S, the DISS was capable of generating high-quality information about the situation in Uruzgan. This information was, in strategic and tactical terms, of great value for the execution of the mission and for the security of Dutch military and civilian personnel. The DISS also deployed additional personnel and resources in support of the operations of special forces.

Information on the situation outside the ink blot was highly important for security within the ink blot. The activities of the insurgents could only be anticipated by holding and maintaining a good information position. Special forces were deployed for this purpose.

4.3.5 Special forces in Uruzgan

From 2006, Dutch special forces (from the Commando Corps (KCT) and the Marine Corps) operated in Afghanistan during two separate periods. Between April 2006 and December 2007, a Special Operations Task Group (Task Force Viper) took part in ISAF operations, initially as part of the Deployment Task Force (DTF) and subsequently as part of the TFU. Over a year later, a Dutch special unit (Task Force 55) was deployed for a second time, from April 2009 up to and including August 2010.

Task Force Viper was primarily deployed as a reconnaissance unit. By gathering intelligence and acquiring and retaining situational awareness, Viper made an important contribution to the missions of both the DTF and the TFU. In addition, Viper supported various TFU operations by, among other things, acting as a Quick Reaction Force and as a convoy protection unit. Viper’s assignments were particularly focused on the boundaries of the TFU’s area of responsibility, where regular units were hardly active if at all.

Task Force 55 (TF-55) was a special unit, consisting of elements of the Commando Corps and the Marine Corps, with support elements. Its tasks comprised carrying out reconnaissance, gathering intelligence, disrupting insurgency activity outside the ink blot, detecting insurgents planning to carry out attacks, and training and mentoring an Afghan partner unit. The unit was stationed at the base in Tarin Kowt, but was not under command of the TFU. The operations of TF-55 were carried out in cooperation with the
Afghan partner unit, at all times only after explicit permission from the NLD CHOD. These operations stood in direct relation to the activities and mission of the TFU in Uruzgan.

TF-55 was supported in each mission by so-called enablers, such as helicopters, engineers, fire support (mortars), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units and capabilities for electronic warfare (EW). TF-55 did not have its own enablers. The unit consequently had to rely on the TFU and RC-S for enabler capabilities.

### 4.3.6 The ink blot strategy in practice

Before the handover to ISAF in 2006, OEF coalition troops in Uruzgan had four bases, two near the population centres in the south of the province, at Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod, and two at a more northerly location in the province. The Article 100 letter of 2005 contained the following passage: “In view of the size of the units made available for the mission, the task force will, for the time being, not occupy all four of the current bases located in Uruzgan. The Dutch area of deployment will remain restricted to the southern part of the province of Uruzgan”.

Initially, the ADZ in Uruzgan encompassed solely the population centres of Deh Rawod and Tarin Kowt. In order for the ink blot to expand, smaller posts (Forward Operating Bases and Patrol Bases) were established in the periphery of the ink blot.

Consequently, in a large area of Uruzgan there was no Dutch military presence. In the districts of Chahar Chineh and Khas Uruzgan, American special forces were active, while Australian special forces were operating in central Uruzgan.

Activities related to socio-economic development were not restricted to the ADZ. Disadvantaged tribes, who often supported the Taliban, also had their settlements outside the ADZ. They were actively approached in order to improve their socio-economic situation by means of development projects, thus reducing their support for the Taliban. In this context, among the activities carried out were the building of bridges and renovation of water channels in the Gizab district.

The ISAF strategy of the four separate operational phases (Shape, Clear, Hold and Build), described earlier, was not carried out strictly according to the concept. In practice, a strict separation between the separate phases (both in time and space) was not possible to achieve. At certain times, different parts of Uruzgan were in different phases of the concept. Whereas the Shape phase was initially solely focused on aspects of the military operation, activities carried out in this phase became, more than was previously the case, focused on the needs of the local people, bringing this phase more in line with the following phases. The same can be said for the other phases. Eventually, operations were prepared (Shape) in such a way that after the operation (Clear) had taken place, security could be guaranteed (Hold) and reconstruction projects could be started (Build). The integration of these different elements became more pronounced as the mission progressed, which benefited the effectiveness of specific operations. The necessity of repeat operations in the Baluchi Valley highlighted the importance of an integrated approach.
Operations around the Baluchi Valley

In the 2006–2010 period, various large-scale, initially solely military operations took place with the objective of bringing the Baluchi Valley, which connects Tarin Kowt with Chora, under control of ISAF and the Afghan government.

In 2006, after the arrival of the DTF, but before the TFU had become operational, the coalition troops conducted the large-scale Operation Perth with the intention of eliminating the threat emanating from the valley occupied by insurgents, a relatively short distance from Kamp Holland, which was under construction at the time. Task Force Viper played a role in the preparation and execution of this major operation. The operation was a success, but within months of the coalition troops’ departure, the valley once again became unsafe.

At the end of 2007, another large-scale operation was conducted, under command of the TFU. The Dutch Battle Group, with the assistance of the RC-S reserve battalion, carried out another operation to clear the Baluchi Valley of insurgents. After the operation, posts were set up in the vicinity of the northern and southern entrances to the valley in order to prevent the valley falling back into Taliban hands. The operation was successful, but, without the permanent presence of the ANSF or ISAF, after just a few months the Baluchi Valley once again became unsafe.

Late in 2008, an integrated 3D operation was conducted under command of the TFU to once again clear the Baluchi Valley of insurgents. The operation was a more integrated affair than the two previous operations. In the first phase, contact was made with the tribal leaders to inform them of the TFU’s intentions and to assess their own wishes and ideas. Directly after the operation, reconstruction activities were carried out and, on the basis of the earlier experiences, the decision was made to maintain a permanent ANSF and ISAF presence in the valley. In contrast to previous years, there were sufficient numbers of ANSF troops available to carry out that task. The Baluchi Valley remained reasonably stable.

At the end of 2010, the Baluchi Valley is still reasonably stable. A paved road from Tarin Kowt to Chora, an important reconstruction project financed by the Netherlands, is being built through the Baluchi Valley. The first 16 kilometres of the road had been completed by June 2010 and led to accelerated socio-economic development of the areas in the vicinity of the road.

The size of the ink blot (or ADZ) was limited owing to, among other things, the number of troops available from both the TFU and the Afghan authorities. The initial intention was for the Afghan police force to ensure security inside the ink blot, whereas ISAF and the Afghan army were to enforce security at the periphery of the zone. However, in the first few years this proved unfeasible owing to an insufficient number of Afghan security units becoming available for provision of security within the ink blot. This restricted the possibility of ISAF and the Afghan army expanding the area of the ink blot. The limited availability of supporting enablers was a further restriction on TFU operations.

During the course of 2007, the ink blot was expanded to the district of Chora, which was heavily fought over by ISAF and insurgents. But there were also (temporary) relapses in the expansion of the ink blot when the insurgency managed to regain its influence in certain areas, such as in the
northern part of Deh Rawod in 2007. By the end of 2007, the ink blot encompassed the areas around Tarin Kowt, central parts of the Chora district and the southern part of Deh Rawod. The northern part of Deh Rawod was added to the ink blot in the spring of 2008. Various major operations were conducted in the Baluchi Valley and the area connecting Tarin Kowt and the Chora Valley. The area was not stabilised until late 2008, after an integrated approach to operations had been taken. In 2009 and 2010, the ink blot was extended further in the direction of Deh Rashan and Mirabad; the areas around Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod were also expanded.
Within the ink blot, the Afghan population had an acceptable degree of freedom of movement and, consequently, economic activities flourished. Although infiltration of the ink blot occurred intermittently, involving a small number of heavy attacks, the local population was relatively safe.

The COIN doctrine prescribes that military personnel live among the locals as much as possible. This places personnel at risk and leads to logistic complications. In Uruzgan, the choice was made to concentrate the troops
in large and small bases, while contact with the local people was sought and maintained by mission teams and (foot)patrols.

There were a particularly large number of armed confrontations between the TFU and insurgents in the 2007-2008 period. The insurgents did not accept the Dutch military presence without a fight and the ensuing confrontations mostly took place around Deh Rawod, in the Baluchi valley between Tarin Kowt and Chora, and in Darafshan. In 2009, the situation stabilised, leaving the possibility open of dismantling the temporary bases or handing them over to the Afghan army or police force. In direct confrontations, the TFU was able to defeat the insurgents in each case. The rapid availability of air support and the presence of ISAF artillery and mortars gave the TFU a decisive advantage over the insurgents. A great deal of attention was focused on sound coordination between ground forces and air forces, in order to prevent collateral damage or friendly-fire incidents.

The standing policy was to use a minimum of force, with the Afghan culture being respected as much as possible. The Tactical Directive of the Commander of ISAF set extremely stringent requirements on delivering fire or air support to ground troops with the purpose of preventing civilian casualties and collateral damage. In addition, a number of conditions were set regarding entering people’s homes. These guidelines were fully in line with Dutch policy and were constantly adjusted on the basis of experience gained in the field.

In the 2006–2010 period, there was a shift in the insurgents’ method of operations. In the first two years of this period, the insurgents sought confrontation with ISAF by means of sometimes large-scale, armed operations. The most significant of these took place in June 2007 during fighting near Chora. This fighting was to prove the turning point in the insurgents’ method of operation.

The fighting near Chora, June 2007.

In June 2007, the insurgents carried out an open, coordinated, large-scale attack on the district centre of Chora. Afghan police posts were attacked and almost all of them captured after an attack by hundreds of insurgents. During the attack, civilians were abused and killed in the eastern part of the valley. The Dutch platoons in Chora, which were arriving to support the Afghan police units, also came under attack and were pushed back into a small area. The situation was felt to be extremely threatening. The commander of the TFU subsequently took the decision to hold his position and counterattack the insurgents.

During the first night, extensive artillery and air support was used to deprive the insurgents of the opportunity of continuing their attack. Ground troops, including special forces, were also deployed in order to relieve pressure on Chora. These measures were successful and the situation stabilised during the following morning.

The Battle Group, complemented by 80 Afghan military personnel, subsequently carried out a counterattack through the western part of the valley. At the same time, a coordinated counterattack through the eastern part of the valley was carried out by an Afghan militia. The fighting, which saw much use of artillery and air support, lasted a number of days, after which the insurgents were driven out of their positions.
Owing to the insurgents intermingling with civilians, there were unfortunately a large number of civilian casualties. Between 50 and 80 civilians were killed and approximately 100 injured as a consequence of the fighting.

Four investigations were conducted into the fighting of June 2007 (see paragraph 4.3.9). These events led to much discussion, both in the Netherlands and on the international stage. For the Afghans, it was important that the Dutch troops had demonstrated that they were not shirking the fight. The fighting marked a turning point in the Taliban’s operations in Uruzgan. From that moment on, the Taliban chose the option of open confrontations less frequently.

From ‘Chora’ onwards, the insurgents’ method of operations focused more on planting IEDs, launching unguided missiles and carrying out suicide attacks. These tactics were less risky for the insurgents but caused a high number of civilian casualties (by IEDs, executions and the use of civilians as human shields).

IEDs formed a constant threat to coalition troops and the local population. With the establishment of a Counter-IED Task Force, the TFU was supported from the Netherlands and in the area of operations itself by evermore advanced detection and protection equipment. This way, fast and effective countermeasures could be identified and implemented if there were new developments in the area. The purchase and deployment of the Bushmaster armoured vehicle and the establishment of a forensic laboratory tasked with the detection of IED networks are good examples of this. An IED network is an insurgency organisation which designs, constructs and plants IEDs. The detection and, if possible, the elimination of IED networks was supported by the DISS and by deployment of regular and special forces from the Netherlands or coalition partners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TFU IEDs</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010 (up to 01/07/10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IEDs detected</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEDs exploded</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage exploded / disarmed</td>
<td>45/55%</td>
<td>37/63%</td>
<td>32/68%</td>
<td>22/78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that the percentage of detected and disarmed IEDs has, as a result of the measures taken, increased. At the same time, it is clear that the focus on protection remained highly important in view of the increasing number of IEDs.

During the course of the mission, an increasingly varied, but also more complex, picture of Afghan society and its conflicts within began to form. Deeper insight into local relations emerged as a matter of high importance. In addition, the insurgents appeared to be more solidly organised than
previously thought and comprised a hard core, under direct control from Pakistan, local commanders and temporary hangers-on. In order to carry out the 3D approach, a deep and balanced insight into local society emerged as a highly important factor.

From the beginning of the Netherlands’ participation in ISAF, it was recognised that the critical success factor of the mission would be less about the fight against the insurgents and more about depriving the insurgency of the local population’s support and garnering support among the local people for the Afghan government. CIMIC activities were commenced immediately after the deployment of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan and were focused on garnering support for the Dutch military presence in the area. These activities consisted of, among other things, establishing contacts among the local people, with the local government and NGOs, and carrying out small-scale aid projects. The basic principle was for all population groups to have an equal share in the positive results of these activities (‘the tribal balance’). This placed heavy demands on the flexibility of Dutch troops. Within a short space of time, the troops would have to switch from acting as combat units to acting as security units or CIMIC units. This also placed demands on training and preparation in the Netherlands.

The decision to use the ink blot strategy was a pragmatic one. It was made on the basis of the limited scope of the mission combined with security as a condition for further stabilisation through reconstruction and strengthening of local governance. The strategy led to a reasonably controllable development within the area of the ink blots that, with the increased security, the growth of the Afghan army and police force, the arrival of UNAMA, UNDP and approximately 40 NGOs, progressed successfully.

Although the ink blot was not expanded to include all of the province’s population centres in the 2006-2010 period, it did grow steadily. However, the population centres in north-western Uruzgan were not reached. This was caused by the burden placed by the insurgents’ activities on the limited numbers of ISAF and Afghan troops. Further expansion during the aforementioned period was impossible. With the increased security, gains were made, particularly within the ink blot, in terms of education, health care, governance and infrastructure. Areas that until 2010 had not yet become part of the ink blot did nevertheless profit from under-the-radar development projects.

4.3.7 Build-up of police and army
In Uruzgan, the build-up of the Afghan army and police formed an important element for the stabilisation of Afghanistan and for handing over responsibility for the security of the country to Afghans themselves. Since 2006, the Netherlands has been strongly committed to the build-up and funding of the police force. At the start of the mission, the Afghan army had little presence in Uruzgan and the police apparatus was a weak link in the Afghan security chain.

The Netherlands made efforts to contribute to the build-up of Afghan security organisations through diplomatic channels. The policy in this matter was to request attention from all political levels for this question; in contacts between Dutch and Afghan ministers, between military personnel and diplomats in Uruzgan itself, and from RC-S headquarters in Kandahar and Kabul. In addition, during international conferences, the Netherlands emphasised the importance of well-trained Afghan security troops. The Netherlands also negotiated with the Afghan government on the set-up of a
realistic security plan for Uruzgan province and lobbied to implement national programmes for capacity build-up of security troops in Uruzgan. During the mission, the Netherlands made a substantial contribution at the national level of EUR 22.6 million to the ANA Trust Fund, managed by NATO, for strengthening the Afghan army. The funding was intended for procurement of non-lethal materiel.

One important national programme for the funding of the police force was the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA). The LOTFA has been financing the build-up of the police apparatus (Afghan National Police [ANP]) since 2002. The LOTFA was managed by the UNDP. The core tasks of the fund were the payment of police salaries, capacity development of the police force and the Ministry of the Interior, improvement of the police’s equipment and infrastructure, lending support to the prison service and increasing the number of women in the police force. Police salaries accounted for approximately 90% of LOTFA’s total budget. The most important contributors to the budget were Japan, the United States, the European Commission, Canada and the Netherlands. During the June 2008 conference in Paris, the Netherlands pledged a contribution of EUR 10 million for the 2008-2011 period, that it has since paid.

From 2007, the 4th Brigade of the 205th Corps of the Afghan army was also present in Uruzgan. During the mission, this Afghan military presence was increased to include four infantry kandaks\(^\text{12}\) and two support kandaks. An ISAF Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) was attached to each unit to advise and mentor the unit in the execution of its operational tasks. In Uruzgan, these OMLTs were provided by the Netherlands, France, the Czech Republic and Australia. Afghan units were coupled with ISAF units as much as possible in order to better enable them to operate autonomously in the future. As much as possible, operations were prepared and executed collectively. Later on during the mission, the Afghan units planned and executed their operations independently on a more regular basis. Examples of this are the security operations surrounding the 2009 presidential elections and the 2010 parliamentary elections. The Afghan army showed a strong qualitative improvement owing to the mentoring of the OMLTs and the partnering with international units. Particularly during 2009 and 2010, increasingly larger operations were prepared and executed by the Afghan army, with ISAF units shifting from a leading role to an advisory role.

Right from the beginning of the mission, there was also a focus on the build-up of a sound police apparatus in Uruzgan. After the extension of the mission in 2007, the Netherlands’ focus on the Afghan police intensified and, from that moment onwards, policy centred more on the build-up of the police force in terms of quality. At the start of the mission, the capabilities of the police in Uruzgan were very limited. From 2006, PRTs conducted police training courses. Between 2006 and 2008, approximately 1,000 Afghans were trained for service in the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), which became part of ANP in 2008. The idea of an auxiliary police force of low quality turned out to be an unstable concept and the ANAP showed a large turnover of personnel. What remained of the ANAP was incorporated into the ANP. The Netherlands was an advocate of the deployment of EUPOL, the European Police Mission, in Uruzgan. EUPOL arrived in the province in 2009 and has since contributed to increasing the capabilities of ANP commanders in the area.

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\(^\text{12}\) A kandak is an Afghan army unit of battalion size with a strength of approximately 600 men.
Apart from facilitating training and mentoring, the Netherlands set up a number of infrastructure projects for the police force in Uruzgan, such as checkpoints and police stations. The Netherlands built a police training centre on the periphery of Kamp Holland in Tarin Kowt so that police officers could be trained in their home province. The instructors at this centre were from the TFU and EUPOL. From March 2008, Dutch EUPOL trainers were also active in Tarin Kowt. Since the opening of the centre in March 2009, over 800 police officers have completed basic training. That is over half of the total number of police officers now active in Uruzgan. The Netherlands also contributed to ‘on-the-job’ training by deploying Police Mentoring Teams to the area in late 2008. Initially, the Netherlands sent three teams, a number that was increased to five in 2009. The deployment of these teams led to clear further improvement of the quality of the police force.

An additional training programme, led by ISAF, was conducted for the Afghan police per province. Local police units being trained were temporarily replaced by Afghan police units from other provinces. Despite these efforts, the police apparatus remained a weak link in the Afghan security system. A 2009 evaluation\(^\text{13}\) stated that the quality of the Afghan police force was lagging far behind the quantity. The Netherlands therefore pressed for good coordination between the LOFTA and other contributors, for an intensification of LOFTA investment in capacity-building at the Ministry of the Interior, and for an increase in the quality of the police force.

Steps have been taken, but in comparison to the army, the capabilities of the police force in Uruzgan remained weak. Corruption in the Afghan police force is still a major problem and this is reflected in the local people’s perception of the police. The army is respected and appreciated more than the police force. Local people often still see the police as being badly trained and ill-mannered and does not feel that the police is protecting their interests.

### 4.3.8 International cooperation

#### 4.3.8.1 Lead nation

In the 2006-2010 period, the Netherlands was lead nation in Uruzgan. The associated tasks, powers and responsibilities lay primarily in the area of logistics. As lead nation, the Netherlands was the largest supplier of troops and the facilitator of much of the logistic and infrastructure activities in the province. However, Dutch mission command was not solely responsible for security in the whole province. Various partners, such as ISAF and OEF, acted independently of the Netherlands in the province. In most cases, but not all, such activities were discussed, and if possible coordinated in advance with Dutch military command. In practice, the TFU was unable to enforce that coordination with partners but had to depend on their willingness to cooperate. During the mission, much time was invested in good coordination and cooperation with partners and, despite sometimes contrasting views and approaches, it can be said that activities of partners did not lead to real conflicts with the TFU’s operations and activities. However, contrasting views regarding the approach to tackling informal leaders (see paragraph 4.4.3) did form an obstacle in implementing an effective policy aimed at restricting the influence of power brokers and warlords.

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\(^{13}\) TLO: Three Years Later, 2009
4.3.8.2 International partners
From the time of the Dutch government’s decision in 2005, the Netherlands cooperated closely with Australia. At that time, Australian special units were already active in Uruzgan. It was agreed with Australia that the Netherlands would be lead nation in Uruzgan and that the two countries would form a combined task force under Dutch command. This task force was formally named the 1st Netherlands/Australian Task Force Uruzgan (1(NLD/AUS)TFU), usually referred to as TFU. The Australian contribution comprised a Reconstruction Task Force (RTF), later known as the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force (MRTF) and finally as the Mentoring Task Force (MTF). Eventually, the M(R)TF encompassed six OMLTs working for the benefit of the Afghan army. In addition to this contribution, Australia also based a special forces unit in (Task Force 66) in Uruzgan, which was not under TFU command. Both Dutch and Australian staff personnel worked on the TFU staff. TFU Dutch-Australian cooperation was later expanded to include France (one OMLT), the Czech Republic (guard personnel and PRT staff members), Slovakia (guard personnel) and Singapore (unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, medical personnel and surveillance radar).

From 2008, the Dutch Air Task Force (ATF) worked closely with the Belgian F-16 detachment which was also based at Kandahar Airfield. Together with Canada, the Netherlands also formed the Canadian-Dutch Combined Air Bridge (CAB), which provided tactical air transport from the United Arab Emirates to Kandahar Airfield.

4.3.8.3 Influence within higher staffs
Dutch military officers assumed command of RC-S during two separate periods of the mission. The two officers in command, both of them in the rank of major general, were supported by a small number of staff officers, a staff support company, a force protection platoon and an airmobile (reserve) company. Dutch military personnel also held important positions in the staffs of RC-S and ISAF in Kabul, Deputy Commander (Air) of ISAF and Deputy Chief of Staff Stability being among them. Directly responsible to COM ISAF, the Dutch rear admiral in the latter position was responsible for, among other things, the lines of operation regarding the governance and development of Afghanistan and the organisation of the elections. Personnel for the manning of these staffs came from throughout the armed forces. Civilian positions in Kabul and Kandahar were also filled. For example, throughout the duration of the mission a senior political adviser was posted to RC-S in Kandahar. These positions, and particularly that of C-RC-S, offered the possibility for the Netherlands to influence the course set by ISAF in general and activities in Uruzgan in particular. The Dutch commanders held talks with, among others, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Security Advisers of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada and were subsequently able to clearly profile the Netherlands within the context of the mission.

4.3.8.4 OEF and ISAF
In general, cooperation between OEF and ISAF units throughout Afghanistan was transparent. For the Dutch troops in Uruzgan and for ATF, the Van Baalen motion of 24 November 2005 became an important factor. This motion called upon the Dutch government to, within the context of missions, only cooperate with countries which respect international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions; this included operations as part of the fight against international terrorism. On the basis of this motion, Dutch units could not work together with OEF units, owing to the posture adopted by the Bush administration. No combined operations were carried out and, in principle, units did not operate in the same area simultaneously.
If operations in close proximity of each other had been planned, then solid agreements regarding deconfliction were required in advance. Support was only given to OEF units in emergency (*in-extremis*) situations. This applied to both TFU and ATF, with the latter also being deployed for tasks outside Uruzgan. For military operations, it is an undesirable situation for two operations to take place simultaneously under different mandates and with separate command structures within the same geographical area. This would not conform to the principles of unity of command and unity of effort. Military operations could only be carried out if sufficient exchange of information had taken place between the two missions. Apache and F-16 pilots did not always know in advance whether units requesting air support were operating under ISAF or OEF mandate. At times, this resulted in time-consuming verification procedures to make sure that Dutch conditions had been met before (air) support could be given. However, this did not occur in the case of requests of (air) support during emergency situations, such as urgent self-defence. In one case, air support was given to Afghan troops, who, as later emerged, were operating under the OEF mandate. As far as can be ascertained, the Dutch actions taken on behalf of OEF did not lead to civilian casualties. Only on a small number of occasions did the contingent commander, in his capacity as red-card holder, veto provision of air support.

The fact that the Netherlands was the lead nation in Uruzgan did not result in actual unity of command over all coalition partner units present in the province. That was only the case for foreign units under direct command of the TFU, of which the Australian M(R)TF was the largest. The non-compulsory character of coordination with other parties, particularly special forces, was an obstruction to unity of command.

4.3.8.5 **Counterterrorism**

The TFU did not focus on so-called counterterrorism operations, but on the ink blot strategy. The ink blot strategy fits in with the general endeavour to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a stronghold for terrorist networks.

4.3.9 **Civilian casualties**

For the Netherlands, the prevention of civilian casualties is, within the context of international law and international humanitarian law, of great importance with regard to the deployment of the armed forces during armed conflicts. During the deployment in Afghanistan, the prevention of civilian casualties was not only a goal in itself, but also contributed to achieving the objectives of ISAF (‘to protect the people’ being among them) and to the acceptance of ISAF among the local people. After a number of incidents in which Afghan civilians became unintended casualties of ISAF activities, the prevention of civilian casualties and collateral damage became increasingly important in the planning and execution of ISAF operations throughout Afghanistan. If, despite the measures taken, indications arose pointing to civilian casualties, the ISAF would investigate the matter. Other organisations (the UN and various NGOs, but also the media) also investigated such incidents. In the period that the Netherlands was active in Uruzgan, successive ISAF commanders introduced increasingly meticulous procedures, focusing on the prevention of civilian casualties and collateral damage, into their Tactical Directives. Particularly the deployment of air support was subject to ever more careful procedures and this also applied to the deployment of Dutch fighter aircraft and attack helicopters. This process resulted in a substantial reduction in numbers of civilian casualties during ISAF operations. The more stringent guidelines
that were put in place had the desired effect, an effect particularly important to the Netherlands. Unfortunately, the numbers of civilian casualties resulting from the activities of the insurgents continued to rise. The insurgents’ planting of IEDs was a particular source of casualties among civilians. By planting IEDs near police posts or recruiting stations, the civilian population sometimes became an intentional target of the insurgents. The insurgents also killed civilians cooperating with ISAF as a means of deterrence.

In the 2006 – 2010 period, ISAF was also a cause of civilian casualties in Uruzgan. The Dutch government deeply regrets the fact that casualties were caused among the local people. In Uruzgan, ISAF units operated under Dutch command, but coalition partners (US OEF and AUS SF) also carried out operations in Uruzgan that were not under TFU command. The exact number of civilian casualties caused by Dutch actions can therefore not be established with any degree of certainty. This uncertainty is caused by a number of factors. Several actors carried out investigations into the circumstances surrounding civilian casualties. Firstly, ISAF itself\textsuperscript{14}, but the UN (UNAMA) and NGOs also carried out investigations. The numbers established by these organisations are not also suitable for comparison, while they also lack the detail required to attribute casualties to specific provinces, units and/or operations. The UN and ISAF often had no access to areas where possible civilian casualties had been reported. Furthermore, it is not always clear whether the casualties were caused by ISAF actions or had possible other causes. Reports of civilian casualties originating from the local population are often also inaccurate and incomplete. The distinction between OEF and ISAF units was often unclear, particularly to the population living outside the ink blot. In almost all cases, it was difficult or even impossible to carry out a battle damage assessment. The security situation did not always allow it, the Muslim community buries its dead within 24 hours and the population census left much to be desired. The majority of the civilian casualties attributable to the Dutch forces’ actions fell during the fighting around Chora. This operation led to investigations by ISAF, the Afghan government, UNAMA and the Netherlands Public Prosecution Service. In the opinion of the Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, force had been used within the limits of international humanitarian law and the Rule of Engagement in force. The independent investigation carried out by UNAMA and AIHRC at the request of the Netherlands concluded that “...the findings of the investigation suggest that in the specific circumstances ISAF forces were not responsible for any serious violations of international humanitarian law\textsuperscript{15}.” Investigations carried out in cases of possible civilian casualties is partly a result of international obligations regarding the registration of civilian casualties.

For 2010, UNAMA and AIHRC\textsuperscript{16} reported 2,777 civilian deaths in the whole of Afghanistan, 2,080 of which were attributed to the insurgents. A number of 440 deaths (16% of the total; a fall of 26% in comparison with 2009) is connected to ISAF and ANSF actions. Of this number, the use of air weapons was responsible for 171 deaths (a 52% fall when compared with 2009). For Uruzgan, UNAMA reports that during 13 incidents in the vicinity of the ink blot in 2009 and 2010\textsuperscript{17} there were 36 civilian deaths during ISAF, OEF and or ANSF operations. UNAMA does not name units in its report. The TFU was not involved in the incidents referred to.

\textsuperscript{14} Civilian Casualties Standard Operating Procedures.
\textsuperscript{15} AIHRC and UNAMA joint investigation into the civilian deaths caused by the ISAF operation in response to a Taliban attack in Chora district, Uruzgan on 16\textsuperscript{th} June 2007
\textsuperscript{16} Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2010 (March 2011)
\textsuperscript{17} UNAMA figures to be found on http://www.sciencemag.org/content/331/6022/1256/suppl/DC1
As previously mentioned, the prevention of collateral damage was constantly an important point of focus during the deployment of air support by the ATF. For example, use was made of the option involving the smallest amount of force in achieving the desired effect, i.e. by low fly-overs or by dropping flares without use of force. If possible, the lightest types of ammunition were selected for operations, with precision ammunition as the preferred option. In the deployment of air weapons, the ground unit requesting the support was responsible for target selection and target designation. The pilot is responsible for deciding whether the use of weapons is possible within the Rules of Engagement in force and with a minimum of collateral damage. Much attention was given to this point during the preparation of pilots and ground units. The same considerations were made during the use of the TFU’s heavy weapons (mortar, self-propelled howitzer). Furthermore, the consideration of a minimum use of force was also made at, for example, checkpoints in the case of warning shots being fired. Every incident involving the use of force by the TFU and the ATF was reported to the Netherlands Public Prosecution Service via Troops in Contact reports and After Action Review/Mission Reports. These incidents were then examined and, in some cases, led to a full investigation by the Public Prosecution Service. None of these cases led to prosecution.

UNAMA and ISAF reports show that, unfortunately, suicide attacks and IED attacks are increasingly affecting the local people. The Netherlands made a number of *ex gratia* payments in the case of collateral damage.

Sub-conclusions on security
It is difficult to draw objective sub-conclusions regarding the development of the security situation in Uruzgan. Security incidents often have several causes. The number of security incidents give an indication of the security situation, but this is a rather rough criterion for drawing definitive conclusions. Moreover, in assessing the security situation in Uruzgan, account should be taken of the fact that the Dutch presence in the area was largely limited to inside the ink blots; foreign units were active outside the ink blots. Claims made about the effect of the Dutch deployment in Uruzgan on the security situation focus mainly on the areas within the ink blot.

During the period that the Netherlands was in the province, the security situation inside the ink blot improved. Increased security made socio-economic development possible. There was a sharp reduction in the number of direct confrontations with the insurgents. Studies carried out by a number of organisations, among them The Liaison Office (TLO) and The Asia Foundation, indicate as much. Owing to the poor security situation in Uruzgan during 2006 and 2007, the Asia Foundation was unable to carry out studies in the area; after 2007, however, it was able to continue its research. Martine van Bijlert from the independent Afghan Analysts Network asserts that: "Attempts by the Dutch military and their civilian counterparts to avoid exacerbating existing conflicts and to reach out to disaffected and marginalized leaders have helped regain a level of stability in areas such as Darafshan, Chora and Deh Rawod. The situation, however, remains highly fragile". In March 2010, a petition was submitted to the Dutch representative during a *shura* (meeting of tribal and village elders) which contained the following passage: "The economic and social progress would not have been achieved without military protection of the

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18 "The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006 to 2010 – A TLO socio-political assessment" (August 2010)
environment by the Dutch PRT. Afghan security forces are not yet capable of ensuring security and stability in Uruzgan by themselves. Therefore the civilian targets in Uruzgan cannot be accomplished in the next years without military security provided by the coalition of Netherlands, USA, Australia, ANA and ANP. However, if civilian targets are not achieved, there will be no security in Uruzgan. In the security network of Uruzgan, the Netherlands is essential because the Dutch ISAF Contingent has developed a strong relationship of trust with the population of Uruzgan; without such a relationship, sustaining security is not possible in Afghanistan21.”

Demonstrable developments in the area of security are:

- In June 2009, the Operational Coordination Center-Provincial (the provincial central incident room for security-related issues) was established.

- In 2006, 160 Afghan military personnel were active in Uruzgan. In 2010, this number had increased to 3,200, approximately 2,000 of whom were capable of operating outside the compound simultaneously. The deployment of these soldiers was made possible by the efforts of Dutch, French and Australian OMLTs.

- Between 2006 and 2010, the number of Afghan police officers in Uruzgan increased from zero to 1,600. Most of them were trained at the Police Training Centre, which is financed by the Netherlands, in Tarin Kowt.

- Six new Police Sub-Stations were built in Uruzgan between 2006 and 2010. In addition, scores of checkpoints were established or improved.

- As a result of the intensive patrolling carried out by Dutch and Afghan military personnel and coalition partners, there was less fighting in the area compared to the start of the mission. However, the insurgents did use more IEDs, of which an increasing number were detected owing to improved detection techniques and intensive pressure on IED manufacturers and IED planters. The number of detected IEDs and weapon storage places found on the basis of information provided by the local population also rose.

- The Afghan army and police force became ever more capable of operating independently. This resulted in the ink blot around Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawod and Chora, with extensions towards the Baluchi Valley, Deh Rashan and Mirabad, becoming much bigger in the 2006-2010 period. Traffic between the three largest population centres increased substantially. In 2010, government officials were no longer afraid to travel by car between Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod and to show themselves in Chora.

- Afghan security services became increasingly self-sufficient and effective. In 2009, local governors independently drew up a security plan (entitled “The Uruzgan Security Plan”) and the Afghan security services organised and led the security operation surrounding the 2009 election independently.

21 Bette Dam/Netherlands Radio World service, 26 March 2010
- Between 2006 and 2010, the number of ISAF and Afghan security services posts and bases in Uruzgan rose from four to more than twenty, which represented a larger and visible presence of the Afghan government, with its responsibility for security, in the area.

4.4 Good governance
With regard to this aspect of the mission, the Netherlands concentrated on providing financial support, advice and diplomatic effort at all political levels. As far as improvement of local government is concerned, at the international level the Netherlands advocated more attention for the development of good governance throughout Afghanistan; at the Afghan national level, it lobbied for, among other things, implementation of national programmes for the improvement of local governance (i.e. also in Uruzgan); and at the local level, it emphasised the importance of good governance and assisted the UNDP in implementing a capacity programme.

The governor of the province had a central role in the implementation of the Dutch policy regarding local government. The success of this policy implementation was largely dependent on the authority of the governor and his efforts in this area.

4.4.1 Capacity building
For the Netherlands, an important spearhead for the improvement of local governance was capacity building and the staffing of local government positions, under the pre-conditions of improving representation, transparency and integrity.

During the mission, the Netherlands constantly argued and lobbied at the national level for more Afghan government attention for Uruzgan province. This policy was successful in view of the fact that the gap between Kabul and the province has been substantially reduced and the number of programmes aimed at developing governance in Uruzgan has increased. The national government’s and NGOs’ extremely negative perception of this province has also been significantly reduced, although it has not yet disappeared altogether. An important logistic step in reducing the gap between Uruzgan and Kabul was the establishment of regular flights between the two locations, making the province more accessible to government and NGO officials based in Kabul.

In December 2006, the PRT organised the first Provincial Development Council, in which provincial government officials, ministers from national government and PRT members discussed plans for the development of the province. As a result, the Provincial Development Team was set up and tasked with supporting and coordinating between provincial government departments; it comprised five Afghan advisers, led by the provincial governor. This team was assisted by civilian advisers from the PRT.

At the national level, on the initiative of the Netherlands and a number of other parties, in late 2007 Uruzgan was designated a ‘pilot province’, where local government reform was to be pushed through rapidly. In the same period, the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) was established, partly as a result of funding from the Netherlands. The IDLG is an advisory body directly under the President and its most important tasks are to centrally direct provincial government bodies and enhance good governance and institutional development at the decentralised level. Soon after its establishment, the IDLG started its work in Uruzgan. Partly as a result of Dutch lobbying at the national level, senior IDLG officials and
Afghan ministers visited the province. The objective of these visits was to open a dialogue and to be personally informed of problems at local level.

Two other initiatives in Uruzgan started at the same time as the IDLG programme. These were the Afghan Subnational Governance Programme (ASGP), in which the Independent Administrative Reform & Civil Service Commission (CSC) was involved, and the Priority Reform and Reconstruction (PRR) programme. The objective of the two programmes was to increase the number of qualified civil servants operating at the provincial level. The Netherlands has urged the CSC to devote more attention to the recruitment and training of civil servants in Afghanistan. As a consequence, in early 2010, the CSC committed itself to strengthening provincial government in Uruzgan by providing more civil servants and, furthermore, fulfilled this pledge with Australian funding by establishing a programme for capacity-building in Uruzgan. Fifty trainees were recruited for the programme and trained for employment with the provincial government. By the end of 2010, 37 of these trainees were employed in provincial government.

The activities of various NGOs and international organisations (IOs) in Uruzgan also showed an increase. The ASGP and UNDP and the opening of a UNAMA field office in the province are examples of this. The eventual establishment of a UNAMA office in Uruzgan was a direct consequence of Dutch diplomatic efforts and resulted in the UN carrying out various development programmes in Uruzgan (‘food for work’, school meal programmes and vaccination programmes). Prior to the mission, there were only seven NGOs active in Uruzgan; in 2010, the number of NGOs that were or had been active in Uruzgan had increased to over forty. This increase was partly the result of conscious Dutch efforts, on the diplomatic and security fronts, to stimulate the civil domain in the province.

Among these activities, there were also initiatives aimed at enhancing the capacity and quality of local government. For example, the German NGO Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) provided training courses to government officials and The Asia Foundation (TAF) made advisers available to local governors with the aid of Dutch funding. In addition to TAF, the IDLG also employed a number of Afghan advisers in support of the Governor of Uruzgan. During the course of the mission, the Governor appointed 20 advisers, but in practical terms these did not all exercise an equal amount of influence. This was due to the fact that the Governor as well as the advisers had little budgetary and discretionary authority. This authority was vested in the provincial ministries, which operated under directions from Kabul. For this reason, the Governor and his advisers could do relatively little about possibly dysfunctional ministries. All in all, only a part of the advisers, particularly the advisers for security, infrastructure and rural development, had an influence on policy in Uruzgan.

Various training courses given on the subject of good governance have resulted in more civil servants becoming aware of its basic principles. These principles include the administrative planning and budgetary cycle.

At the national level, the Netherlands did not only request more focus on poor governance in Uruzgan and on the funding of various programmes aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of local government, but also invested in improving government buildings and other civil service facilities. This was a highly necessary step for developing governance. One example of this was the reopening of the White Compound, the seat of the district
government of Chora in January 2010, made possible by the renovation of the building with Dutch resources. This project contributed to making the district government better able to carry out its administrative work.

The visibility of government in Uruzgan in 2010 has improved since 2006. After decades of absence, district governments were set up in two districts (Deh Rawod and Chora) following efforts made by the Netherlands. The population in these areas is once again involved in politics, after a long absence of formal government. This is a step in the right direction.

During the course of the mission, the Netherlands continuously advocated, both at the national and international levels (e.g. during various international conferences on Afghanistan), a broad, national capacity-building programme. In June 2010, the Afghan government approved the Sub-National Governance Policy Framework on the basis of agreements made during the London conference. This acted as the new Afghan national policy framework for the improvement of local government, with sub-frameworks for financial management, capacity development and tackling corruption.

Sub-conclusion on capacity-building:
Despite all of the initiatives taken, capacity-building in the area of governance was laborious. The figures show moderate progress in the quantitative capacity of formal local governance; from 20% to 30% in terms of staffing, as the TLO report states. Although, by the end of the mission, the positions of governor and chief-of-police were manned in all districts, a large proportion of the other positions remained vacant. This means that by late 2010, capacity shortfalls were still among the biggest problems for the development of good governance.

4.4.2 Transparency and integrity
In addition to capacity-building, one of the policy priorities in place was to enhance the legitimacy of local government by improving transparency and integrity. At the start of the mission, government organisations did not have a great deal of legitimacy among the local population. Various problems, among them the dominance of the Popolzai tribe in local government positions, played a part in this phenomenon. In addition, appointments were almost always based on personal relations with high-placed provincial or national government officials or even the President, instead of on qualifications for the job. Large-scale corruption within provincial government and failure to apply financial control mechanisms were further problems in this area.

The 2007 Article 100 letter announced the intensification of Dutch policy regarding the support and mentoring of local governance in Uruzgan. Increasing the transparency and integrity of local governance was meant to increase the population’s confidence in local government organisations, in turn resulting in acceptance and greater effectiveness of these organisations. At national level, the Netherlands pressed for the appointment of government officials known for their personal integrity.

In the context of transparency and integrity, the Netherlands also advocated a policy of appointing suitable candidates for jobs. As part of the Netherlands’ efforts in this field, the Netherlands lobbied for provincial civil servants who did not belong to the Popolzai tribe and were of good reputation. On a number of occasions, the Dutch lobby met with success. For example, Jan Mohammed Khan resigned before the Dutch mission began and a governor with a better reputation, Munib, was appointed to
replace him. The appointment of Munib’s successor, Governor Hamdam, was also in line with Dutch policy. These two governors had no direct ties to Uruzgan province and could therefore start their duties with a relatively clean slate. They were also able to bring disadvantaged tribes back into politics. At the beginning of their periods of office, the two men were able to achieve, in relative terms, quite a lot; it is therefore in those periods that the most progress was made regarding good governance.

However, in both cases, the effectiveness of the two governors diminished during the course of their terms of office. An active first period in the terms of both Munib and Hamdam was followed by a period with little activity and less progress. This was partly due to the influence that informal leaders, such as Jan Mohammed Khan, were able to exert. Informal leaders often did not support the policies of Munib and Hamdam and regularly worked against local government initiatives. This was a negative influence on the development of good governance. In Governor Munib’s case, he was not only thwarted in his efforts by informal leaders in Uruzgan but also lost the confidence of the population, further weakening his position. Another consequence of the negative influence of informal leaders was the gradual decline in the governors’ enthusiasm for making greater efforts for the province, resulting in them appearing less and less in the province itself. The complex government position and the influence of informal leaders on the government’s endeavours greatly influenced the effectiveness of the provincial government.

Tackling corruption was an important part of enhancing the transparency and integrity of local government. The Netherlands combated corruption by only entering into agreements with reliable partners and by implementing national programmes with national control mechanisms. At the same time, these partner organisations had a monopoly position, particularly at the beginning, owing to the limited number of actors. There was increasing corruption due to the availability of large sums of donor funds. Therefore, a critical attitude was adopted and a critical dialogue opened regarding the efforts of these organisations. Cooperation was ended if an organisation was not functioning appropriately and transparently. The Netherlands also made efforts at the international level in asking for more attention for tackling corruption. One example of this is that the Netherlands, in the context of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), continuously requested the World Bank’s attention for the introduction of a system of local responsibility for expenditure of financial resources; and, subsequently, for the World Bank to monitor the system. This would act as a control mechanism for better detection of corruption. However, at the end of the mission, it can be concluded that corruption is still a major problem and is an obstruction to the effectiveness of government.

Sub-conclusion on transparency and integrity
The perception of the population regarding the integrity of the provincial and district government has shown little change for the better. The TLO perception study confirms as much. Confidence in local government has remained at a low ebb and the population perceives local civil servants to be corrupt, poorly qualified for their jobs and guilty of nepotism.

4.4.3 Power brokers
As described above, the influence of informal leaders is a problem for the formal system. In practice, the question of doing business with these power brokers proved to be a complex issue. Before the arrival of Dutch military personnel in Uruzgan, Jan Mohammed Khan was Governor of the province.
At the beginning of the Dutch mission, the Netherlands insisted that he give up his position as governor on account of his violent and corrupt past. His departure was a condition for deployment of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan. Jan Mohammed Khan was eventually forced to resign by President Karzai, but did, however, retain a great deal of influence over day-to-day affairs in Uruzgan from a position behind the scenes. He was, together with his cousin Matiullah Khan, the most important power broker in Uruzgan. Dutch policy regarding these two power brokers of ill repute was to avoid intensive cooperation with them. However, in practical terms, the issue of avoiding doing business with these power brokers turned out to be an extremely complex matter.

The main effort of the mission was primarily in support of the legitimate Afghan government. The activities of, for example, warlord Matiullah Khan could potentially have contributed to creating a certain form of security, albeit that his activities were not necessarily aimed at strengthening official Afghan government authority but more at strengthening his own position of power. It was also known that, in the past, Matiullah Khan, together with Jan Mohammed Khan, had marginalised large parts of the population. For that reason, the Netherlands was of the opinion that the influence of Matiullah Khan and Jan Mohammed Khan should be used in a controlled way. That could only be done if the two power brokers were prepared to recognise the authority of the local government and take into account the wishes and vision of all population groups and tribes when carrying out their activities. A policy was adopted of only working with Matiullah Khan if he was under Afghan government leadership. The Netherlands also decided not to take part in shura meetings initiated and organised by Matiullah Khan. The Netherlands urged ISAF partners to follow the same course of action.

The Netherlands also made efforts to integrate Matiullah Khan’s men into the formal Afghan police force structures. From 2007 onwards, Matiullah Khan’s men (the Kandak Amniante Uruzgan – KAU) no longer had any formal raison d’être and should have been part of the Afghan police force. In practice, Matiullah Khan’s men operated as a militia group, checking traffic on the most important roads in and out of Uruzgan and generating high revenues for the warlord in the process. This militia group was not under supervision of the Afghan government. Unfortunately, at the national level, there was too little Afghan political will and drive to bring Matiullah Khan’s militia to an end, leaving him complete freedom of action to follow his own path and carry on with his activities.

Despite this, the policy implemented by the Netherlands did result in winning the confidence of other tribes that had previously been marginalised. These disadvantaged tribes had in the past often sought support from the Taliban in their tribal struggle against the power of the Popolzai tribe of Jan Mohammed Khan and Matiullah Khan. As the presence of and protection afforded by Dutch troops gave them the opportunity to once again get involved in local governance, the support of such disadvantaged tribes for the Taliban gradually, but noticeably, started to diminish.

One problem with the stringent Dutch policy towards power brokers was that it did not allow the Dutch mission leadership to enter into dialogue with Jan Mohammed Khan and Matiullah Khan who, in practical terms, still held a great deal of informal power and resources with which they could obstruct formal government officials in their activities. This was in direct contrast to ISAF and OEF partners in the area, who did cooperate with them, especially
in the area of security. There was therefore no unity of effort regarding this issue. As a consequence, the Netherlands was not able to find a consistent and definitive solution for the complex problem of dealing with this type of informal leader.

Sub-conclusions on power brokers
Dutch policy towards certain power brokers resulted in gaining the confidence of previously marginalised tribes. However, the adopted policy did not lead to curbing the power and influence of these power brokers; even without a formal power base and without contact with the Dutch military in the area, they continued to play a significant role during the course of the Dutch mission. The lack of international agreements on how to deal with informal leaders resulted in the Dutch policy in this area having little effect.

4.4.4 Representation and tribal balance
Uruzgan has a complex tribal power structure. Tribal leaders have long played an important role in society in the province and there is little scope for other forms of governance, although the situation is gradually improving. As mentioned above, the Popolzai tribe, with its former leaders Jan Mohammed Khan and Matiullah Khan, is very dominant in the province, even though this tribe is a minority of the population. Right from the start, the Dutch devoted considerable attention to the distorted tribal relationships. The great majority of the tribes in Uruzgan had no share in the power and consequently had no access to the – limited – public services. Achieving a better reflection of the tribal relationships in government posts was a first priority. Dutch policy was aimed at – where possible – making a contribution to a structural improvement in these relationships, both in formal and informal governance.

Up until May 2007, the Afghan government allotted only very little central funding to improving governance in Uruzgan. In response to these problems and at the request of local administrators, the Netherlands, via its embassy, used its influence to bring about the reinstatement of the operational funds for the provincial governors, which had been stopped in 2006. These funds pay for, among other things, tribal representation activities and reconciliation programmes. The Netherlands has contributed financially to these funds via the ARTF.

In order to counterbalance the informal power structures of Popolzai powerbrokers and the distorted tribal relations, the Netherlands gave considerable support to tribal leaders of less influential tribes. These tribes are the Ghilzai, particularly in the Mirabad region, the Deh Rafshan area and Deh Rawod, and the Barakzai and Achekzai tribes in the district of Chora. The cultural advisers played an important role in maintaining contacts with the leaders and collecting information.

An important step in improving the tribal balance was the tribal dialogue. The Netherlands contributed greatly to this by encouraging meetings between the leaders of various tribes and the local administration in all three of the population centres, and also by providing the necessary facilities. Many conflicts in Uruzgan had nothing to do with the Taliban, but arose from conflicts about land and water or dated back to the old ethnic conflicts. By helping the Afghan government to carry out development projects, the Netherlands tried to encourage the population of Uruzgan to be more open to the formal Afghan authorities. At the start of the mission, the PRT’s contacts with the tribal leaders were mainly aimed at security and building up the (auxiliary) police and police stations. In addition, via the
intermediary of TLO and political and cultural advisers, an intensive dialogue was in place with influential tribal leaders in Uruzgan, Kandahar, Kabul, and even in Pakistan. In 2008, the policy with regard to informal leaders or powerbrokers was formalised by RC-S for the whole ISAF in the south. RC-S identified all the powerbrokers in the south of Afghanistan. RC-S, together with the TFU, determined an individual approach for each powerbroker. The programme ran from 2009 to the end of the mission in 2010. The main players in Uruzgan were the non-Popolzai leaders who were keen to work with ISAF and the Afghan government. The regions in which these players held sway were, in particular, Deh Rafshan, parts of the Mirabad valley and parts of the district of Chora.

Solid results have been achieved in the areas of representation and tribal balance. Although the Popalzai still occupy the majority of government positions, the number of members of other – previously disadvantaged – tribes in local government has increased. This has resulted in tribes such as the Barakzai, Ghilzai/Tokhi and Achekzai regaining representation in provincial politics. The influence of informal power structures frequently formed a greater obstacle to the development of good governance than the influence of the Taliban. The relatively large influence of the Taliban (see also paragraph 3.4.1) was seen by the Netherlands as a consequence of the tribal imbalance in the province. This perception turned out to be correct. The efforts of the Dutch to solve the problem of tribal imbalance resulted in reduced support for the Taliban. Especially in the case of the Ghilzai (including the Tokhi) and the Barakzai, this Dutch policy led to a more secure situation and increased government control of areas in Uruzgan. The population welcomed this emphasis on tribal balance and the policy of ‘develop where possible, take military action where necessary.

This does not, however, mean that the people’s faith in national politics has improved. For example, members of the Ghilzai tribe did not nominate any candidates for positions in the *Wolesi Jirga* (the Afghan House of Representatives) because they had no trust in the national elections being carried out fairly and honestly. In general, the turn-out at elections in the southern provinces has fallen, which confirms the impression that the people do not have much confidence in national politics.

A large part of the population considers the improvements in the field of good governance as an achievement of the Dutch and not due in part to the efforts of local government22. This is further evidence of the local population’s lack of confidence in local government. Once it became clear that the Dutch deployment in Uruzgan would come to an end, the local leaders, especially of the tribes that had been marginalised in the past, started to get worried because they feared that the tribal balance would swing against them after the Dutch withdrawal23. This demonstrates that the Dutch efforts in support of the local leaders and population were appreciated. During the transfer to the Australian and US troops, the Dutch explained their approach to tribal balance to their successors.

Sub-conclusion on representation and tribal balance
The Dutch efforts to reduce tribal imbalance resulted in a fall in the population’s support for the Taliban in certain areas. Especially in the case of the Ghilzai (including the Tokhi) and the Barakzai, this policy led to a more secure situation and increased government control of areas in Uruzgan. In any case, the mission put an end to the one-sided dominant position of the Popolzai tribe and the Australian and American successors

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22 TLO 2010, p. 28
23 TLO 2010, p. 53-54
have largely continued the policy with regard to representation and tribal balance.

4.4.5 Rule of Law

Improving the legal sector in Uruzgan was not a top priority for the Netherlands, since other issues had greater urgency. However, the problem was soon recognised and, in 2007, a temporary rule-of-law specialist was called in, who mapped out the – rudimentary – legal sector in Uruzgan. As from the end of 2008, the Netherlands devoted more attention to the legal sector. This related mainly to the ‘enabling environment’ for the Public Prosecutor’s Office, judges and the prison service.

One part of the improvement to the judicial system in Uruzgan was facilitating the legal infrastructure. This was largely lacking in Uruzgan and was one of the causes of the capacity problem. Due in part to the absence of a well-organised formal judicial system, the population often turned to informal forms of justice, including that administered by Taliban leaders. The Netherlands supported several small-scale projects aimed at refurbishing the necessary buildings. This made it possible to contribute relatively simply and quickly to promoting the rule of law in Uruzgan, although on a modest scale. Examples of this were the restoration of the courthouse in Tarin Kowt and the district court in Chora, so that they could be put back into use. In addition, a number of houses intended for judges have been renovated in order to make it more attractive for judges to come to Uruzgan. By investing in the infrastructure, the Netherlands has made a contribution to improving the image of this sector and making it more attractive for judicial personnel to move temporarily to Uruzgan.

The Netherlands has also made contributions in the field of custodial facilities. Thanks in part to Dutch support, the Central Prisons Department has assigned additional personnel to Uruzgan and the prison staff have received training from the Ministry of Justice in Tarin Kowt in prison management and the correct treatment of detainees. In order to improve the treatment of detainees by the Afghan authorities, the Article 100 letter of 2005 included the following sentence:

“This may include the construction of a detention facility that meets international standards, as well as the training of guards, explanation and assistance regarding national and international monitoring, etc.”

Right from the start of the mission, political advisers were working on a plan, and its implementation, for the construction of a prison in Tarin Kowt. The construction of this prison turned out to be an extremely laborious process and an example of how difficult it is to carry out infrastructural projects in provinces such as Uruzgan. Finally, in the spring of 2011, the detention facility was officially opened and put into use.

In order to identify the problems arising in the field of the rule of law, the Netherlands in 2010 commissioned the German Max Planck Institute to conduct a study into the subject. When the study was completed in 2010, it had meanwhile been decided that the Netherlands would leave Uruzgan. In order to ensure that the recommendations of the Max Planck Institute would be adopted, the study was widely disseminated among donors and the successors to the Netherlands in Uruzgan.

Sub-conclusion on rule of law

The time that the Netherlands was able to devote to the judicial sector in Uruzgan was too short to achieve any substantial improvement in this sector. Efforts were therefore focused on the infrastructure and much less on capacity development. Despite a modest increase in attention and
interest for filling judicial positions in Uruzgan, the province is still faced with considerable capacity shortfalls.

4.4.6 Detention
From the start of the mission, the Dutch treatment of detainees was an important point of attention. ISAF units were authorised, under certain conditions, to capture and detain people. This also applied to Dutch military personnel. Detainees had to be handed over to the Afghan authorities within 96 hours. Up to the hand-over to the Afghan authorities, the ISAF partners were responsible for the correct treatment of the detainees. The ISAF nations were not responsible for detainees arrested by the Afghan army or police.

Prior to the Uruzgan mission, the Dutch government made agreements, confirmed in writing, with the Afghan government regarding the transfer and treatment of persons whom Dutch military personnel in Afghanistan had captured and handed over to the Afghans.

The Article 100 letter of 2005 contains the following statement: 
".. it has been agreed with the Afghan government that the death penalty may not be carried out in respect of detainees transferred by the Netherlands. The Afghan authorities shall treat the detainees in question in accordance with the applicable international standards. The detainees may be visited by representatives of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), the International Red Cross, UN Human Rights reporters and the Dutch Embassy. The Afghan authorities shall notify the Dutch Embassy of important steps in the legal procedure, such as the start of a trial or their release.

These agreements were in line with the Geneva Conventions, which were also referred to in the Van Baalen motion of November 2005, which expressed concern for the treatment of detainees. In addition, it was agreed that the ICRC and the AIHRC would be informed within 24 hours of a detainee being housed in the Temporary Holding Facility in Kamp Holland. These organisations would also be informed of any release or transfer to the National Directorate of Security (NDS). Within one week of a detainee’s transfer to the Afghan authorities, the detainee was usually visited by an employee of the Dutch embassy in Kabul or the political adviser in Tarin Kowt. Subsequently, an embassy employee would visit the detainee every three months. Detainees transferred by Australia were also monitored by the Netherlands in accordance with the same principles.

In the course of the mission, over 500 persons were captured and detained under this arrangement. The majority were released shortly after capture. Some of them were handed over to the NDS on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Afghanistan. With regard to this group, there were sound reasons for further investigation into possible criminal offences.

Sub-conclusion on detention
The agreements in the MoU were, in general, well observed. Where this was not the case, the Afghan authorities were called to account. Detainees handed over by the Netherlands were not tortured or treated inhumanely. In the event of complaints by detainees, the Netherlands ensured that these were dealt with by the Afghan authorities. No complaints were upheld during the course of the mission. Access was readily granted for the monitoring organisations and the embassy staff to visit the detainees. The ICRC and the AIHRC were, in general, very satisfied with the way in which
the TFU handled the issue of detention. Amnesty International concluded in 2007 that the Dutch MoU seemed to function better than that of some other countries.

4.4.7 Human rights

The government set itself the objective that, by the end of the mission, human rights would play a greater role in Uruzgan, as laid down in the Article 100 letter of 2007. The human rights situation in Afghanistan was, even after the fall of the Taliban, a cause for concern. The principal themes were violence against women and girls, restrictions on freedom of speech, a culture of impunity and the administration of the death sentence. The opaque Afghan legislative process and the weakness of the formal judicial system hindered the achievement of this objective. At the same time, civil society was still too weak to properly monitor compliance with human rights by the Afghan government.

Human rights, and more specifically the protection of the population and improved access to basic facilities, formed an important point of departure for the Dutch mission. All interventions and activities were first analysed in respect of the question as to whether they could contribute to improving the situation of the population in Uruzgan, with particular attention for human rights in all areas of the mission.

The Netherlands provided funding at a national level for a variety of activities in the field of human rights. These included access for Afghan women to the legal system, transitional justice, education and democratisation. The Netherlands invested in special programmes of, for example, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the AIHRC, which were aimed at combating discrimination against women and promoting equality between men and women in respect of rights and duties. In bilateral contacts with the Afghan government, the Netherlands highlighted various human rights issues on several occasions. In addition, close contacts were maintained with the AIHRC, various Afghan NGOs, European partners and the UN. Financial aid from the Netherlands also enabled technical assistance to be given to Afghanistan for the compilation of the first national Universal Periodic Review (UPR) report of the UN. The Netherlands contributed to financing an Afghan radio and TV station that made educational programmes about the rights and duties of Afghan citizens under the Afghan constitution.

The Netherlands was particularly concerned about violence against women and girls and restrictions on freedom of speech in Afghanistan. The international community, including the Netherlands, has on many occasions expressed its concern to the Afghan authorities about a number of provisions in the Shia Family Law which discriminate against women. The Netherlands also had a role in the drawing up of the NATO report “Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 – Practices and Lessons in Afghanistan”. On the basis of this report, it was decided to appoint two gender advisers at the ISAF headquarters in Kabul. The Netherlands itself deployed a human-rights specialist who is particularly active in the field of women’s rights and youth delinquency, a gender specialist as part of the Dutch personnel contribution to the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan, and a gender specialist at the ISAF headquarters. In addition, the NGO “Save the Children” drew attention to children's rights by means of radio programmes made for and by children, as well as by preparing courses on children’s rights aimed at teachers and police officers.
During the Uruzgan mission, a great deal was invested in increasing access to basic facilities, such as education, including for girls, and better health care for the population (see Annex B). As part of their efforts to build good governance and law enforcement, the NGOs, the UN and the PRT also devoted attention to human rights and the position of women. For example, the Netherlands raised a number of human rights issues with local authorities and made resources available to tackle the problems. The PRT sought contact in an appropriate manner with women in the province and, for example by means of radio broadcasts, highlighted the need for respect to be shown to women and girls and for their rights.

Sub-conclusion on human rights
The Netherlands, with its totality of activities and interventions, helped the Afghan authorities protect the population against violence and made it possible for more opportunities for development to be offered. The conservative, tribal and deeply religious Muslim population of Uruzgan had, up to the arrival of the Netherlands, little experience of girls going to school, women being given access to medical care and opponents being treated with respect for their individual rights. It may be concluded that a start is being made with the process of building awareness and putting into practice the principle of equal human rights for everyone in Uruzgan, but that the situation of women remains difficult, also by Afghan standards.

4.4.8 Counternarcotics operations
Uruzgan is one of the traditional opium regions of Afghanistan and in 2004 was the fourth province as regards area under opium poppy cultivation. From the start of the mission, there were indications that the authorities were involved in the drug trade in Uruzgan as well. As a result, the drugs problem also has a negative effect on the local administration. Moreover, the revenues from the sales of drugs form an important potential source of income for the insurgents.

ISAF could assist Afghan government with counternarcotics operations, but ISAF did not have the legal authority to destroy harvests or take any other autonomous action against drug producers. In 2005, the EU and Afghanistan agreed to cooperate in the field of anti-drug operations. When the mission was extended in 2007, policy priorities for the Dutch mission’s anti-drug operations were announced. These related to a consistent information campaign for farmers, the development of alternative sources of income (partly in the framework of a broad rural development strategy) and more attention for law enforcement and interdiction.

In 2007, the Netherlands signed an agreement with the US Drugs Enforcement Administration (DEA) to assign a DEA team to Uruzgan. This team gathered intelligence and cooperated closely with the Afghan National Interdiction Units, which operate at a national level to capture major drug dealers and producers. In practice, however, the DEA did not live up to expectations because its priorities were in other provinces.

Dutch policy was aimed at contributing to a programme of providing farmers with alternative sources of income, within the framework of the Afghan national counternarcotics plan. The Netherlands intended to take advantage of the relatively high world prices for food crops. This would help to make the transition more attractive for the farmers. Initially, efforts were directed, via small-scale projects and national programmes of the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), to the repair of irrigation channels, the distribution of seeds and fertilizer and the building up of infrastructure. In February 2007, a mission consisting of, among
others, representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature & Food Quality and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with Afghan and British experts, started an investigation into alternative livelihoods. This has led to several projects involving saffron, fruit trees, poultry and vegetable cultivation, as well as the GTZ project ‘Alternative Livelihoods’. Between 2008 and 2010 the FAO carried out a large-scale programme to provide farmers with wheat seed and fertiliser.

In addition, support was given to projects aimed at building awareness of the dangers of drug-taking. The provincial government in Uruzgan organised several anti-drugs meetings. SABA Media, in cooperation with the FAO, organised a weekly information programme on the advantages of legitimate crops as compared with illicit cultivation of opiates. This organisation also provided information material and radio and (later) television programmes on anti-drugs activities and the criminal aspects of poppy cultivation. The meetings were also used to provide information on alternative sources of income. In the latter part of the mission in particular, more and more attention was being paid to telling people in Uruzgan about the negative consequences of drug use. In 2009, the NGO Save the Children set up a drug addiction treatment centre with twenty places, which soon had a waiting list.

These activities led to some modest results. In 2009, opium poppy cultivation in Uruzgan fell, especially within the ink blot. Around mid-2008, a counternarcotics specialist of the National Police Services Agency (KLPD) was assigned to the TFU in order to increase the expertise and knowledge in the field of counternarcotics. Available information about drug production and trafficking was collated and regular discussions were held with the international ISAF partners.

In the field of interdiction, the construction of an office for the specialised Afghan Counter-Narcotics Police was financed via the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The embassy in Kabul successfully lobbied for an expansion of the Counter-Narcotics Police.

Sub-conclusion on counternarcotics operations
There was constant attention during the mission for the way in which the objectives in the field of counternarcotics could be achieved, especially by the efforts of the TFU. Activities were undertaken in the field of socio-economic development and these scored a number of successes. Firstly, counternarcotics was left to the Afghan authorities on the basis of the strategy supported by the international community. This strategy is based on alternatives for poppy, punishment of people in the network and destruction of the crop by local authorities. The number of activities carried out within the ISAF mandate was progressively increased. The question of what was the international role and what should be left to the Afghans was a constant point of attention. Dutch policy was that it was not NATO’s task to carry out eradication. It considered that too much emphasis on eradication was unwise, since it hit the farmers the hardest and not the traffickers. On the other hand, the Netherlands recognised the value of supporting efforts to destroy the networks (interdiction) and providing farmers with alternative sources of income.

General sub-conclusion on good governance
Some promising first steps were taken in the field of good governance and these have produced some modest results, although it must be admitted that the results did not meet expectations or the previously formulated ambitions. Four years proved to be too short to substantially and
structurally change governance in Uruzgan. The problem was just too complex. The support, up to the highest national level, enjoyed by the informal structures and powerbrokers also played a considerable role here and continually undermined the formal structures. There was also the problem of distribution due to the fact that Kabul serves a large number of provinces. On the positive side, some changes were initiated that may produce permanent results in the longer term. But this does not mean that by mid-2010 there was a situation of good governance with sufficient capacity and legitimacy to control the province autonomously. It takes more time to build good governance in a country such as Afghanistan and a province such as Uruzgan. The civil assessment was very useful for structuring the policy in the field of good governance. However, since the assessment was only carried out in the summer of 2006, the information it provided could not be put into effect right from the start of the mission.

4.5   Socio-economic development

4.5.1 Execution and results
During the first two years of the mission, the Netherlands – in addition to quick and visible projects – concentrated on Afghan national programmes and promoting their presence in Uruzgan. This also required investment in local capacity in the province, both that of the government and of the NGOs. The main characteristics of the Dutch contribution were the support of the Afghan government agencies (Afghanisation) and enlargement of the “civil domain” in the province. In order to ensure the permanence of the programmes, the Netherlands tried to create as much scope as possible for civil partners, such as ministries, NGOs and UN organisations, so that they could identify and carry out the necessary activities. This would be easier for these bodies, since they had more contact with the people and were familiar with local culture. There was an ongoing search for the right mix of instruments to achieve rapid and visible results on the one hand and to support lasting Afghan development on the other hand. The development cooperation programme in Uruzgan covered a great many sectors and themes: security, good governance, rule of law and human rights, gender, agriculture and rural development, infrastructure (connecting roads and water facilities), education and health care.

4.5.2 Afghanisation
The government considered that the key to the lasting stabilisation of southern Afghanistan was in the hands of the Afghan government and the local population. They were to play an important role in identifying, prioritising and carrying out the projects. One of the principal instruments for doing this was “civil assessment”. Efforts were devoted, in consultation with the governor, to launching the Provincial Development Committee, that would be responsible for coordinating and steering the reconstruction activities. Afghanisation sometimes led to the implementation of the programmes taking longer than would otherwise have been the case, on account of the extremely limited absorption capacity of the province.

In all the sectors, the Netherlands tried to work as far as possible via the Afghan government and with Afghan partners. For example, it invested in education via the ARTF by earmarking resources for the EQUIP educational programme of the Afghan Ministry of Education. In addition, the Netherlands financed the Dutch division of the Save the Children NGO, which works with Afghan contractors. They, in cooperation with the Afghan Ministry of Education, also carried out a part of the EQUIP programme, thus
enabling the Netherlands to keep a closer watch on the progress of this programme.

Improvements to health care were made via the Afghan NGO AHDS. AHDS was responsible for carrying out the national programme of the Ministry of Education. In order for these national programmes to be implemented in the province as well, the Netherlands stimulated Afghan ministers to visit Uruzgan on several occasions. The Netherlands also financed the Dutch Consortium Uruzgan (DCU). The DCU, a partnership of five Dutch NGOs, worked closely with Afghan partners in Uruzgan in order to win local support for the projects and assure their sustainability. The DCU’s programme runs until April 2013. Its role is set out in more detail in paragraph 4.5.5.4.

The Dutch mission focused mainly but not exclusively on the three most densely populated districts: Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawod and Chora. Development cooperation activities also extended outside these districts in order to reach marginal population groups. The local population and administrators played an important role in identifying, prioritising and carrying out projects. The activities in agriculture, rural development and water management, financed via the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the FAO and local NGOs, were for the most part identified by a referendum and carried out by local communities. The international and Afghan NGOs were not, in general, too keen on working together with the local authorities. Although the atmosphere of mutual distrust could not be cleared entirely, the many talks between these two groups, initiated by the PRT, did much to improve their mutual contact and understanding.

Sub-conclusion on Afghanisation
The Afghan government is the central focus; the governor and the ministries must be able to deliver the basic services. This brings legitimacy and stability. That is why efforts were concentrated on improving the government’s service provision and consequently its public support. The dynamics and influence of political, tribal, social and economic structures on the stability in a province such as Uruzgan are great. It was therefore essential to have an understanding of the background to the conflicts in the province. That is why the Netherlands devoted a great deal of effort, both before and during the mission, to identifying and analysing these dynamics and their influence on the region and the people.

In order to achieve lasting results, it was essential to involve the population in all stages of the project cycle. It is the population, together with the government, that holds the key to peace, security and sustainable development. A great deal of time and energy is devoted to strengthening social outreach and ownership. Initially, local civil organisations were considered as the main partner for sustainable development. Later on, provincial government played a more important role and there was more and better interaction between the two groups.

4.5.3 “Quick and Visible Projects” (QVPs) and “Equal Financial Ceiling” (EFC) projects
The implementation and supervision of the QVPs was the responsibility of Afghan NGOs. These projects were financed by Development Cooperation funds and were managed by the Dutch Embassy. They included repairs to roads and irrigation channels, health care, communication and rural

development programmes. Before the QVPs were launched, the local dynamics of the region in question were carefully mapped out. The main players ("change agents" and "spoilers"), the current and potential conflicts and the most urgent needs in the districts were identified. The next step was to consult local NGOs, tribal chiefs and elders, and shuras in order to determine which projects were a matter of priority. In this way, the mission tried, where possible, to create a bonding effect between communities and tribes.

In addition to these activities focused on a specific village community, a number of so-called "Equal Financial Ceiling" projects were carried out in groups of twenty villages spread over a valley or rural area. These were often areas that, on account of the precarious security situation, were difficult to reach and suffered from many internal conflicts. For these EFC projects, carried out in fairly inaccessible areas, it was important that they all received roughly the same amount of funding in order to avoid jealousy and rivalry within the communities. These projects helped to mobilise the population and show them that there was an alternative to siding with the Taliban.

Sub-conclusion on QVPs
Thanks to the willingness of the Afghan NGOs to work in Uruzgan with Dutch funding and their access to the local population, it was possible to carry out QVPs right from the start of the mission. After a cautious start with just a few Afghan NGOs in order to assess their executive capacity, this programme soon built up momentum with more NGOs and larger numbers of small-scale activities in all districts. These soon became visible to the local population. Initially, in order not to endanger the facilitators, it was not officially made known that they were supported by Dutch funding. Both types of projects subsequently proved to be the first step towards implementation of the COIN strategy. Some examples of these projects are the Mirabad valley, the Deh Rafshan valley and the Tangi valley.

4.5.4 National programmes
The Netherlands was one of the driving forces behind the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and pressed for the national government to adopt a strong, leading role. The national programmes did not benefit all the provinces, even though these programmes had been improved. By employing focused lobbying, contributing to building up capacity and selective support, donors were able to exert pressure on getting the national programmes rolled out in more provinces. The ARTF is run by the World Bank and receives contributions from 27 donors. Since its establishment in 2002, this fund has been the principal instrument for integrated and coordinated financing of reconstruction in Afghanistan and is linked to the Afghan budget. The ARTF finances the day-to-day expenses of the Afghan government as well as investments in reconstruction. The fund makes an important contribution to strengthening the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government. It also funds successful programmes, such as the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). Thanks to this programme, villages are directly involved in the selection and implementation of projects.

In the period covered by this evaluation, the Netherlands contributed EUR 140 million to this fund. Total contributions to this fund since 2002 are EUR 270 million. In order to ensure that important reconstruction programmes are also carried out in Uruzgan, the Netherlands has earmarked a part of its contribution for this province.
As from the end of 2006, the Dutch embassy concluded a number of contracts with the aim of getting national programmes operating in Uruzgan. These programmes related to education, health care and rural development. Further on in this chapter they will be explained further in the description of the Dutch efforts at a sectoral level. In order to enable the implementation of national programmes, the Netherlands has on several occasions facilitated visits of Afghan ministers to the province of Uruzgan. The Netherlands also repeatedly brought up this question during bilateral talks in Kabul.

The flow of national funds down to the local level proved to be difficult, especially in the case of EQUIP. The causes were the lack of good (air) connections with the province and the lack of a banking system, so that funds had to be transported physically. The provincial and national authorities, with the support of the embassy, lobbied national banks to open branch offices in Uruzgan. On account of a shortage of capacity at the Afghan Ministry of Finance and the lack of an institutional framework, the introduction of “programme based budgeting” for the national budget, which had been stimulated by the World Bank and its donors, suffered severe delays. Despite the pressure exerted by donors on this and other ministries, the problem persisted for a long time.

The aim of working as far as possible via the government also had its drawbacks. Administrative problems had a major impact on the progress of the reconstruction: weak formal government structures hampered the identification and implementation of projects. As a result of the security situation, there were only few implementing organisations and little supervision by the World Bank at a provincial level. Certain elite groups and powerbrokers, moreover, were pursuing their own interests when it came to projects being carried out or not, especially where pieces of land or the hiring of personnel were concerned. In addition, formal key figures, both on the side of the donors and the Afghans, did not always remain in their posts for long.

Sub-conclusion on national programmes
Thanks to intensive lobbying, the Netherlands managed to get Kabul to pay more attention to a disadvantaged province such as Uruzgan than to other provinces. This enabled a number of national programmes to be launched in the province. The slow flow of funds and the undercapacity at a provincial level, together with insufficient supervision by the World Bank, continued to have a negative impact on the implementation.

4.5.5 Civil domain
In line with the integrated character of the Dutch deployment, the motto has always been ‘as civilian as possible, as military as necessary’. The focus was primarily on the people, with the idea that more prosperity would give people the much-needed prospect of a better future. This could eliminate the feeding ground for anti-government elements and increase support for the Afghan authorities, thus leading to stability. In view of the pre-defined duration of the Dutch mission and in the interest of continuity in the construction process, lasting beyond the departure of the Dutch mission, the Netherlands tried to create as much scope as possible for Afghan civil partners and multi-year programmes.

4.5.5.1 Civil organisations
Uruzgan was one of the least secure regions in Afghanistan and even the Afghan national statistical office was unable to gather relevant data on this province. This was not only due to the actual dangers present there, but
also the way in which Afghans perceive the province. Uruzgan is seen as the province from which the foremost Taliban leaders originated. The inhabitants of the province were considered to be extremely conservative. The consequence of this unfavourable image was that few Afghans wanted to work there. As a result, there was little enthusiasm for civil organisations to carry out programmes or open local branches in Uruzgan. The Dutch approach in Uruzgan and particularly the fact that Afghan organisations were treated as equal partners and were able to operate in relative peace attracted progressively more organisations to the province.

Although there were relatively few NGOs in the province at the end of 2007, this number gradually increased, thanks to the ongoing efforts of the Netherlands in this direction. The government signed a contract with the Microfinance Investment Support Facility Afghanistan (MISFA) to set up a local branch of an NGO that founded financial institutions for microcredit associations. The FAO was the first UN organisation that was ready to operate in Uruzgan, in cooperation with local NGOs. In addition, the German development organisation GTZ and the DCU were granted a subsidy for multi-sector programmes. It took some time before these activities led to visible and, in most cases, lasting results.

The province of Uruzgan was not only dangerous, but was still quite inaccessible and difficult to reach. As from mid-2009, therefore, the Netherlands subsidised a civilian airline for the purpose of providing flights to the province. In addition, it invested in the construction of a civilian terminal at Tarin Kowt Airport.

4.5.5.2 Donor coordination at a provincial level
Lack of capacity and the security situation in parts of the province were the main obstacles to development. In Afghanistan as a whole and also in Uruzgan there was a need for strong Afghan leadership and UN donor coordination. Thanks to the Dutch efforts, the number of civil organisations grew; at the end of 2008 there were over twenty, including local, national and international organisations. More and more Afghan-run development-cooperation projects were set up, taking over from CIMIC and QVPs. There were over fifty local and international organisations and programmes operational in 2010. The capacity of these organisations varied. Good donor coordination was needed on a provincial level. That is why the Netherlands supported the strengthening of Afghan coordination in this area and lobbied UNAMA to set up a UN office in the province. The DCU also played an important role in the coordination of the NGOs in Uruzgan. Enlargement of the civic terrain meant not only an expansion of the civilian staff of the US, Australia and the Netherlands in Uruzgan, but also that the Afghan government, the UN and NGOs would take over, step by step, the stabilisation and reconstruction tasks of the PRT. The PRT fulfilled an important role by helping the provincial government to coordinate the various activities, including the involvement and stimulation of the Provincial Development Council. The Netherlands encouraged the establishment of various consultative structures. Much time and energy was devoted to developing the relationship with our Afghan counterparts. The development advisers conducted intensive consultation with the provincial ministries and were also closely involved in coordination at a district level. Consultation with the local population was crucial in order to prioritise and manage the OS programme. This created mutual understanding and promoted stability.

For the purpose of coordination, information exchange and joint deployment in the agricultural sector, a Technical Working Group on Agriculture and
Livestock was set up under the leadership of the Ministry of Agriculture (MAIL) and the FAO. In the field of governance, the Uruzgan Sub-national Governance working group was organised in cooperation with IDLG. In addition, there was a Provincial Medical Board for all actors in the health sector. As from the end of 2008, two-weekly discussions were held for all NGOs operating in Uruzgan. Closer coordination with civilian actors also required a larger civilian team: this grew, as mentioned above, from three to twelve political and development-cooperation advisers.

The Netherlands worked hard to convince UNAMA to adopt a stronger coordinating role in the province. This paid off when, at the end of 2008, SVSG Kai Eide decided to open an office in Uruzgan. Although in many respects the PRT continued to play a central role, it was in practice just one of the many players in the field of reconstruction. As a consequence, the TFU had less insight into and control over the various reconstruction processes in the province, but on the other hand these development activities were no longer entirely dependent on the ISAF presence.

**4.5.5.3 Relationship with and security of aid organisations**

Respect for the mandate and the expertise of the various actors was of great importance. NGOs guarded their autonomy vigilantly and did not wish to be associated directly with ISAF. Development was the domain of the central and provincial governments and the civilian actors with expertise in these fields. Programmes had to be kept separate from the military presence and the PRT in order to keep them from being seen as a part of the conflict. Contacts between the donors and the NGOs were therefore maintained via the Embassy in Kabul. It was also very important for the NGOs to be visibly independent of the military operation. At the same time, it was desirable that the military units could defend the NGOs in emergencies. It was important to have agreements in place for the provision of military support in exceptional cases, medical assistance and, if wished, air transport. There were also regular discussions about the security situation, in which the PRT and NGOs exchanged information. In the course of 2009 and 2010, more and more NGOs discovered the benefits of working with the PRT. Visiting a project under military escort was still out of the question, but the NGOs did not mind meeting the (civil part of the) PRT for talks at Kamp Holland or on neutral territory such as the UN office or at the governor’s compound.

**4.5.5.4 Cooperation with Dutch NGOs**

In 2006, three Dutch NGOs (Save the Children, HealthNet TPO and Cordaid) decided to join forces in the Dutch Consortium for Uruzgan (DCU). In 2008, another two Dutch NGOs joined the DCU, namely ZOA (Relief, Hope and Recovery) and the Dutch Committee for Afghanistan - Veterinary Programmes (DCA).

The DCU focused on improving a number of basic provisions in the province of Uruzgan:

- civil society and institutional development (all, ZOA in particular)
- health care (Healthnet/TPO)
- education (Save the Children)
- social development (Save the Children)
- rural development (ZOA and CORDAID)
- livestock and animal health (DCA).

The DCU had a permanent presence in the provincial capital Tarin Kowt and operated independently of the TFU. By working together with the local population and local organisations, the DCU's programme of activities was
tailored to the real needs of the people and thus gained added value. Particular attention was paid to capacity building of the local partners and the local government.

Consultation with the Dutch NGOs (for example in the Afghanistan Platform) took place not only in the field, but also in The Hague. This consultation was attended not only by the NGOs in the DCU, but also by other Dutch NGOs working in Afghanistan. These meetings enabled open discussion between the NGOs and the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

Sub-conclusion on civil domain
Right from the start, the Netherlands worked specifically with Afghan organisations. In this way, the foundations were laid to enable national programmes, larger national and international NGOs and UN organisations to operate more safely. The integrated Dutch efforts resulted in a great many NGOs being brought into the province and the various activities being coordinated in close consultation with the local authorities and, from May 2009, with UNAMA as well. The presence of UNAMA functioned as a symbol of the international civil presence and meant in practice that the coordination of relief activities was also supported by the PRT. However, the absence of a properly functioning government focal point made things a lot more difficult for the mission in the last few years. The lack of trust between NGOs and the government was also detrimental to the effectiveness of the deployment.

It was essential to guarantee the independent character of NGOs, so as not to compromise their security. Successful deployment of civil relief organisations required them to be autonomous and not an extension of ISAF. Respect for the mandate and the expertise of the various actors had to be a first priority. Discretion with regard to the programme, actors and activities was necessary. It was vital that external actors should keep a low profile in order not to endanger local communities and their organisations.

4.5.6 Sectoral deployment
At first, the Netherlands had intended to concentrate on a limited number of sectors. However, since the Netherlands was the main donor and lead nation, it became more and more difficult to ignore certain sectors in view of the desire to meet the local needs and set up coherently related activities.

During the whole period of the mission, the independent Afghan research organisation TLO studied the results of the Dutch engagement in Uruzgan. In its 2010 report, TLO identified positive results achieved by the Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan. TLO concluded that after four years, the Netherlands could leave in the knowledge that the mission had contributed to security and development in Uruzgan. The Dutch deployment in Uruzgan was considered as a model of successful civil-military cooperation in the context of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. TLO also pointed out that the sustainability of the achievement would be dependent on the continuation of the Dutch efforts by the new ISAF partners, the US and Australia, together with the Afghan government.

In order to ensure that ongoing projects are kept on the right track, a POLAD/OSAD has been posted in Uruzgan until the end of 2011. In addition, where possible and necessary, the Netherlands tried to transfer

activities to the US and Australia. As well as the previously mentioned Rule of Law study by the Max Planck Institute, the Netherlands commissioned a “needs assessment” of water management in Uruzgan. These studies served as a basis for the development of concrete activities in these sectors. In 2010, the findings of the two studies were shared with the Americans and Australians.

The DCU operates independently from the military personnel stationed in the province. The departure of the Dutch military in August 2010 did not, in principle, have any direct effect on the work of the relief organisations. The projects of the DCU and GTZ were able to continue uninterrupted.

A number of Dutch-financed activities were also carried out by the Afghan government without direct Dutch involvement. Most of the long-term programmes are national programmes and were already being carried out by Afghan partners. These are the programmes run by the MRRD (NSP, NABDP, NRAP), BPHS, MAIL/FAO and AICSC/IDLG and the education programme EQUIP. It is the task of the World Bank to ensure that the Afghan ministries spend the funds provided by the ARTF wisely. For a number of short-term activities, other donors were approached for co-financing. The Dutch POLAD/OSAD also worked closely with local authorities and the Combined Team Uruzgan (CTU, the successors to the TFU) in order to assure the security and feasibility of the infrastructural projects. The CTU considers the construction of the road between Tarin Kowt and Chora to have a high priority.

The following results, given by sector, are taken from the TLO report and are, where possible, checked against other reports. It should be borne in mind that reliable statistical data from the province of Uruzgan are very scarce. This hampers data comparisons. The TLO also pointed out that there is a risk of certain government statistics being manipulated. It is alleged that, in order to receive more central government funding, some departments artificially inflate the number of teachers or police officers on their payroll.

**4.5.7 Humanitarian aid**

In the period of 2006 – 2010, the Netherlands contributed to a number of UN organisations and the ICRC in Afghanistan via the Humanitarian Action Plan, an overall plan embracing the whole of Afghanistan and overseen by the UNHCR. Local organisations in Uruzgan have given humanitarian aid and emergency assistance to victims of floods and hailstorms in Deh Rawod and a few other areas.

**4.5.8 Health care**

Priority was given to increasing the availability and accessibility of basic health care. The national programme Basic Packages of Health Services (BPHS) was already being financed in Uruzgan by the European Commission in cooperation with Cordaid. In Uruzgan, the NGO AHDS (Afghanistan Health and Development Service) is responsible for the introduction of the BPHS. Thanks to the many years it has had a presence in the province, AHDS now enjoys good access to communities and has – by local standards – extensive expertise. Compared with the European Commission, the Netherlands financed a considerably broader-based BPHS programme. The aim was, within the space of two years, to make health care accessible to all the inhabitants of the province.

Before 2006, only a small fraction of the population of Uruzgan had access to medical care. Four years later, the number of clinics in all districts except
Gizab had increased and there was a form of medical care available in all six districts of Uruzgan. The number of operational health care facilities grew from nine to seventeen. The number of health care staff rose from 89 to 124 and the number of doctors also rose from 19 in 2006 to 31 in 2010. The number of community health workers rose from 130 to 300, including 100 women (see the histogram below for a comparison of the qualified medical personnel in Uruzgan in 2006 and 2010). The district hospital of Tarin Kowt expanded into a provincial hospital. There was also an increase in the number of first-aid stations and women’s access to basic health care facilities was improved. In addition, the following activities took place: education in the field of sexual and reproductive rights, training of qualified personnel, treatment of drug addicts, and awareness campaigns for health-related issues and vaccination programmes.

The expansion of health-care centres was often subject to delays due to the instability in the areas where they were to be set up (in the more stable areas the infrastructure had already been put in place). Moreover, it was not easy to get qualified personnel, such as female doctors and nurses. And then the expectations of the population were often higher than what could be provided. The community health workers, for example, are really only volunteers who are greatly overstretched, while only being able to offer first aid. Not all the clinics have qualified personnel. The consequence is that many cases are still dependent on the hospital in Tarin Kowt.

**Histogram from TLO report:** Comparison of qualified medical personnel in Uruzgan in 2006 and 2010.

- TL: total number of qualified medical personnel
- F: number of female medical personnel

4.5.9 **Education**

The Netherlands had set itself the goal of enlarging the number of self-sustaining schools and school-going children, including girls. For the last category in particular, more female teachers were required. The Netherlands supported the launch of the national education programme EQUIP in Uruzgan. This launch was possible thanks to a Dutch and a local NGO (ANCC/Save the Children). The first stage was to provide education in three districts. The ultimate goal was to achieve this in all centres of
population. This programme focused on the building of schools, the involvement of parent committees, curriculum development, improved education management, and incentives for teachers. It also devoted attention to support centres for management and supervision of education in the districts. Attention was also focused on setting up a teacher training college, a multipurpose training college and establishing an education programme specifically for deprived children (primarily girls). However, the flow of national funds from the EQUIP programme to the province proved to be difficult. This caused delays in the building of schools and the payment of teachers’ salaries. The Netherlands, together with the other donors, frequently raised this issue.

The number of functioning schools and the number of school-going children in Uruzgan increased substantially over the period 2006 – 2010: from 34 to 166 operational schools; 42,772 children go regularly to school, of whom 6,774 are girls. The EQUIP programme provided all districts with education, except the districts of Chahar Chineh and Gizab. EQUIP did, however, provide course material to schools in Gizab via an Afghan NGO. The Netherlands also supported the EQUIP programme for the construction of primary schools. By mid-2010, there were 53 under construction, of which 42 were already operating at other – temporary – locations. School Management Committees were also set up. And also in Khas Uruzgan, ten EQUIP schools were financed by Dutch funds via UNICEF. It should be noted, however, that there were shortcomings in the monitoring of the EQUIP programme.

For the long-term character of these investments, it was essential not only to put up a building, but also to have teachers and course material. In addition to the EQUIP programme, the Netherlands therefore also provided the finance for Save the Children to carry out education projects in Uruzgan. At the request of the Afghan Ministry of Education, this NGO concentrated its efforts on expanding the pool of qualified teaching staff in the five southern provinces, with the emphasis on Uruzgan, and improved access to education by increasing the number of schools. According to the available data, in 2010 there were a total of 1,126 teachers, 67 of whom female. However, they often have to wait several months before receiving their pay. This means that teachers sometimes develop other sources of income and therefore have no time for their pupils. To make matters worse, the teachers often have to fetch their salaries themselves in Tarin Kowt, so that a part of their pay is spent on travel and bribes. The arrival of the new governor in December 2010 opened up new opportunities of putting an end to these unsound practices.

In addition, Save the Children directed its efforts, via the Quality Primary Education Project (QPEP), at community-based learning. This proved to be a successful activity in which Accelerated Learning Classes (ALCs) were set up in private houses for children who, on account of the unstable situation, were unable to undergo formal education. A total of 130 of these classes were set up.

Finally, at the request of the Ministry of Education and with the goal of relieving the acute shortage of teachers, 120 educational scholarships were provided for students from the southern provinces (at least 60 from Uruzgan). It is expected that about half of these will return to their region to take up teaching. All of them are contractually obliged to teach in their province of origin for two years.
The DCU programme devoted and still devotes attention to various aspects of education, such as educational radio programmes, education on health and children’s rights. In 2011, AUSAID signed a contract with Save the Children to continue building up capacity in the sectors of education and health care.

*Growth of the number of (operational) schools in Uruzgan (2006-2010)*.

### 4.5.10 Rural development and infrastructure

Economic growth in Uruzgan will come primarily from crop farming and, to a lesser extent, livestock breeding. The Dutch activities in this sector therefore focused on improving the infrastructure (making villages and village markets accessible) and supporting production chains for alternative crops (instead of poppy cultivation).

#### 4.5.10.1 Infrastructure

Through both the ARTF and earmarked funds, the Netherlands contributed to various programmes of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). With those funds, small-scale provincial infrastructure projects such as the construction of rural roads, bridges and irrigation works were carried out and national programmes aimed at the repair and construction of infrastructure, such as the National Rural Access Programme and the National Area-Based Programme, were supported.

These efforts in national and provincial programmes were complemented by CIMIC programmes, QVPs and NGOs so that, through cash-for-work, the population itself had an immediate share in the development of the small-scale local infrastructure. These small projects reached around 60% of the population. In addition, thanks to Dutch investments, two bridges were built over the river Helmand in Gizab.

The Netherlands has invested and continues to invest in a number of important large infrastructural facilities in the province, including the road from Tarin Kowt to Chora and civil facilities (terminal and access road) at the airport. The road connects the two main trade centres of the province and also provides better access to markets in Kandahar. Since June 2010, the road has already cut the journey time on the first 20 kilometres by more than an hour. The improvements on the road from Tarin Kowt to Chora have led to more activity, better market access, better access to...
health care and lower transport costs. A road survey carried out by GTZ shows a threefold increase in traffic. Both projects are carried out by the German development organisation GTZ and contribute to the accessibility of the province. The main artery from Kandahar to the province of Uruzgan continued to be a significant problem, as security there still left much to be desired and warlords had a monopoly on transport security. The Afghan civil airline KamAir carried out three passenger flights a week between Kabul and Tarin Kowt, subsidised by the Netherlands. The funding which was provided between June 2009 and May 2011 was start-up funding to establish a sustainable air link in an emerging market. From autumn 2008, the flights had a capacity of 35 passengers and were generally all but full. This gave Afghan civil servants, NGOs and businesspeople access to the province.

4.5.10.2 Alternative livelihoods
Thanks to Dutch funding, the FAO has been able to distribute wheat seed and fertiliser in Uruzgan. This contributed to sustainable food independence for the province. In the period from August 2008 through December 2008, 18,283 households were provided with more than 900 tonnes of certified wheat seed and more than 1,800 tonnes of fertiliser. In the period from August 2009 to January 2011, 17,365 households in Uruzgan and Daykundi were provided with more than 875 tonnes of certified wheat seed and more than 1,750 tonnes of fertiliser. This led to a 44% increase in the harvests compared with the harvests from local wheat seed. The FAO also provided support to 2,050 weak rural households in order to make a sustainable improvement to their income positions. This concerned projects in the areas of fishing, beekeeping, dairy cattle, fruit trees and vegetable cultivation. In addition, chickens were distributed to 500 families (widows with children) and 15,000 families received vegetable seed.

Dutch market-gardening company Growing Sales Exchange (GSE) applied itself to alternative crops and carried out a saffron project and a fruit and vegetable cultivation project in the province. A total of 500 farmers took part in GSE’s saffron project. In 2008, there was a harvest of around 53 kg and in 2009 that grew to 105 kg. In 2010, the yield had increased to around 200 kg. The quality of the saffron is generally good. The farmers have received training in the various stages of saffron cultivation (planting, cultivation, fertilisation, irrigation, harvesting and processing of the saffron). Expectations are that the quantity of saffron bulbs will multiply by a factor of two to three over a period of five years.

The Netherlands also conducted an extensive cooperation programme with GTZ, focused on integrated rural development in Uruzgan. The introduction of new crops such as saffron, around one million fruit trees (distributed by various organisations) and vegetable seed has strongly improved crop diversity in the province and provided alternatives to poppy cultivation. The results and the impact of these perennial crops (saffron and all types of fruit tree) can only be determined in the longer term. Of the annual crops (such as wheat and vegetables) it can already be said that, thanks to this distribution, the income of many farmers has increased.

4.5.10.3 Microcredit
Through the Microfinance Investment Support Facility of Afghanistan (MISFA), the Netherlands requested that the affiliated microcredit institutions submit project proposals in the area of small-scale credit facilities for Uruzgan. MISFA is the umbrella organisation for all institutions in the area of microcredit in Afghanistan. In July 2010, 1,874 microcredit loans were provided with a total value of more than USD 1 million. For the
purpose of these loans, cooperatives were set up, with a total of 2,204 members. Loans were partly issued in cash and partly in kind, for instance in the form of seeds, fertiliser etc. The micro-credit system is widely accepted because it suits the local culture, the way of doing business and the local market well. Entrepreneurs from a variety of sectors - small farmers, service providers and tradespeople - have been able to make small investments and thus improve the productivity and quality of their businesses with the aid of this credit.

4.5.10.4 Vocational education
There is a shortage of educated workers in Uruzgan, but there are no technical education programmes on offer (with the exception of the Australian technical school within the PRT). The Netherlands therefore funded and continues to fund GTZ’s establishment of a technical school in Tarin Kowt and an agricultural information centre outside Tarin Kowt. The school has not yet been completed.

In collaboration with the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Safety, at the request of the Afghan government, the Wageningen University and Research Centre (WUR) was involved in the formulation of national agricultural education and the development of an agricultural education curriculum. This included the establishment of an information centre in Uruzgan. This centre and the aforementioned centre eventually became a project. In addition, the Dutch NGO DCA, as part of DCU, set up paraveterinary units and trained paraveterinarians. As part of EQUIP, a teacher’s training course has begun in the province and, as has been mentioned earlier, with Australian funding a training course trainee civil servants was started in 2010, with training being provided through the Afghan Independent Civil Service Commission (AICSC).

4.5.11 Water and energy
The population of Uruzgan is dependent on agriculture for its food and income. Good water management is very important for agriculture. Water is scarce in Uruzgan and unfair distribution may lead to conflicts.

Thanks to the efforts of the PRT and CIMIC, and making use of sustainable development projects, the Netherlands has put a considerable effort into small-scale, local projects throughout Uruzgan, such as water pumps and irrigation channels. On a slightly larger scale, with Dutch funding, micro-dams and riverbank protection works were constructed and karezes (underground channels) were repaired. In addition, the Netherlands supported the provincial administration and local communities in solving water conflicts peacefully through dialogue.

From 2006 to 2009, a total of 54 projects were carried out in the area of irrigation and 97 projects to improve the water supply and sanitation. This does not include DCU’s work.

GTZ also carried out various water projects for the Netherlands. These projects included digging 108 wells for 2,100 households, constructing fifteen micro-dams, building ten micro-hydroelectric plants and building three bridges and five water reservoirs. The population now has better access not only to cleaner water, but also to more drinking water. Improved irrigation has increased the farmers’ harvests and made more wheat and corn available for sale at the market. Crop diversity has also increased.

The Netherlands also funded an assessment of water management in Uruzgan, carried out by a consortium comprising Royal Haskoning,
Deltares, the Delft University of Technology and the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers VNO-NCW.

Most districts have no sustainable access to electricity. In Khas Uruzgan, ten generators were provided as part of the National Solidarity Programme. In addition, GTZ conducted a study in 2009 into the energy demand and the potential for (sustainable and fossil) energy generation. The recommendation is focused on the district centres and rural areas. The study serves as a handle for the creation of a provincial energy plan and follow-up activities in cooperation with the provincial authorities.

4.5.12 Media / communication
In 2006, besides the BBC and Voice of America Uruzgan radio stations, Uruzgan had just one Afghan radio station with a very limited range. This station was in the hands of the government. The province did not have its own newspaper or television station. In order to broaden the media landscape in Uruzgan, the infrastructure for the Nawa radio station was set up with support from the Netherlands. In 2008, FM relay stations were installed and taken into service in four districts. Radio Nawa broadcasts around the clock, mainly in the local Pashto language. The station produces a great number of drugs-awareness and education programmes. During the agricultural season, there are weekly informative programmes, during which listeners can phone in with questions. The programmes are repeated daily. There is also a drama series about drug abuse, as well as themed programmes on such matters as children’s rights and International Women’s Day. There are regular radio interviews with Uruzganis, and Radio Nawa also regularly conducts surveys on what the population is interested in and they have set up a network of local correspondents. Radio Nawa also broadcasts children’s programmes, some of which are made by children. In total, 48 radio programmes were produced by 180 children from 7 schools in Uruzgan, and broadcast in Tarin Kowt (each programme broadcast twice a week). In 2010, there were eight media channels: five radio stations, one television station and two combined radio and television stations.

4.5.13 Business sector
The Netherlands has set up various instruments to promote development of the private sector: the Private Sector Investment Programme Plus (PSI plus), the Uruzgan Economic Reconstruction Fund (FEOU), the Matchmaking Facility, microcredit facilities and the establishment of a Business Development Centre and a project with the Afghan Women’s Business Council in Tarin Kowt.

The Afghanistan Reconstruction Working Group (WEWA) was established by the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers VNO-NCW, as an initiative of the Dutch business sector to support the reconstruction in Afghanistan. With support from the embassy and the PRT, the WEWA assessed the possibilities for the development of activities. In order to give a further impulse to the business sector’s efforts, the FEOU was set up, worth EUR 10 million.26 European companies with an Afghan partner were able to qualify for partial funding (up to a maximum of 80%) of activities which would benefit the economic development of Uruzgan. An example of the initiatives this led to is a feasibility study into the export of pomegranates from Uruzgan. The WEWA also opened an office in Kabul, to conduct feasibility studies for economic chains and to facilitate contact between the Dutch and Afghan business sectors. The FEOU was open for more than two years and was closed to new applications in December 2010.

26 This amount is part of the overall total in Chapter 5 (private sector development) of expenditure by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Dutch participation in Afghanistan.
In view of the lack of enthusiasm among the business sector, the small scale of Uruzgan's economy and the amount of American resources available in the province, the total impact of the fund was less than had been hoped for.

As of January 2010, Uruzgan has a small-scale business centre. The Business Development Centre (BDC) advises new companies and provides training to local entrepreneurs. In addition to bookkeeping courses and business management courses, this involves computer courses and language courses for both men and women. All the courses are taught free of charge. The centre works in close cooperation with local credit providers, the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and the Afghan Women's Business Federation. The project gives local Afghan entrepreneurs the opportunity to expand their economic activities and acquire relevant knowledge and skills. The BDC will train a total of at least 300 participants and provide advice to a similar number of entrepreneurs with regard to their business operations. Through the Self Employment Programme, 60 poor Afghan families were taught handicraft, business and literacy skills. They have acquired incomes by (for instance using microcredit) completing purchased handicraft kits and selling them to Boumi, an idealistic company focusing on local Afghan products. The number of women participating is still very limited.

As a result of the improved security and the increase in the population’s purchasing power, the number of businesses at the Tarin Kowt bazaar has increased from 900 to more than 2,000, and there is much more money in circulation. Two banks have opened branches in Tarin Kowt. Due to the unsafe situation on the roads to the province and monopolies on transport, transport costs are still relatively high.

4.5.14 Gender in Uruzgan

The Netherlands has contributed in various ways to practical measures to improve the position of women and girls. Both in education and in health care, efforts were made to improve access for women by, for instance, the setting up of a women’s wing at the Tarin Kowt hospital and the training of both midwives and female teachers.

There are more jobs for women, for instance in hospitals, schools and the civil service. Women also participate more in community activities and visit the bazaar more often. The position of women was also taken into account in economic activities. For instance, chicks and vegetable seed were made available to widows, and women were given preferential treatment in the issuing of microcredit. In 2008, some 8,000 laying hens were distributed among 500 poor families. GSE provided 550 widows and poor women with chicks and vegetable seed. The FAO programme for vulnerable farming families includes activities to improve the situation for women in particular. A local NGO from Gizab carried out projects in the area of health education and combined sewing courses with reading and writing lessons. GTZ distributed 250 sewing machines to women in the Surgh Murghab area near the Baluchi Valley. These projects contribute to the financial independence.

The Netherlands also invested in contacts with key female figures from the province. The PRT thus showed that they took women’s problems seriously and that they wanted to contribute to solutions. The Netherlands also contributed to technical support for female members of parliament, focusing in particular on the women representing Uruzgan. In 2010, two Pashtun

27 www.boumi.com
women held seats in the Provincial Council and, compared with previous years, more women stood for election to the *Wolesi Jirga*.

In addition, the Netherlands contributed to the reestablishment of women’s *shuras*. October 2009 saw the first women’s *shura* in Tarin Kowt in years. The Netherlands contributed to the celebration of International Women’s Day, during which the women and their issues had the attention of the provincial authorities for the day. The board of the Afghan Women’s Business Council visited Uruzgan, met with 500 women and set up activities. The result of this *shura* was an inventory of the problems which women from Uruzgan encounter in their daily lives. As a direct consequence of this *shura*, an Afghan aid organisation set up a handicraft project with Dutch funding.

The Nawa radio station in Uruzgan also paid a great deal of attention to women’s rights and women’s issues. This was done on the basis of research in the province into the wishes and needs of, *inter alia*, women. In addition, attention was paid to gender awareness during ANP training. Such projects required a continuous process of consultation with community leaders and the governor to ensure their support and involvement so that these initiatives would continue to progress.

Sub-conclusion on sectoral efforts / general sub-conclusion on socio-economic development

Given the starting position, a considerable amount has been achieved in Uruzgan over the four years. The capacity of the local authorities, national programme and NGOs was limited, and due to the negative perception of the province at the national level, it was not easy to find qualified personnel. Significant progress was made in the socio-economic area. That progress was mainly owing to the good cooperation with Afghan partners. Thanks to their knowledge of the local dynamics and their access to the local population, even in the remotest areas, trust was gained and a support base created for the Dutch mission. The implementation of numerous projects, at all times maintaining a careful balance between the various population groups, contributed to an economic revival in Uruzgan. Coordination, synchronisation with the authorities and monitoring of the various activities continued to require attention due to the fragile local environment.

The mission has laid a foundation for development, opened up the province to the outside world and managed to interest an extensive network of actors, including UN organisations, in this province. Bringing in national programmes and actors with experience in the areas of education, health care and rural development gave an initial impulse for sustainable, long-term development. Significant progress was made in the areas of education, health care, water and energy supply, food security, alternative crops and local media. The accessibility of the province also improved considerably. The paving of the provincial road to Chora has led to more activity, better market access and better access to health care. The economic base and activity have increased, particularly in areas which gained access to local and regional markets. Food security has also improved considerably. The socio-economic development was the most substantial around the three largest towns, but even outside that area, activity increased. The population’s freedom of movement increased greatly and the province has become more accessible to NGOs and IOs.
5 Expenditure for the mission and implementation aspects

The Dutch participation in Afghanistan has demanded a considerable amount from personnel and materiel, and taken a great financial toll. Expenditure for the mission was funded mainly by the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, from the Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). There was also funding from the Defence budget itself. In addition to the expenditure for the mission, funds from the regular sustainment and readiness operations of the armed forces can also be related to the ISAF deployment. This chapter discusses the expenditure and a number of implementation aspects.

5.1 Expenditure for the mission

The total expenditure funded by the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs for the Dutch participation in ISAF from 2006 to 2010 amounted to EUR 1.991 billion. Most of this was funded from the Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). Additional funds were also added to the regular Defence budget for the purpose of the mission, in order to fund mission-specific expenditure not covered by the HGIS budget, such as materiel investments.

Overview of the total expenditure for the Dutch participation in Uruzgan, 2006-2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure for Dutch participation in Uruzgan</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HGIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HGIS Defence</td>
<td>143,943</td>
<td>232,566</td>
<td>279,270</td>
<td>299,151</td>
<td>272,598</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,227,528</td>
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<td>HGIS Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>53,727</td>
<td>62,428</td>
<td>78,544</td>
<td>110,264</td>
<td>68,720</td>
<td></td>
<td>373,863</td>
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<tr>
<td>HGIS total</td>
<td>197,670</td>
<td>305,002</td>
<td>357,814</td>
<td>409,415</td>
<td>341,278</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,601,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget addition to regular Defence budget</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>390,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>252,670</td>
<td>355,002</td>
<td>462,814</td>
<td>489,415</td>
<td>391,278</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,991,391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amounts x € 1,000

Prior to the period dealt with in this evaluation, the Netherlands was also involved in Afghanistan. This concerned relatively small contributions to ISAF and OEF, including the deployment of F-16s, a contribution to the international staffs, the deployment of a PRT and the deployment of special forces. The involvement in Afghanistan as part of OEF and ISAF in the period from 2002 to 2006 cost around EUR 210 million, which was funded from the HGIS budget. Costs arising from the Dutch participation in Afghanistan have also been estimated for the period after the evaluation period. This concerns a national contribution to ISAF and the cost of redeployment. For 2011 this amounts to EUR 105 million, while for 2012 the amount is EUR 20 million.
5.1.1  HGIS
The greater part of the expenditure for the mission in Afghanistan, around EUR 1.6 billion, was funded from the HGIS budget. The HGIS budget was established in 1997 and is a permanent provision within the National Budget for the funding of the government’s international cooperation. This comprehensive approach, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs acting as a coordinator, enhances the cohesion and cooperation required for an integrated and coherent foreign policy. This arrangement means that various ministries have HGIS budgets included separately in their overall budgets.

5.1.1.1  HGIS expenditure, Ministry of Defence
HGIS has a permanent provision for additional expenditure by the armed forces for crisis-management operations. This provision is part of the Defence budget and is known as policy article 20, ‘Conduct of crisis-management operations’. This provision is reserved for the possible deployment of the Defence organisation in current and future missions. The provision is to ensure that missions do not weigh on the funds in the Defence budget which are reserved for the regular day-to-day running of the armed forces. These regular funds are for the readiness and sustainment of the armed forces. The funds for missions from HGIS are additional funds. The costs which the Ministry of Defence can charge to the HGIS budget are costs which would not have been incurred if there had been no deployment. Examples include the allowance which military personnel receive while they are on deployment, food, accommodation, transport to and from the mission area, fuel consumption in the mission area and materiel maintenance. In principle, the HGIS budget only covers running costs, not investment costs. That means that the purchase of new materiel is charged to the investment budget in the regular Defence budget.

Expenditure covered by the HGIS budget for the armed forces’ participation in Afghanistan amounted to around EUR 1.2 billion in the 2006-2010 period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HGIS provision for ‘Conduct of crisis-management operations’</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure for ISAF stage III</td>
<td>143,943</td>
<td>232,566</td>
<td>285,600</td>
<td>315,607</td>
<td>203,698</td>
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<td>Allowances and pension premiums</td>
<td>44,337</td>
<td>73,229</td>
<td>81,267</td>
<td>95,301</td>
<td>64,309</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel expenditure</td>
<td>14,446</td>
<td>41,610</td>
<td>45,961</td>
<td>41,902</td>
<td>28,701</td>
<td>172,619</td>
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<tr>
<td>Materiel expenditure</td>
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<td>6,469</td>
<td>8,003</td>
<td>7,480</td>
<td>5,618</td>
<td>29,806</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>13,151</td>
<td>22,035</td>
<td>26,588</td>
<td>33,394</td>
<td>31,247</td>
<td>126,415</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>47,316</td>
<td>41,228</td>
<td>49,903</td>
<td>80,253</td>
<td>30,865</td>
<td>229,565</td>
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<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>8,636</td>
<td>13,892</td>
<td>20,992</td>
<td>16,527</td>
<td>13,227</td>
<td>73,210</td>
</tr>
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<td>Data and communication</td>
<td>3,154</td>
<td>4,756</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>2,757</td>
<td>3,994</td>
<td>17,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel, oil and lubricants</td>
<td>2,081</td>
<td>5,227</td>
<td>12,732</td>
<td>15,396</td>
<td>9,206</td>
<td>44,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>7,530</td>
<td>21,003</td>
<td>33,610</td>
<td>21,732</td>
<td>12,420</td>
<td>97,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,057</td>
<td>3,130</td>
<td>3,716</td>
<td>20,865</td>
<td>13,112</td>
<td>41,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National contribution to ISAF staffs, Aug 2010 – Dec 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,754</td>
<td>4,754</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDTF expenditure</td>
<td>64,146</td>
<td>64,146</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts for ISAF stage III</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,330</td>
<td>16,456</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>143,943</td>
<td>232,566</td>
<td>279,270</td>
<td>299,151</td>
<td>272,598</td>
<td>1,227,528</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amounts x € 1,000

Rise in expenditure and initial estimates

When an Article 100 letter is drawn up, an initial estimate is made on the basis of the parameters, experience data and key indicators which are known at that time. The actual expenditure covered by HGIS for the deployment of the Netherlands armed forces in Afghanistan turned out to be significantly higher than the estimates. For the period from August 2006 to August 2010, there was a discrepancy of around EUR 300 million.

Overview of estimate versus actual expenditure, 1 August 2006 – 1 August 2010 (excluding RDTF).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Actual expenditure</th>
<th>Discrepancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005: 2006 - 2008</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007: 2008 - 2010</td>
<td>540,000</td>
<td>580,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amounts x € 1,000

In the Article 100 letter of December 2005, HGIS expenditure for the deployment of the armed forces for ISAF up to 1 August 2008 was estimated to amount to between EUR 300 million and EUR 340 million. The main components in this estimate were the payments and allowances for military personnel on deployment, personnel expenditure, infrastructure and transport. When the estimate was made, the latter two items in particular were subject to a number of uncertain factors; the plans regarding transport and the construction of infrastructure still needed to be worked out in greater detail. A large-scale, complex mission such as that in

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28 This account is based on the financial accounts in the annual reports of the Ministry of Defence, but for the purpose of this evaluation they have been specified further.
Uruzgan, in which the Netherlands was also lead nation, proved to involve unforeseen expenditure. There was no data from any past experience available in this respect. Unforeseen expenditure arose from operational requirements or changed parameters. For instance, for 2007 the estimate was initially based on a troop strength of 1,200, but during the course of the year, the number was increased to 1,665. This increase had a direct effect on the expenditure for deployment allowances, food, transport and ammunition. The increase in expenditure for fuel, oil and lubricants in 2008 and 2009 compared to previous years was a result of the autonomous increase in fuel prices and an increase in the number of operations outside the compound. For instance, more patrols were needed as a result of the expansion of the ink blot. This was not taken into account in the initial estimate. The increase in expenditure for infrastructure in 2008 is partly related to maintenance at Kamp Holland and Camp Hadrian as a result of the decision to extend the mission in 2007. These issues led, in the first two years of the mission, to a discrepancy of EUR 260 million between the initial estimate and the actual expenditure.

For the extension period up to August 2010, there is also a discrepancy between the estimate and the actual expenditure, but it is considerably less than was the case with the initial estimate. In the Article 100 letter of 2007, it was announced that expenditure would be monitored more frequently and that an adjusted estimate system would be used, based on data from the previous years’ experience in Uruzgan. These adjustments reduced the discrepancy between the estimates and the actual expenditure. The discrepancy which arose in this period was the result of the hiring of unmanned aircraft. This increase is listed in 2009 under ‘other expenditure’. This hire was not taken into account initially.

During the course of the mission, the estimate of expenditure for the redeployment operation was repeatedly adjusted. In 2005, it was initially thought that it would take two months to bring back personnel and materiel. In the Article 100 letter of 2007, it was clear that this was too ambitious. There were no specific parameters with which to plan the period or for the size of the detachment needed to carry out the redeployment. An provisional sum was therefore initially included. Once the planning of the redeployment had started, a detailed estimate was made. It was based on a large-scale Redeployment Task Force (RDTF), including capacity for the detection and disarming of IEDs, and with the F-16s and helicopters for protection. It was also acknowledged that, after returning to the Netherlands, the deployed materiel would require maintenance and repair, which meant that expenditure would run on until 2012. The amount initially estimated in April 2010 for the redeployment was EUR 229 million. During the first few months of the redeployment, it became clear that there were ways to complete the operation more quickly and with fewer personnel. Partner countries proved willing to provide more force protection than was previously foreseen and they were also willing to take over materiel. On the other hand, the security situation required more air transport, which drove the transport costs up. In September 2010, it was therefore decided that the RDTF estimate would be adjusted to EUR 211 million. It is too early to form a more detailed financial judgement on the redeployment, as spending in this respect is still ongoing. This includes repair work being carried out on the materiel which has been brought back from Afghanistan.

Sub-conclusion
There is a significant discrepancy between the initial estimates and the actual expenditure funded by the HGIS. When the initial estimate was drawn up in 2005, there was too little insight into what the actual
expenditure related to the deployment of the armed forces as lead nation in Uruzgan would amount to. No financial room was budgeted for significant unforeseen expenditure. Due to operational requirements and changes in the parameters of the mission, however, there were indeed unforeseen expenses. As a result, the participation of the Netherlands armed forces in Afghanistan involved significantly higher spending than had been estimated at the outset. This mainly related to the first two years. When the mission was extended in late 2007, an estimate was drawn up which was better aligned with the expenditure.

Efficient use of financial resources
In principle, the HGIS system only accommodates additional expenditure if it is related to a mission. That means that expenditure related to the regular, day-to-day operations of the Defence organisation, as well as investments related to missions such as the purchase of the Bushmaster, must be funded from the regular Defence budget. This may foster inefficient use of resources. Repair may be favoured over replacement, or hiring temporary personnel favoured over permanent personnel. Transport expenditure for the return of materiel to the Netherlands could in certain cases amount to more than the intrinsic value of the materiel itself. In order to prevent this as much as possible, the decision was made to allow an exception to the HGIS rules for the Dutch participation in ISAF if it demonstrably led to more efficiency, in consultation with the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance. EUR 1.5 million was then transferred from the HGIS budget to the DMO part of the regular Defence budget. As a result, the Logistic Support Unit (LSU) in Eygelshoven could be kept open longer for repair work to materiel brought back from Uruzgan. In June 2010, the United States had decided to leave this support unit, which was on Dutch territory. Dutch support personnel then fell under the Defence organisation's social policy framework. Instead of having relatively expensive externally hired personnel carry out the necessary repair work arising from the deployment in Afghanistan, it was decided that an exception would be made to the HGIS rules and the work would be carried out by LSU personnel. As a result, the actual expenditure for this work, funded by the HGIS, was less. Apart from the HGIS rules, in a number of cases it proved more efficient to sell materiel from the mission, such as containers, locally in Uruzgan and buy new materiel in the Netherlands.

Political decision-making also prompted focus on efficiency. This was the case, for instance, during the debate in 2010 on extension of the mission and the possible participation in the police training mission in Kunduz. During the redeployment, materiel that could be used in a possible new mission was scheduled last in line for transport back to the Netherlands. This saved on transport costs, as much of this materiel was indeed needed in Kunduz.

Sub-conclusion
In principle, the HGIS system only accommodates additional expenditure for the Defence organisation if it is related to a mission. Capital investments and running costs that are part of the day-to-day operations of the organisation are not funded by the HGIS. The rules can foster inefficient use of government funds. These efficiency considerations were taken into account with regard to the expenditure for the armed forces' deployment to Afghanistan. If it demonstrably led to more efficiency, and only in consultation with the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, in certain specific cases the decision was made to allow an exception to the HGIS rules by transferring funds from the HGIS part of the Defence budget to the regular Defence budget.
Scope of HGIS provision for ‘Conduct of crisis-management operations’

When the decision was made in 2007 to extend the mission, the government acknowledged that the participation of the armed forces in ISAF required a substantial financial commitment. The HGIS provision for ‘Conduct of crisis-management operations’ was not sufficient to accommodate that extension. Therefore, the fourth Balkenende government decided to add funds to this HGIS budget. With the coalition agreement of that government, the HGIS provision was increased incidentally over the next four years by an amount that rose gradually from EUR 25 million in 2008 to EUR 100 million in 2011. This increase was announced in the coalition agreement as one of the measures which would contribute to the goals of the government, i.e. an active and constructive role for the Netherlands in Europe and the world. There was little scope for prioritisation within policy article 20 instead of adding to the budget. Many of the missions that had already been planned had arisen from international agreements.

Sub-conclusion
The toll taken by ISAF on the ‘Conduct of crisis-management operations’ budget was considerable. On average, during the 2006-2010 period, around 78% of the total budget was used for the military contribution to ISAF. The decision for the Netherlands to make an extensive contribution to ISAF over a period of four years meant that there was little financial room for other (crisis-management) operations.

ISAF expenditure as a percentage of the total HGIS provision for ‘Conduct of crisis-management operations’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy article 20</th>
<th>2006&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure</td>
<td>259,515</td>
<td>303,828</td>
<td>328,023</td>
<td>360,093</td>
<td>318,319</td>
<td>1,569,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF Stage III and RDTF</td>
<td>143,943</td>
<td>232,566</td>
<td>279,270</td>
<td>299,151</td>
<td>272,598</td>
<td>1,227,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amounts x € 1,000

5.1.1.2 HGIS expenditure, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Due to its responsibility for foreign policy, the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is fully funded by the HGIS, with the exception of payments to the EU. This includes specific expenditure for Uruzgan and Afghanistan during the Dutch participation in ISAF. These HGIS funds came from the Stability Fund, the Foreign Policy Support Programme (POBB) and the delegated budgets of the embassy in Kabul.

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<sup>29</sup> This amount excludes the contributions to the UN which were funded from policy article 20 up to 2006, in order for the comparison to be valid.
Multi-year expenditure, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, ISAF 2006-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amounts x € 1,000</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Uruzgan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security (excl. CIMIC)</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>10,245</td>
<td>2,705</td>
<td>22,670</td>
<td>3,253</td>
<td>40,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance and human rights</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>2,981</td>
<td>3,055</td>
<td>2,428</td>
<td>9,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal sector</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>1,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>7,821</td>
<td>9,679</td>
<td>17,076</td>
<td>36,321</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>1,542</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>4,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2,730</td>
<td>1,682</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>3,334</td>
<td>9,821</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and media</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>2,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1,925</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>3,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural development</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>5,299</td>
<td>11,142</td>
<td>15,599</td>
<td>6,293</td>
<td>39,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social protection</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>594</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector development</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,205</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>4,123</td>
<td>1,187</td>
<td>8,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>891</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>2,667</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>35,200</td>
<td>45,400</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>212,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) (ODA)</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA) (ODA)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA Trust Fund (non-ODA)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>10,400</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel expenditure</strong></td>
<td><strong>159</strong></td>
<td><strong>942</strong></td>
<td><strong>407</strong></td>
<td><strong>583</strong></td>
<td><strong>184</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,257</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>53,727</td>
<td>62,428</td>
<td>78,544</td>
<td>110,264</td>
<td>68,720</td>
<td>373,863</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of EUR 159 million was spent on assistance for Uruzgan. The majority of this was development funding (ODA). The Netherlands also contributed to funds which benefited Afghanistan as a whole. These funds are not directly linked to the Dutch participation in ISAF, but are part of the Dutch development programme with regard to Afghanistan and are as such in a wider context also related to the Dutch participation in ISAF. As one of the major donors of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (LOTFA), the Netherlands has been able to make strong efforts for the roll-out of programmes in Uruzgan. It cannot be said, however, exactly how much of the Dutch contribution has been spent in Uruzgan. The same is true for the Dutch contribution of EUR 22.6 million to the ANA Trust Fund for strengthening the Afghan army by funding non-lethal materiel. The expenditure listed for personnel related to the salaries and allowances for service abroad for extra external hired personnel, including interpreters. Most of the expenditure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs goes to development cooperation activities in Uruzgan.

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30 For personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, additional personnel expenditure only concerns the allowances for service abroad and for the hired external interpreters it concerns both salaries and allowances for service abroad.
31 Including interpreters for three years, both salaries and allowances for service abroad (EUR 0.6 million).
5.1.2  **Budget additions to regular Defence budget**

The HGIS facility ‘Conduct of crisis-management operations’ was the instrument for funding the deployment of the Netherlands armed forces as part of ISAF. In addition, the deployment also affected spending from the regular Defence budget. On several occasions, extra funds were added to the regular Defence budget. Because these expenses are strongly correlated to the deployment in Afghanistan, these budget additions are, for the purposes of this evaluation, considered as forming part of the total cost of the deployment. Since the conclusion of the mission, the greater part of the acquired materiel has become part of the armed forces’ current equipment.

**Overview of budget additions to the regular Defence budget as part of the participation in ISAF.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence budget addition</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helicopter losses</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Geel funds</td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bos funds</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition of Bushmasters</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoring Operational Readiness</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td><strong>390,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amounts x 1,000

**Helicopter losses**

In 2006, 2007 and 2008, the Balkenende II government added a total of EUR 105 million to the regular Defence budget to compensate for the loss of helicopters in the preceding years. This was done pursuant to the motion brought by the Members of Parliament Voordewind, Knops and Eijsink.  

During operations in Afghanistan prior to 2006, one Apache helicopter (2004) and two Chinook helicopters (2005) had been lost. The capacities in question could not be supplemented from the organisation’s own assets, nor could they be obtained from the market in the short term. It was, however, imperative for the armed forces to have these assets at their disposal as soon as possible. Two Chinooks were purchased in a replacement project (“4+2 Chinook expansion and reinforcement project”) to bring the air fleet back to strength. The project is currently being implemented and the new helicopters will be added to the existing air fleet from the end of 2011. Beside this specific addition to cover the loss of the helicopters, the Voordewind, Knops and Eijsink motion also led to the decision to complement the Defence budget with a structural sum of EUR 25 million to cover future operational losses.

**Mission-specific capital investments**

Following from its participation in ISAF, the Defence organisation made a number of additional investments in response to operational requirements that ensued from a changed concept of operations and the extensive wear and tear and loss of materiel. These investments concerned, *inter alia*, equipment to improve the protection of deployed units, such as robots for

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32 Motion by Voordewind, Knops and Eijsink, Parliamentary Document 27925, no. 207.
explosive ordnance disposal, armoured containers, assets for improving situational awareness, such as night-vision equipment for the Cougar helicopters, and infrastructural facilities such as capabilities for waste-processing and water supply.

To be able to finance these mission-specific investments, additions to the budget were necessary.

The prolonged operational deployment in Afghanistan took a heavy toll on the armed forces' materiel due to its intensive use. The cost for repairing materiel could, in principle, be funded from the HGIS. Certain types of materiel were exposed to wear of such a nature that replacement investments were required at an earlier stage than would have been the case if the materiel had been subject to normal use. Repairs offered no solution in those cases. These replacement investments could not be covered by the HGIS. Therefore, following the Van Geel motion, EUR 50 million was added from general funds to the regular Defence budget in 2008, and again in 2009. The scope of this addition was not specified in any more detail. In the Memorandum of Amendment to the Budget for 2008, the Minister of Defence indicated that the additional funds would be used for necessary additional investments for the replacement of weapons, vehicles, engineer equipment, generators, and communication and observation equipment deployed under ISAF. In the Spring Financial Report of 2008, the government also added extra funds in the form of the so-called Bos funds. EUR 50 million was thus added to the budgets of 2010 and 2011. Adding the Van Geel and Bos funds resulted in an increase of the volume of the Defence investment budget. The Defence organisation was thus given the possibility to make more replacement investments in the short term than originally planned.

In 2006, there was also a budget addition as a result of the procurement of the first Bushmaster vehicles. The purchase of these vehicles arose from an operational requirement for better protection against the IED threat. When the first 35 vehicles were ordered, the government made available EUR 25 million for this purchase in the Autumn Financial Report of 2006. The other Bushmasters were financed from the capital investment budget that was already available.

Apart from the aforementioned investments, extra funds were also added in order to restore operational readiness, which, as a result of the deployment in Uruzgan, had been under serious strain at the Operational Commands. As part of the Spring Financial Report of 2008, it was decided to add EUR 30 million to the regular Defence budgets of both 2008 and 2009 as a contribution enabling the stocks of ammunition, spare parts and clothing to be brought up to par.

Sub-conclusion
In addition to the expenditure funded by the HGIS, the mission in Uruzgan also gave rise to costs funded by the regular Defence budget. These costs were the result of changes in the concept of operations and the loss of materiel in combat and due to major wear and tear. The Defence budget alone was not sufficient to cover all of the expenditure involved. For this reason, extra funds were added to the Defence budget. For instance, the Bos and Van Geel funds were added to allow investment in new materiel for the mission. Additions for operational losses and for the purchase of the Bushmasters were also required.
5.2 Estimate of permanent funds in the Defence budget related to ISAF

In addition to the fact that this evaluation discusses the various aspects of the Review Protocol, it also serves as a policy assessment for the Defence organisation. To this end, the funds employed for the specific policy area in question must be described. In addition to the expenditure in the context of the mission, an indication can also be given of the permanent funds which, while forming part of the regular Defence budget, can be related to the ISAF participation. In the context of this policy assessment, a model-based estimate was made of the funds bearing relation to the deployment of the armed forces to ISAF in the years covered in this evaluation. This estimate amounted to EUR 130 million per year for the duration of the mission. The funds form part of the organisational and programme-related expenditure of the Defence organisation which are used for the sustainment and readiness of the armed forces during peacetime operations. If a mission is being conducted, a portion of these funds can be ascribed to that mission. The same applies to the ISAF mission during the 2006-2010 period. This concerns parts of the operational budgets of the four Operational Commands, Support Command and the Defence Materiel Organisation. These were used for, for instance, exercises in the work-up phase prior to deployment to Afghanistan, or for Support Command personnel stationed in the Netherlands who were involved with the transport to and from the mission area. These budgets would also have been used in peacetime operations, but in that case they would have covered regular exercise and training activities. These budgets can therefore not be accounted to the total expenditure of the mission.

5.3 Implementation aspects

5.3.1 Personnel aspects of the mission

5.3.1.1 Personnel organisation

The overall size of the Netherlands’ contribution to ISAF fluctuated. Whereas the estimated number of personnel stated in the 2005 decision to participate was 1,200 (950 of which to be stationed in Uruzgan), the actual number reached a maximum of 2,000 military personnel in 2009, despite the fact that the 2007 decision to extend the mission provided for a reduction of the number by transferring tasks from the Netherlands to other parties (France, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic). The causes of this quantitative rise are found in developments in the security situation, the growing importance of training the Afghan army and police, and the national input of additional assets (e.g. the RecceLight reconnaissance system for the F-16). The extension of the ink blot also led to a need for more military personnel. When the mission was concluded, the build-up of the Afghan army and police had not yet reached the stage where they were ready to take over responsibility for the security of the population centres from TFU. Dutch military personnel continued to be necessary along with Afghans to guarantee security in those areas. At the same time, however, Dutch personnel were needed to achieve expansion of the ink blots. This is why there was no further expansion of the ink blots.

The personnel numbers stated in the Article 100 letters were perceived as leading for the composition of the TFU. The personnel on location perceived

33 The calculation model designed as part of the Future Policy Survey project was used for this estimate. In this model, all of the Defence budget (with the exception of HGIS) is ascribed to the specific operational units of the armed forces. For this particular calculation, the representative units that bear relation to the contribution to ISAF 2006-2010 were generated from the model.
this situation as constraining, for it made it impossible for all additional requirements to be met. The commanders on location therefore had to set priorities during deployment.

Compared to earlier missions, the deployment of the TFU involved a relatively large number of civilian personnel, although it may seem limited when set against the number of military personnel. The number of civilian representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs grew substantially during the course of the mission. At the outset of the mission, there were three officials from Foreign Affairs: one political adviser (POLAD), one development cooperation adviser (OSAD) and one cultural adviser (CULAD). The civilian team from Foreign Affairs was expanded with a Civil Representative (CIVREP) in the summer of 2007, and several extra POLADs and OSADs were added later. By the end of the mission, their number had quadrupled to 12 civilian personnel per rotation. In addition to the diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the civilian personnel comprised functional specialists (reserve officers), militarised interpreters and other militarised civilian personnel.

Between 2006 and 2010, a total of 130 civil servants of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were directly involved in the Netherlands’ mission in Uruzgan. A total of over 60 civilian personnel participated in six-monthly rotations in the Uruzgan PRT as POLADs, CULADs, OSADs or interpreters. During the mission, the composition and the number of officials constituting the PRT changed several times. The staffing of the political and socio-economic department of the embassy in Kabul was also doubled because of the mission. During the second half of the deployment (2008-2010), a counternarcotics adviser from the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations joined the civilian team of the mission. From 2006, a political adviser was posted to the ISAF regional headquarters at Kandahar Airfield every six months, as a strategic detachment and also in the context of the periods in which the Netherlands held command of RC-S.

Besides the deployment in TFU and ATF, Dutch personnel were also deployed to the ISAF Headquarters, the IJC in Kabul, and the RC-S at Kandahar Airfield. Dutch flag and general officers filled a number of influential positions. The Dutch deployment for ISAF was supported by logistic detachments stationed at Kandahar Airfield and in the UAE.

5.3.1.2 Work-up phase

Dutch service personnel are generically and organically (meaning in units with fixed compositions and under the command of their own staffs) trained to the “Operationally Ready” level. For the mission in Uruzgan, the Task Force was chosen as the form of deployment. For its specific task in Uruzgan, this Task Force was formed as a composite unit, built up from organic entities and additional elements (for instance, a combination of armoured and airmobile infantry and marines). This ad hoc composition meant that stringent requirements were imposed on the preparations in the work-up phase in order to achieve the “Operationally Ready” level. Training personnel to perform non-organic tasks and to work with non-organic materiel, the limited availability of the equipment to be used in Uruzgan (e.g. Bushmasters and night-vision equipment), and integration of the composite unit combined to form a great challenge.

In the beginning of the mission, the work-up paths of civilian and military personnel were largely separate. But before long it was acknowledged that a collective work-up would be beneficial to performance in the field. As the mission progressed, efforts were made to improve the coordination of both
types of work-up. During the last two rotations of the TFU and the PRT, a fully integrated work-up path was in effect. Particularly to officials of Foreign Affairs, participation in a large-scale mission was something new. It was only at a later stage in the mission that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs succeeded in freeing up its officials at a sufficiently early time prior to the actual deployment so as to enable them to follow the joint work-up path together with Defence personnel.

5.3.1.3 The deployment
The personnel of the TFU staff and of the PRT rotated on the basis of six-month periods, with a view to continuity and the contacts with the Afghan population. The personnel of the BG and the ATF rotated in four-month periods, because of the demanding physical and climatic working conditions. The intention was to compose the BG of organic companies as much as possible. This became increasingly difficult in practice due to the limited availability of sufficiently trained and exercised units. In 2010, the BG included a marine company. The plan was to supply the staff of the TFU from the standing brigade staffs of the RNLA, but, also in this case, units were becoming increasingly mixed. As a result of the different deployment rotations of the TFU staff and the BG, relations between the brigade staff and the subordinate battalions in the peacetime organisation came under strain, which impeded instruction and training. A few years into the mission, this problem also made itself felt in the preparation for deployment. The deployment to ISAF placed a heavy burden on scarce specialist capabilities, such as medical and intelligence personnel and engineers. The personnel of those units were exposed to strong deployment pressure.

5.3.1.4 Care and aftercare

Care
The medical risks which could coincide with scarce specialist medical personnel capacity were overcome by making agreements with partners about the medical evacuation chain, by making available a field hospital in Uruzgan as well as personnel and materiel (including a blood bank) for the field hospital at Kandahar Airfield, and, lastly, by preventive measures such as vaccinations. The medical care system and the evacuation of wounded functioned well during the mission. Despite the rugged terrain and the limited fleet of helicopters available for the tactical evacuation of wounded personnel, it turned out to be possible in practice to provide adequate medical care to patients within an acceptable time span. Patients in need of more extensive specialist medical care could often be treated within 24 hours after sustaining their injuries, in the Central Military Hospital in Utrecht, Netherlands.

Aftercare
The Defence organisation attaches great importance to aftercare for military personnel and their homefront, and the ISAF mission placed high demands on both. The Defence organisation therefore devoted a great deal of attention to care and aftercare even while the mission was still ongoing. The organisation of aftercare was structured in phases. Aftercare begins with an operational debriefing, often still in the mission area. This is followed by a debriefing during the adjustment period in Crete. After their return, service members are given leave, during which period they can talk to colleagues about mission experiences and about possible problems experienced after their return. Subsequently, a return interview is held, and a few months later a questionnaire is sent to both service personnel and their homefront. Depending on the wishes and needs, reunions can be
organised at a later stage. In addition, there is individual care available, depending on the presence of problems and their nature.

Aftercare in the Defence organisation functioned satisfactorily in practice during the ISAF mission. However, aftercare does not stop after completion of the mission, and there must be lasting attention for military personnel and their homefront. Between six weeks and two months after his/her return, a mandatory return interview is held with the service member, aimed at obtaining an image of the his/her mental and physical health condition. In addition, there will be an exchange of information between the Social Medical Team (SMT) that was involved during deployment and the SMT of the service member’s unit. The SMT is a multidisciplinary cooperative body that advises the commanding officer with regard to his responsibilities in the areas of absenteeism through illness, reintegration, deployability and leaving the service. In the main, the procedures of these return interviews and the transfer between SMTs functioned satisfactorily. The commanding officer, who has an important responsibility in the return interviews, should be supported and equipped better. The personal involvement of a commanding officer appears to be of essential importance for the way aftercare is structured and effectuated in practice.

In late 2010, a guideline was issued to assure the performance of an SMT in an unequivocal and high-quality manner. For instance, explicit attention must be given to the transfer of records from the SMT in the mission area to the SMT of the unit.

Approximately six months after returning from the deployment area, the service member receives two aftercare questionnaires: one for him/herself and one for his/her homefront. Both questionnaires serve as screening instruments for possible medical and/or psycho-social complaints. Various initiatives (such as presenting questionnaires in a digital format) were taken over the past years to encourage response to the questionnaires. The effects of these initiatives have not been measured yet. A great deal of attention is also given to the homefront and this appears to work satisfactorily. The homefront has indicated that it appreciates the care and attention it receives.

In addition to aforementioned phased aftercare, there is also aftercare focusing on the specific care requirement of the service member or his/her homefront. This individual aftercare is structured to cater for active service members, veterans and military war and service casualties. Individual aftercare for actively serving personnel is generally adequate and is also appreciated as such. Access to care is mostly sufficient. There is also individual aftercare for veterans available. Contact is made via the Central Reporting Point for Veterans at the Veterans Institute. Owing to the great deal of attention devoted to active service members’ transition to veteranship, the threshold for veterans to contact the Central Reporting Point seems to have been lowered. ISAF veterans with questions and concerns regarding care tend to contact the Central Reporting Point relatively quickly. This appears to be the result of the careful provision of information to military personnel prior to deployments. This information supply appears to have lowered the threshold for (former) personnel and benefits the eventual provision of aftercare.

Aftercare for military war and service victims is aimed first of all at recovery and reintegration. The first point of contact is the commanding officer, who coaches the service member and is assisted by the case coordinator. The actual reintegration of military war and service victims is the responsibility
of the Reintegration Services Centre. The welfare desk of the General Pension Fund for Public Employees mainly provides assistance regarding questions and concerns of military war and service victims in the material domain. It has been established that the organisational set-up of aftercare for military war and service victims functions satisfactorily, and that accessibility and awareness regarding the welfare desk is sufficient. The threshold for (former) personnel to approach the relevant organisations with a care question or concern is low. This applies to active service members as well as to veterans and military war and service victims of the Uruzgan mission. Retaining and strengthening the current low-threshold care system will enable timely recognition and treatment of complaints, some of which only manifest themselves several years after the deployment.

Individual care is customised and both care providers and care organisations have therefore had to deviate from existing procedures in some cases. It is important that these changes are eventually incorporated into existing regulations and that the latter are adapted where necessary. Registration of data and making available information also deserves permanent attention.

Finally, it can be said that the mutual coordination between care providers and organisations is important and can still be improved further. Because the provision of aftercare is accommodated in many different places in the organisation, there is a need for a comprehensive concept of care which integrates all procedures, enabling aftercare to become even better. The process of aftercare can be optimised in the coming years. For this effort, the input from the Inspector-General of the Armed Forces and from the Inspector of Military Health Care will be used.

5.3.2 Financial aspects of care and aftercare
The past years have shown that it is impossible to link the expenditure for care provision directly to specific deployments because of the permanent nature of the care the Defence organisation provides to active and former service members and the fact that care constitutes a permanent element of day-to-day management. For this reason, no separate accounts for personnel care and health care are kept during operational deployment. In addition, care is in some cases provided over very long periods of time and a need for care may manifest itself at a very late stage, making it difficult to determine to which specific mission that particular need relates.

In 2008, in retrospect and on the basis of assumptions and estimates, an effort was made to gain a clear insight into the amounts spent on care and aftercare for military personnel deployed to Afghanistan. Following from the account of expenditure on the ISAF mission and with a view to the future planning and accountability of expenditure on care and aftercare, an effort was made to develop a methodology that will be applicable to missions in general. Using tariffs, part of the mission-related expenditure on care and aftercare can thus be made transparent. These tariffs have been established on the basis of facts and experience and concern the extra expenditure for care arising from a deployment, which can be linked directly to the deployed personnel. As a principle, ‘care’ was understood to mean medical care in deployment areas, and, in the Netherlands, treatment of physical and mental injury, (extra) vaccination, medical examinations prior to deployment, post-deployment adjustment, aftercare questionnaires and return interviews. This tariff was calculated at EUR 410. This amount includes the mission-specific vaccination, the medical examination prior to deployment, the aftercare questionnaire, the return interview conducted by
occupational social workers and the cost of the adjustment period (in Crete in the case of Uruzgan). This rate can be applied retrospectively to calculate the expenses for care and aftercare associated with the ISAF mission. Based on the deployment of an average 5,400 service personnel per year in the mission area, the total amount of care and aftercare expenditure that can be traced directly to the mission is set at EUR 2.2 million per year over the four-year period that the mission lasted.

In addition, with regard to the Netherlands’ contribution to Uruzgan, overall amounts can be identified that are part of the expenditure financed from the HGIS (Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation). As part of medical care during the mission, EUR 3 million were spent yearly on the use of medical supplies by the hospitals serving the mission area. This amount also includes care provided to Afghan civilians and international partners. Furthermore, the Defence organisation spent an extra amount of EUR 1.6 million per year on occupational social work arising from the mission in Uruzgan. Approximately 50% of the insurance fees paid by the Defence organisation for deployment, duties at sea, in the air, or related to exercises (the so-called VIVO arrangement) can also be related to ISAF. This amounted to EUR 1.8 million per year.

On the basis of these principles, the total annual expenses on care and aftercare for the mission in Uruzgan in the 2006-2010 period can be set at an approximate EUR 8.5 million per year. Funding from both HGIS and the regular Defence budget were used for this, and this expenditure is part of the total expenditure on the mission of EUR 1.99 billion.

Finally, certain funds in the regular Defence budget can also be related to forms of care and aftercare that constitute an integral part of day-to-day management and can therefore not be traced to a certain mission. These are items concerning disability and survivors’ pensions (EUR 112.3 million per year), expenditure for mental health care for, inter alia, research into PTSS (EUR 2 million per year), expenditure for deployable medical specialists from the Central Military Hospital (EUR 1 million per year), expenditure on the Defence and Partnered Hospitals Cooperation Implementation Project (EUR 6.75 million per year) and various forms of personnel care in the hierarchical chain which are hard to identify as a result of their being interwoven with regular day-to-day management.

5.3.3 Contracting of civilian service providers
The mission in Uruzgan demonstrated that - now even more so than in the past - the Defence organisation must be prepared to conduct complex operations in remote parts of the world. More use was made of special (complementary) resources and the need for specialist knowledge increased. The need for logistic support of the mission also increased considerably. The Netherlands sourced a number of civilian service providers in Uruzgan to support the activities of TFU and ATF. This concerned services such as catering, maintenance of vehicles, building of infrastructure, and transport. The hiring of civilian service providers served to complement military capabilities, enhancing the flexibility and effectiveness of the armed forces. After the conclusion of the mission by the Netherlands, most of the contracts were taken over by the successors of the TFU.

For the security of the Dutch compounds in Uruzgan, the TFU made use of local Afghan security personnel: the Afghan Security Guards (ASGs). The Netherlands hired approximately 250 Afghan security officials individually and used them for manning static guard posts and conducting patrols. The
conditions under which ASGs were hired were laid down in contracts with the individual members and the commander of the Afghan security complement. The ASGs had previously been hired in Uruzgan by the United States and the Netherlands continued this arrangement. The ASGs had a good reputation. The contracts with the Afghan Security Guards were terminated in late 2010. The cost associated with hiring civilian service providers is an integral part of the HGIS-Defence budget.

5.3.4 Material and logistic support from the Netherlands
Following the government decision of 2005 and the ensuing parliamentary debate, the Deployment Task Force (DTF) built two compounds in Uruzgan to accommodate the Dutch contingent. The Netherlands had committed itself to taking over the role of lead nation in Uruzgan from 1 August 2006. When the final decision for the mission was taken, accompanied with the intention to start the deployment on 1 June 2006, there was little time left to form the DTF, to prepare it for deployment, to make other necessary preparations and to ensure that the compounds were ready in time for the arrival of the first main force. The outcome was that, by the time the first rotation of ISAF arrived, the build-up of the facilities at Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod was two months behind schedule. Containers with unclear contents lists, the slow pace of procurement of required materiel and difficulties with the strategic transport of materiel contributed to this problem.

For the mission in Afghanistan, use was initially made of the organic assets of the deployed units. It soon became clear, however, that the rugged terrain and high concentrations of particulates placed a heavy burden on the materiel, causing it to wear at a faster rate than it would under normal circumstances and requiring greater repair efforts. To prevent this increased wear and tear of materiel from affecting the deployability of the armed forces, the Defence organisation was given extra financial manoeuvring space, i.e. the so-called Van Geel and Bos funds, for a number of years to make the necessary investments in materiel. The effects of wear and tear could thus be mitigated.

The international logistic line to Afghanistan was long and vulnerable. For the transport of heavy equipment, use was made of commercial shipping between the Netherlands and the port of Karachi in Pakistan; the transport over land from the port of Karachi to Uruzgan was done by road. Replenishment of food, drinking water and fuel took place through NATO via the same route. Due to the volatile situation in western Pakistan and along the part of the route running through Afghanistan, it was not always possible to keep the buffer supplies at the desired levels in the mission area, especially where drinking water and fuel were concerned. Urgent deliveries of goods as well as personnel movements were conducted using air transport. Along with the national military air transport fleet, hired aircraft, including a helicopter, were also used to do this. Special requirements were set to aircraft conducting flights in Afghanistan. In connection with the security situation, aircraft needed to have certain self-protection assets, among other things. Partly for this reason, a Dutch transhipment facility had been set up in the UAE. Transport from the Netherlands to the UAE was done with aircraft unsuitable for operation in Afghanistan, while for the journey from the UAE to Afghanistan tactical air transport was employed. All Dutch air transport, of both personnel and materiel, was routed to Afghanistan via the UAE.

5.3.4.1 Fast Track Procurement
As the mission progressed, the opponent made increasing use of IEDs. The vehicles used by the Netherlands Defence organisation (particularly the
Mercedes Benz terrain vehicle, the Patria, the YPR-765 and, at a later stage, the Viking) turned out to be vulnerable to these IEDs, and certain adaptations were therefore made to these vehicles to reduce this vulnerability. In addition, this led to an urgent requirement for vehicles that were better protected against IEDs. A so-called Fast Track Procurement procedure, which was specifically designed for this purpose, ensured the swift acquisition of a number of Bushmaster vehicles. This vehicle has an armoured and V-shaped underside that gives it very good protection against IEDs. Having these vehicles at his disposal gave the commander of the TFU more possibilities for adapting the choice of vehicle to the various situations and activities that Dutch units were involved in. The need for increased and improved reconnaissance capabilities and counter-IED capabilities was addressed in a similar fashion. Armoured personnel quarters could also be acquired through the FTP procedure. The FTP ensured that new, urgent requirements and lessons learned could be addressed flexibly and relatively quickly. The FTP procedure turned out to be a useful method to make adequate materiel available to units in Afghanistan in a quick and diligent manner. It contributed to the security and flexibility of the TFU. An inherent side-effect of the FTP is that there is less room for allowing competition, which may cause the cost to rise. For that reason, the FTP procedure was used only in exceptional and acute cases.

5.3.4.2 Redeployment
For the preparation and implementation of the redeployment of the TFU’s materiel to the Netherlands, a Redeployment Task Force (RDTF) was formed. The RDTF’s mission was to transport, in principle, all of the Dutch materiel back to the Netherlands in a controlled and monitored fashion, after which it was to be made operational again as much as possible, and made available for use again. Since at the time of the RDTF’s formation it was not clear yet whether and to what extent it would be possible to transfer or sell materiel to partners in the mission area, it was decided to prepare for a maximum personnel requirement. When work started, on 1 August 2010, it became clear straight away that considerable quantities of materiel could be transferred to partners so that less manpower was needed.

To ensure that redeployment would proceed in a controlled and monitored fashion, all of the present materiel had to be listed, quantities had to be verified and compared to the quantities originally provided, and the condition of the materiel had to be established. The materiel was then transported to the port of Karachi mainly by road, to be transported to the Netherlands by sea. Because ISAF could temporarily not provide guaranteed air support during convoy operations, it was decided to keep the Apache attack helicopters in operation for one more month in Uruzgan. Air support for Dutch convoys, as well as for coalition partners, was thus assured during that period too. Specific strategic assets, such as self-propelled howitzers, were transferred to the Netherlands directly by air.

The final inventory concerning materiel can only be made when the redeployment process has been fully completed.
6 Conclusions

This chapter begins with a brief introduction, followed by the sub-conclusions in the areas of security, good governance and socio-economic development, the Dutch approach (3D), the implementation and the financial aspects of the mission. It concludes with a number of lessons.

6.1 Introduction

This evaluation discusses the Dutch participation in NATO’s UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2010.

During those four years, the Netherlands made a major effort in Afghanistan, both in Uruzgan and elsewhere. The mission took a great toll on the Netherlands armed forces and demanded great sacrifices.

The deployment for ISAF cost the lives of 25 Dutch military personnel. In addition to the servicemen who lost their lives, a total of almost 150 Dutch military personnel suffered mild to very serious injuries during combat action or attacks in the past years, some of which resulted in permanent physical disability. Over 50 Dutch military personnel suffered injuries that required their repatriation to the Netherlands. Moreover, the deployment to Afghanistan in many cases constituted a psychological burden, also for the home front.

The coalition partners in Uruzgan, the Afghan army and the Afghan police all suffered casualties and there were also casualties among the Afghan civilian population.

The Netherlands did not operate alone in Afghanistan, but was part of a large UN-mandated international NATO peace force. The guidelines from the Afghanistan Compact served in part to direct the mission. More than forty countries are participating in the ISAF mission. The Dutch contribution should be considered in the light of the international efforts and the circumstances arising after the attacks in the United States of 11 September 2001. From 2001 onwards, the Netherlands has been actively involved in the stabilisation and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. After the government decision of December 2005, the Dutch contribution increased considerably. The Netherlands was involved, together with the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and other countries, in the stabilisation of the southern provinces (RC-S). There was intensive cooperation with partners, both in Afghanistan and at home, at the military, organisational and political levels. In the coming years, the Netherlands hopes to build on the new contacts and strengthened ties, with Allies and new partners such as Australia.

The Dutch participation in ISAF from 2006 to 2010 and the results achieved in that period should be viewed in the context of this broad international effort.

Compared with previous Dutch peace missions, the Dutch participation in ISAF was extensive and complex. The Netherlands took the great responsibility of becoming lead nation in the province of Uruzgan. In 2005, that very traditional province was one of the most dangerous provinces in the country, a poor, isolated area with little socio-economic development.
This was the first time the armed forces had conducted an expeditionary mission of this scope in such a remote and inaccessible province. The security situation was poor at the outset, the population lived in severe poverty and there was no good governance of any form in place. The mission involved undertaking activities in various areas.

The military personnel, diplomats and other civilian employees often operated in very difficult circumstances. They did so professionally and with great endeavour, which was of vital importance to the mission. Four years was not long enough, however, to enable the Afghan authorities to take care of security, good governance and development themselves. The progress which has been made is not irreversible. Dutch personnel have, therefore, endeavoured to hand over their achievements and their knowledge and experience to their successors. The government is confident that the achievements will be built upon in the years to come.

Both with regard to materiel and in terms of finances, the participation in this mission has had a greater impact than had been calculated at the start. It was difficult to formulate specific objectives and indicators beforehand, which complicated the measuring of results after the mission. The government indicated from the outset that the Netherlands would make a valuable contribution, but that a comprehensive result in all areas would not be feasible, given the context of Afghanistan. There was nonetheless a strong desire to achieve concrete, discernible results quickly. In reality, however, insufficient account had been taken beforehand of the local circumstances and the great complexity of the problems in Uruzgan.

The knowledge and insights gained during the missions led to the adjustment of parameters and assumptions. This is illustrated by the shift in focus in the Article 100 letter of 2007; greater emphasis was placed on capacity-building for the army and police, and so-called ‘Afghanisation’. The learning ability proved great over the years; even during the mission itself a number of lessons learned were already put into practice.

The departure of the Dutch forces has not heralded an end to our ties with Uruzgan. Our contribution to the socio-economic development of Uruzgan will continue, at least until 2014. This will allow for the achievements to be consolidated. In addition, the Dutch efforts are focused on the transition, i.e. the transfer of responsibilities to the Afghan authorities. To this end, an integrated police training mission is being deployed in northern Afghanistan. The developments in Uruzgan will, however, continue to be monitored with a specific sense of responsibility.

6.2 Conclusions

6.2.1 Aim of the evaluation
The aim of this final evaluation is to assess the extent to which the objectives of the Dutch participation in ISAF have been achieved. Another goal is to identify lessons from the Dutch deployment. The focal points of the 2009 Review Protocol will be included in that process. For the Ministry of Defence, this evaluation also serves as a policy assessment.
The first part of the central question of this evaluation is:
To what extent have the objectives of the Dutch contribution to ISAF, during the 2006-2010 period been achieved, given the parameters and assumptions.

The Article 100 letter of 2005 stated that the main objective of the Dutch deployment was aimed at ‘enabling the Afghan authorities to take care of security, good governance and development mainly without help’. This objective was elaborated upon in the same letter. The Netherlands would improve stability and security in Uruzgan by ‘increasing the support for the Afghan authorities among the local population and weakening the support for the Taliban and related groups’.

The second part of the central question of this evaluation is:
‘What lessons can be drawn from the Netherlands’ participation in ISAF?’
Best practices and lessons regarding the Dutch deployment are drawn from the general conclusions.

The sub-questions are as follows:

1. **What was the policy underpinning the Netherlands’ participation in ISAF in the spheres of security, good governance and socio-economic development?**

2. **How was the Netherlands’ policy in the spheres of security, good governance and socio-economic development implemented in practice?**

3. **What has been achieved with respect to the objectives in the spheres of security, good governance and socio-economic development?**

**Objective of the Dutch participation in ISAF**

From the outset of the mission, it was clear that creating stability and security is not possible without more efficient governance and socio-economic development. This was formulated as follows in the Article 100 letter of 2005:

“In accordance with the ISAF mandate, the Netherlands detachment will focus on promoting stability and security by increasing support for the Afghan authorities among the local population and by weakening support for the Taliban and related groups. Promoting good governance, an efficient police and army and the rule of law, performing CIMIC and reconstruction activities, and promoting reconstruction activities by others are important elements of this approach.”

This was put into practice by providing protection to the civilian population, giving an impulse to the reconstruction, enhancing the local administration and improving the living conditions of the population. Dutch policy was characterised by the 3D approach, in which the military, diplomatic and development efforts in Uruzgan were coordinated wherever possible. The mission was based on the assumption that there could be no reconstruction without better security, and that sustainable improvement of the security situation depended on the progress made in the area of reconstruction. This would require the involvement of various ministries, as well as private and non-governmental organisations.

6.2.2 **Introduction to the sub-conclusions**

Before discussing the achievements in the province of Uruzgan, it is important to note that the results in Uruzgan should be placed in a wider context. The goals of the Afghan authorities and the international
community are formulated in the Afghan Compact of 2006. Most of these goals were not achieved, due to their being too ambitious and due to the adverse and complex circumstances. The Netherlands was faced with this at the local level in Uruzgan as well and this places the achievements in perspective.

In addition to the deployment in Uruzgan, the Dutch participation in ISAF also led to results outside Uruzgan. Dutch staff personnel made valuable contributions to the ISAF staffs at various levels, which included providing the Deputy Commander (Air) of ISAF, the Deputy Chief of Staff Stability and twice providing the commander of RC-S. The Netherlands thus had a strong influence on ISAF’s operating methods and the progress of the operation in those periods. In addition, the deployment of the ATF’s fighter aircraft and combat helicopters throughout Afghanistan frequently made decisive contributions to the successful conclusion of confrontations between ISAF units and insurgents.

The involvement of the embassy and political advisers at the national level and outside Uruzgan expanded the network for Uruzgan considerably, as well as increasing insight into the dynamics of the region and involving new actors.

In its response to advisory report no. 64 of the Advisory Council on International Affairs, the government agreed that in the conduct of crisis management operations, for instance in Afghanistan, ‘cooperation and cohesion’ and ‘modesty and level-headedness’ are guiding principles. Echoing the advisory report of the Advisory Council on International Affairs, the government underlined that crisis-management operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere required a realistic attitude with regard to the extent to which the operations would be able to achieve their objectives in full. Formulating a realistic ambition with measurable, specific objectives is a derivative of that principle.

6.2.3 Sub-conclusion: Security

Objective
The objective in the area of security was that, in accordance with the ISAF mandate, the Netherlands detachment would focus on promoting stability and security by increasing support for the Afghan authorities among the local population and by weakening support for the Taliban and related groups. In 2007, this objective was expanded to include the intensification of the training and coaching of the Afghan security organisations.

Policy
In Afghanistan, ISAF applied a counterinsurgency doctrine which focused on obtaining support from the population. The Netherlands implemented this doctrine in Uruzgan by making use of the ‘ink blot’ strategy. This strategy meant that, given the available capacity of the Afghan authorities, the Netherlands and the Allies, the military efforts of the TFU were mostly focused on the main population centres in Uruzgan (Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawod and Chora), aiming to guarantee more security for the Afghan people and enable further development. The build-up of the Afghan army and police was an important precondition for the stabilisation of the province.

Implementation

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At the end of 2005, the Afghan authorities had little to no influence in considerable parts of the province. The security situation was poor and the insurgents had extensive freedom of action. During the mission, the Netherlands succeeded in providing greater security for the population centres and thus for the majority of the people of Uruzgan. There was great fear among the population that the insurgents would return. The protection which the Netherlands was able to provide to the civilian population was at times temporary and localised, depending on the situation. Not always were there sufficient numbers of (Dutch) ISAF troops or ANSF personnel available for that protection to be permanent.

In the first years of the ink blot strategy, operations at the high end of the spectrum of force were necessary on a regular basis. Confrontations between the insurgents and ISAF troops led to casualties among our own units and among the local population. The combination of, on the one hand, the high level of force and, on the other, operations involving social patrols and outreach activities by mission teams demanded a high level of flexibility from the personnel. The units proved to be very capable of carrying out these activities, even if they were conducted close together in terms of time and space. This had a positive impact on the effectiveness of the operations. The freedom of movement of the PRT and the civilian experts and diplomats was limited by the security situation. Within the ink blot, too, the PRT sometimes required force protection from the Battle Group, but that protection was not always available. At times this hampered the activities of the PRT. The activities of the American, Australian and Dutch special forces outside the ink blot were essential in relieving the pressure on the ink blot.

Results
Owing in part to Dutch efforts, the presence of the Afghan army increased in the province of Uruzgan. In 2006, the Afghan army’s presence in the province was very limited and the police apparatus was weak. From 2007, more attention was focused on building up a properly functioning police apparatus. In 2010, the effective size of the 4th brigade in Uruzgan was approximately 3,200 personnel. In the period up to 2010, the Netherlands trained around 1,000 police officers.

With the gradual expansion of the ink blots, an increasing number of the population were brought under the protection of ISAF and the Afghan authorities, despite the pressure from and influence of the insurgents. The Dutch ink blot strategy was based on the premise that after a certain period of time, the Afghan security services would be able to maintain security in the relatively safe areas largely without assistance. That would free up capacity to expand the ink blot further. The independence of the ANSF envisaged in the Article 100 letter, including the transfer of responsibility of security in the populated areas, was not achieved during the mission, however. This laid extra claims on the Dutch ISAF units.

The ink blot areas were expanded over a period of four years. In 2010, the area controlled by ISAF and the Afghan army and police included more than half of the population of the province. Economic activity increased and NGOs found their way to the province. The improved security situation is, however, fragile and not irreversible.

6.2.4 Sub-conclusion: Good governance

Objective
One of the objectives of the Netherlands was to promote good governance. In the judgement of the government, success in this mission was possible if the Afghan government and provincial administration gained legitimacy, human rights played a greater role, corruption was dealt with more effectively, democracy gained more room to manoeuvre and the peace dividend became visible for the population.

Policy
Capacity-building, promoting transparency and integrity in governance and improving representativeness were the three main pillars of the policy aimed at improving local administration. In addition, increasing the involvement in the province of Uruzgan of the national government in Kabul was a policy priority.

Implementation
Dutch policy was undermined by a lack of Afghan political will at the highest level to bring about an effective administration. Representatives of the local administration in Uruzgan received little practical support from Kabul and at the national level, too, the political will to deal with corruption, nepotism and incompetence was often lacking. In addition, there was no tradition of a central government authority, due to the long-standing tribal society of Afghanistan.

Results
Some promising first steps were taken in the field of good governance and these produced some modest results. A fundamental improvement of the effectiveness of the formal local administration will take longer than the duration of the mission, however.

Despite various Dutch initiatives, capacity-building in the area of governance in Uruzgan was laborious. Many positions in the administration of Uruzgan were either not filled or only after a considerable length of time. There was, however, a modest improvement in the staffing levels within the Uruzgan administration, namely from 20% to 30%. The ruling (tribal) elite and the drug trade profited from the status quo. The perception of the population regarding the integrity of the administration has shown little improvement. The results in the area of good governance within the formal provincial and district authorities fell short of the initial ambitions and expectations as set out in the Article 100 letters.

The effects of the Dutch efforts aimed at restoring tribal dialogue and cooperation show a more positive picture. Diplomacy and social outreach to key individuals in Uruzgan and elsewhere were of great importance in this respect. The Dutch approach was aimed at having all tribes participate actively in the development of the province. This emphasis on tribal balance and inclusiveness in local government marked a definite shift in the balance of power within the province. The Dutch policy of not working formally with informal leaders with bad reputations helped gain the trust of marginalised tribes. It did not, however, lead to curbing the power and influence of these informal power brokers; even without a formal power base and without contact with the Dutch military, they continued to play a significant role during the course of the mission.

The Dutch efforts have led to an increase in attention, both in Afghanistan and internationally, for the province. The administrative distance between the province and Kabul has been reduced. With diplomatic efforts, the Netherlands succeeded in bringing (international) funds and the roll-out of Afghan national government programmes from Kabul to this disadvantaged
province. This, too, was done by means of quiet diplomacy and social outreach to key individuals in Uruzgan and elsewhere. This is a positive result.

There was constant attention during the mission for the way in which support could be given to the Afghan authorities in the area of counter-drugs activities. The policy of the mission in this area was mainly aimed at providing a long-term alternative to local farmers who often opted for poppy cultivation on economic grounds. The achievements in this respect therefore lie in providing an alternative source of income rather than interdiction and eradication. The introduction of new crops such as saffron and the planting of fruit trees have strongly improved crop diversity in the province and have provided alternatives to poppy cultivation.

6.2.5 Sub-conclusion: Socio-economic development

Objective
The objective for socio-economic development was to promote reconstruction as an important component of a strategy aimed at stability and peace-building.

Policy
The reconstruction eventually focused mainly on five sectors: health care, education, justice, agriculture and infrastructure. The common theme was "linking up with Afghan national programmes", and striving to "encourage and if possible facilitate reconstruction activities by (Dutch) NGOs".

Implementation
The projects and programmes were developed on the basis of a conflict analysis in which the local dynamics and causes of instability were identified. The activities were therefore focused on the districts of the province of Uruzgan and on tribal, ethnic and religious groups. In particular the population groups which felt marginalised, by the authorities and the ruling elite, needed to be reached. Most of the larger projects focused on the three large population centres in the districts of Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawod and Chora.

The short duration of the tours of the TFU and the PRT led to great pressure to produce concrete results within a period of four or six months. This resulted in many small initiatives which contributed to the visibility of the Dutch presence and acceptance of the military presence. Jobs were also created for the duration of these activities. These small-scale, quick and visible activities, aimed at specific village communities, were just a first step towards sustainable development activities. These projects were then followed up by long-term development projects as soon as was possible. Bringing in national programmes and actors with experience in the areas of education, health care and rural development gave an initial impulse for sustainable, long-term development. This build-up from short, quick and visible projects to long-term, sustainable development was of great importance. The local authorities could thus increase their presence and legitimacy in the province.

The mission began with a limited number of sectors for socio-economic development, but gradually it became clear that the Afghan authorities, the NGOs and other donors were hardly active at all in the province and that broader efforts would be required for the cohesion between the various issues. In order to achieve results, the Netherlands had to be active in more sectors than had been foreseen. In addition, the Netherlands made efforts,
to some extent successfully, to interest more donors in Uruzgan, but it long remained the largest donor.

The results of the Dutch efforts were facilitated by the good cooperation with Afghan partners. Thanks to their knowledge of the local dynamics and their access to the local population, even in the most remote areas, trust could be gained and a support base created for the Dutch mission. It also allowed important information to be gathered which was of great importance to the efforts in the areas of stability and security. The implementation of numerous projects, endeavouring at all times to maintain a careful balance between the various population groups, contributed to an economic revival in Uruzgan.

In Uruzgan, the implementation of programmes for socio-economic development in a fragile environment barely accessible to organisations, and programmes not rooted in the local community and with little implementational capacity on the ground is a difficult process. Civilian organisations and national programmes had to be approached actively and persuaded to work in the province. At the same time, these organisations held a monopoly position, particularly at the beginning, owing to the limited number of actors, and corruption was on the increase due to the ready availability of donor funds. A critical attitude was adopted and a critical dialogue opened regarding the efforts of civilian organisations. Coordination and effective alignment with the programmes and activities of other actors in Uruzgan were therefore essential. It was very important not to hinder sectoral policy and national sectoral plans and programmes. This was generally successful, with a growing trust among civilian organisations, local authorities and ISAF.

Results
A considerable amount has been achieved in Uruzgan over the four years. The local authorities, national programmes and NGOs had limited capacities. Due to the negative perception of this province at the national level, it was not easy to find qualified personnel. Education and health care improved nonetheless, as is evident from the various indicators of the relevant ministries and the evaluations by the AHDS and the TLO. Both accessibility and quality have improved in both sectors. In four years, the number of clinics in almost all districts has increased and there is a form of medical care available in all six districts of Uruzgan. In the 2006-2010 period, there were increases in the numbers of operational health care facilities (from nine to seventeen), health care staff (from 89 to 124), doctors (from 19 to 31) and community health workers (from 130 to 300). The number of functioning schools and the number of school-going children in Uruzgan increased substantially over the 2006 – 2010 period. The number of operational schools increased more than fourfold (from 34 to 166); 42,772 children go to school regularly, of whom 6,774 are girls.

The economic base and activity have also increased, particularly in areas which gained access to local and regional markets. Food security has also improved. The socio-economic development was the most substantial in and around the three largest towns, but even outside that area, activity increased. The population’s freedom of movement increased and the province has become more accessible to civil servants, NGOs and IOs.

Improvement of the accessibility of the province by air and by the provincial roads to Chora and Deh Rawod has had a positive effect on the socio-economic development. The completion of the first 20 km of paved road from Tarin Kowt to Chora has led to the construction of more houses in the
area, increased sales of agricultural products and quicker access to the hospital in Tarin Kowt. The accessibility of the province has also improved thanks to expansion of the telephone, radio and television networks. There is now also access to financial services. As a result of the improved security and the increase in the population’s purchasing power, the number of businesses at the Tarin Kowt bazaar has increased from 900 to more than 2,000, and there is much more money in circulation. Two banks have opened branches in Tarin Kowt. Coordination and monitoring of the various activities continued to require attention due to the fragility of the area.

The ultimate goal was to bring about Afghan authorities which would be able to govern the province and provide the population with basic facilities independently. It was therefore important to have the progress in Uruzgan borne by the local government. The population had to be convinced that their own provincial administration was there for them and that not everything was being done for them by foreign experts and contractors. For the purpose of socio-economic development, this approach generally worked well, although the limited implementational capacity at times slowed progress and, according to the TLO, the population mainly ascribed the progress to the international efforts and not to those of their own authorities.

The Dutch contribution to the socio-economic development will continue until 2014, which will allow the achievements to be consolidated. Some projects are only now properly bearing fruit, such as the road from Tarin Kowt to Chora. The Netherlands has strong partners in AusAid, USAID and GIZ for its activities in Uruzgan up to 2014. The sectoral programmes of the ministries of Education, Health Care, Rural Development, Agriculture and Local Government will also continue. The mission has laid a foundation for development, opened up the province to the outside world and managed to interest an extensive network of actors in this province.

6.2.6 Sub-conclusion: The 3D approach
The Dutch participation in ISAF was characterised by the 3D approach (Defence, Diplomacy and Development). This involves connecting military, diplomatic and development efforts as much as possible and integrating them where desirable and possible. Conscious decisions were made as to what efforts were to be made in which context. This gradually, and naturally, created shared responsibility and planning processes, with individual activities taking place within a shared framework. This increased the effectiveness of the Dutch effort during the mission and became a characteristic feature of it. By the same token, it was decided in 2008 that the mission would no longer be led by a military commander alone, but that this would be done together with a diplomat.

The integration of activities was important in The Hague, too. During the mission, the cooperation between the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence continued to develop. The specific tasks and responsibilities of the two ministries remained in place though. There was appreciation for each other’s expertise and its added value for the mission. The mission enhanced the cooperation between the two ministries.

It should be noted, however, that the comprehensive approach, in which the civilian and military elements of the mission have equal roles, was not always clearly discernible to the public. One of the reasons for this was the fact that the Dutch contribution was part of ISAF, which is led by NATO. NATO made a point of propagating its leading role, and with it the military elements of the international efforts. Compared with the military work, the
civilian element of the Dutch contribution was only carried out by a limited number of personnel at several locations and in cooperation with various parts. As a result, the image of the mission was not always balanced. Another factor behind the diplomats’ work in the mission not receiving a great deal of attention lies in the necessity to handle information regarding NGO projects which were active in Uruzgan and funded by the Netherlands with a certain degree of discretion. NGOs did not want to be associated with ISAF so as not to jeopardise their own safety and that of the local population. Too obvious a connection with the military deployment would make these projects, and the unarmed civilians working on them, into targets for the insurgents.

It can be concluded that the 3D approach was effective in this mission. As concerns future missions, each (post-) conflict situation will require its own, specific approach. It is important to assess during the orientation and planning stages prior to any deployment whether contributions from various ministries are required. In addition to creating an interdepartmental mission design, interdepartmental mission reviews must also be held. The 3D approach is therefore not a goal in itself; the input from the various ministries and actors must have added value and be based on the local context of the mission area.

6.2.7 Sub-conclusion: Aspects in the implementation of the mission
The implementation of the mission has taken a great toll on the organisations involved. At the Ministry of Defence, the work-up process for the deployment to Afghanistan had to compete with other priorities. Particularly for units which were deployed often, this put extra pressure on the training and exercise programme. The decision to extend the participation in ISAF in 2007 placed an extra burden on some units. In addition, the deployment itself was felt to be intensive, particularly on the part of the scarce categories of personnel who went on several deployments. The aftercare for the deployed personnel is therefore an issue which has received specific attention. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had little experience in conducting such a large-scale mission and had to make considerable efforts to ensure its personnel were well prepared for their deployment to Uruzgan. For instance, it was not until mid-2008 that the team from Foreign Affairs was able to conduct their preparation for the deployment to Afghanistan in cooperation with their counterparts from Defence.

Many (international) partners (ISAF, OEF, UN, Afghan authorities, NGOs) were active, directly or indirectly, in Afghanistan. The Netherlands acted as lead nation, but had no formal powers. This situation required a great deal of ad hoc coordination by the Dutch staff. That coordination process was at times difficult, and as a result maintaining the unity of effort and unity of command in the mission took a considerable amount of energy.

The mission further professionalised the armed forces, but was also a formidable challenge. For instance, the time available for deploying the Deployment Task Force at the beginning of the mission was very short, which resulted in logistic problems, particularly in materiel management, which was to have an influence on the mission for a long time. As the mission progressed, extra efforts and assets also proved necessary. For instance, during the mission there was a shortage of what are referred to as enablers: counter-IED assets, medical personnel, intelligence-gathering and processing capacity, helicopter capacity and safety features of certain types of vehicle. These shortcomings could largely be remedied during the mission. In the implementation of the mission, the strict division between
ISAF and the OEF led to extra coordinating measures, both for the TFU and the ATF.

The Netherlands followed the international guidelines regarding the treatment of Afghan detainees during the mission. In 2005, agreements were made with the Afghan authorities in this matter, particularly concerning the Dutch monitoring regime and unlimited access to the detainees for Afghan NGOs, international organisations and the embassy. This Memorandum of Understanding proved its worth.

The Netherlands mainly made use of direct contracts with local organisations and, through them, companies. Having a chain of several sub-contractors was avoided where possible. The financial reports were also checked thoroughly in order to combat corruption and fraud. In a fragile environment with weak institutions and limited monitoring possibilities, irregularities (nepotism, over-invoicing, fraud, corruption etc.) could not be fully ruled out. In this context, the monitoring of activities continued to be a challenge. For that reason, the embassy created a specific framework for indirect monitoring of the activities in the province of Uruzgan. For instance, external, independent parties were involved in the monitoring of output and impact of the interventions. This had a positive effect.

The civil assessment which was conducted at the beginning of the mission was very useful in the further implementation of the mission, particularly because it provided a great deal of information in the social and civil situation in the province.

6.2.8 Sub-conclusion: Expenditure for the mission
The additional expenditure for the Dutch contribution to ISAF amounted to EUR 1.99 billion for the 2006-2011 period. Most of this, EUR 1.6 billion, was funded from the Homogeneous Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). The remaining EUR 390 million came from the investment and readiness budget of the Ministry of Defence and is related to various budget additions.

Of the HGIS-funded expenditure, EUR 1.22 billion can be ascribed to the costs of the deployment of the armed forces in Afghanistan. This is a significantly greater amount than had been expected and this discrepancy mainly related to the first two years. When the mission was extended in late 2007, an estimate was drawn up which was better aligned with the expenditure.

There is a significant discrepancy between the initial estimates and the actual expenditure funded by the HGIS. When the initial estimate was drawn up in 2005, there was little insight into what actual expenses there would be, related to the deployment of the armed forces as lead nation in Uruzgan. No financial room was budgeted for significant unforeseen expenditure. Due to operational requirements and changes in the parameters of the mission, however, there were indeed unforeseen expenses. Examples are the increase in personnel numbers and the hiring of unmanned aircraft.

In principle, the HGIS system only accommodates additional expenditure for the Defence organisation if it is related to a mission. Capital investments and running costs that are part of the day-to-day running of the organisation are not funded by the HGIS. The rules can foster inefficient use of government funds. These efficiency considerations were taken into account with regard to the expenditure for the armed forces’ participation in
the deployment to Afghanistan. If it demonstrably led to more efficiency, and in consultation with the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, in certain specific cases the decision was made to allow an exception to the HGIS rules by transferring funds from the HGIS part of the Defence budget to the regular Defence budget. An example is keeping open the Logistic Support Unit in Eygelshoven for repair work to materiel brought back from Afghanistan.

The toll taken by ISAF on the 'Conduct of crisis-management operations' budget was considerable. Supplementing the HGIS 'Conduct of crisis-management operations' budget was also required to accommodate the four-year mission in Uruzgan. There was little scope for prioritisation within policy article 20 instead of adding to the budget. Many of the missions that had already been planned were related to international obligations. This large-scale and long mission thus took a great toll on the HGIS 'Conduct of crisis-management operations' budget. On average, during the 2006-2010 period, around 78% of the total budget was used for the military contribution to ISAF. The decision for the Netherlands to make an extensive contribution to ISAF over a period of four years meant that there was little financial room for other (crisis-management) operations.

In addition to the expenditure funded by the HGIS, the mission in Uruzgan also gave rise to costs funded by the regular Defence budget. These costs were the result of changes in the concept of operations and the loss of materiel in combat and due to major wear and tear. The Defence budget was not sufficient to fund all the necessary expenditure, so funds were added to it. For instance, the Bos and Van Geel funds were added to allow investment in new materiel for the mission. Additions for operational losses and for the purchase of the Bushmasters were also required.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has funded an amount of approximately EUR 373 million from the HGIS for the Dutch participation in Uruzgan. These funds made a considerable contribution to development cooperation activities, specifically in Uruzgan and, more generally, in Afghanistan as a whole.

6.3 Lessons

There are lessons to be drawn from the Dutch participation in ISAF. Some lessons are important for future missions, others relate mainly to the context in Uruzgan. Some lessons have already been applied, others are yet to be.

6.3.1 General lessons

a. If ambitious goals are set, sufficient resources must be made available to achieve those goals. Changing circumstances demand a degree of flexibility in the deployment of extra resources.

b. Prior to a mission, specific result indicators should preferably be formulated (for instance for the development of security or of trust among the population). These can then be used for monitoring and evaluation.

c. For missions in fragile states, the transfer of responsibility to the local authorities should be one of the initial objectives.
d. The recommendations from advisory report no. 64 of the Advisory Council on International Affairs (including exchanges, training and exercises, exchanges of officials between the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs) should be elaborated.

e. Ensure that there is sufficient capacity so that diplomats and other civilian experts are able to do their jobs under protection.

f. Good mutual agreements are needed between the ministries involved regarding media policy, public information and public statements, in order to support the public image of the mission and create support for the mission.

6.3.2 Lessons to be consolidated

a. The current (national and NATO) COIN doctrine requires adjustment, followed by permanent review.

b. In a 3D approach, integral planning of activities and sound institutional embedding of responsibilities from the start of the planning stage is recommended.

c. A mission with an obvious civilian component should have sufficient civilian expertise at its disposal, including interpreters. To that end, the pool of rapidly deployable civilian experts and the flexible deployment of diplomats from the ministry of Foreign Affairs require particular attention.

d. Prior to a (military) deployment it should be decided whether a civil assessment is required. The results of such an assessment should be made available as early in the process as possible, in order for them to have the greatest possible impact. Preferably they should be available, therefore, during the preparation of the decision-making process regarding the mission.

e. Close cooperation with other lead nations in multinational missions is important. The relationship between and the division of responsibilities among the various actors present (NATO, UNAMA, EU and NGOs) require daily and intensive coordination.

f. The required troop strength and deployment duration for the participation in a mission must allow flexible adjustment if the circumstances change, for instance after mission reviews.

g. The financial estimate for a mission must be realistic, on the basis of the parameters which are known at that time. In addition, unforeseen expenses must be explicitly taken into account. Changes in the parameters require a review of the estimate.
h. Within a single area of operations there should be unity of effort and unity of command. For a lead nation, good arrangements have to be made with all coalition partners prior to deployment.

i. The limited availability of enablers (such as air-defence specialists, counter-IED, helicopters and military nurses) formed a limiting factor during operations. In future operations, this should be taken into account when designing the mission.

j. More mentoring of local actors by civilian experts is desirable and necessary. Develop a long-term partnership / coaching / supporting strategy to build up local security services and civilian expertise in the province.

k. Contacts with informal rulers or power brokers must be preceded by thorough preparation with direct partners. Be prepared to compromise in order to achieve goals.

l. The importance of social outreach and ownership (which came to be known during this mission as 'Afghanisation'); the population itself is the key to peace, security and sustainable development. At the same time, improve the services provided by the authorities and thus the support base for the authorities.

m. Civil domain: Local civil organisations should be considered as partners for sustainable development. It is essential to ensure the independent character of NGOs, particularly humanitarian organisations, and thereby not to compromise their security. Successful deployment of civil organisations requires them to be autonomous.

n. From QVPs to development programmes; the build-up from short, quick and visible projects to long-term sustainable development. Small-scale, quick and visible activities, aimed at specific village communities, are just a first step towards sustainable development activities. Eventually these projects should be followed as soon as possible by long-term development projects. The local authorities can thus increase their presence and legitimacy in the province.
Annex A, Afghanistan Compact Benchmarks and Timelines

SECURITY

International Security Forces
Through end-2010, with the support of and in close coordination with the Afghan Government, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and their respective Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s) will promote security and stability in all regions of Afghanistan, including by strengthening Afghan capabilities.

Afghan National Army
By end-2010: A nationally respected, professional, ethnically balanced Afghan National Army will be fully established that is democratically accountable, organized, trained and equipped to meet the security needs of the country and increasingly funded from Government revenue, commensurate with the nation’s economic capacity; the international community will continue to support Afghanistan in expanding the ANA towards the ceiling of 70,000 personnel articulated in the Bonn talks; and the pace of expansion is to be adjusted on the basis of periodic joint quality assessments by the Afghan Government and the international community against agreed criteria which take into account prevailing conditions.

Afghan National and Border Police
By end-2010, a fully constituted, professional, functional and ethnically balanced Afghan National Police and Afghan Border Police with a combined force of up to 62,000 will be able to meet the security needs of the country effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable.

Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
All illegal armed groups will be disbanded by end-2007 in all provinces.

Counter-Narcotics
By end-2010, the Government will strengthen its law enforcement capacity at both central and provincial levels, resulting in a substantial annual increase in the amount of drugs seized or destroyed and processing facilities dismantled, and in effective measures, including targeted eradication as appropriate, that contribute to the elimination of poppy and regional governments will work together to increase coordination and mutual sharing of intelligence, with the goal of an increase in the seizure and destruction of drugs being smuggled across Afghanistan’s borders and effective action against drug traffickers.

Mine Action and Ammunition
By end-2010, in line with Afghanistan’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Afghanistan’s Ottawa Convention obligations, the land area contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance will be reduced by 70%; all stockpiled anti-personnel mines will be located and destroyed by end-2007; and by end-2010, all unsafe, unserviceable and surplus ammunition will be destroyed.

GOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Public Administrative Reform
By end-2010: Government machinery (including the number of ministries) will be restructured and rationalised to ensure a fiscally sustainable public
administration; the civil service commission will be strengthened; and civil service functions will be reformed to reflect core functions and responsibilities. A clear and transparent national appointments mechanism will be established within 6 months, applied within 12 months and fully implemented within 24 months for all senior level appointments to the central government and the judiciary, as well as for provincial governors, chiefs of police, district administrators and provincial heads of security. By end-2006 a review of the number of administrative units and their boundaries will be undertaken with the aim of contributing to fiscal sustainability. By end-2010, in furtherance of the work of the civil service commission, merit-based appointments, vetting procedures and performance-based reviews will be undertaken for civil service positions at all levels of government, including central government, the judiciary and police, and requisite support will be provided to build the capacity of the civil service to function effectively. Annual performance-based reviews will be undertaken for all senior staff (grade 2 and above) starting by end-2007.

**Anti-Corruption**
The UN Convention against Corruption will be ratified by end-2006, national legislation adapted accordingly by end-2007 and a monitoring mechanism to oversee implementation will be in place by end-2008.

**The Census and Statistics**
The census enumeration will be completed by end-2008 and the complete results published. Reliable statistical baselines will be established for all quantitative benchmarks by mid-2007 and statistical capacity built to track progress against them.

**National Assembly**
The National Assembly will be provided with technical and administrative support by mid-2006 to fulfil effectively its constitutionally mandated roles.

**Elections**
The Afghanistan Independent Electoral Commission will have the high integrity, capacity and resources to undertake elections in an increasingly fiscally sustainable manner by end-2008, with the Government of Afghanistan contributing to the extent possible to the cost of future elections from its own resources. A permanent civil and voter registry with a single national identity document will be established by end-2009.

**Gender**
By end-2010: the National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan will be fully implemented; and, in line with Afghanistan’s MDGs, female participation in all Afghan governance institutions, including elected and appointed bodies and the civil service, will be strengthened.

**Rule of Law**
By end-2010, the legal framework required under the constitution, including civil, criminal and commercial law, will be put in place, distributed to all judicial and legislative institutions and made available to the public. By end-2010, functioning institutions of justice will be fully operational in each province of Afghanistan, and the average time to resolve contract disputes will be reduced as much as possible. A review and reform of oversight procedures relating to corruption, lack of due process and miscarriage of justice will be initiated by end-2006 and fully implemented by end-2010; by
end-2010, reforms will strengthen the professionalism, credibility and integrity of key institutions of the justice system (the Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary, the Attorney-General’s office, the Ministry of Interior and the National Directorate of Security). By end-2010, justice infrastructure will be rehabilitated; and prisons will have separate facilities for women and juveniles.

**Land Registration**

A process for registration of land in all administrative units and the registration of titles will be started for all major urban areas by end-2006 and all other areas by end-2008. A fair system for settlement of land disputes will be in place by end-2007. Registration for rural land will be under way by end-2007.

**Counter-Narcotics**

By end-2010, the Government will increase the number of arrests and prosecutions of traffickers and corrupt officials and will improve its information base concerning those involved in the drugs trade, with a view to enhancing the selection system for national and sub-national public appointments, as part of the appointments mechanism mentioned earlier in this annex.

**Human Rights**

By end-2010: The Government’s capacity to comply with and report on its human rights treaty obligations will be strengthened; Government security and law enforcement agencies will adopt corrective measures including codes of conduct and procedures aimed at preventing arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, extortion and illegal expropriation of property with a view to the elimination of these practices; the exercise of freedom of expression, including freedom of media, will be strengthened; human rights awareness will be included in education curricula and promoted among legislators, judicial personnel and other Government agencies, communities and the public; human rights monitoring will be carried out by the Government and independently by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), and the UN will track the effectiveness of measures aimed at the protection of human rights; the AIHRC will be supported in the fulfilment of its objectives with regard to monitoring, investigation, protection and promotion of human rights. The implementation of the Action Plan on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation will be completed by end-2008.

**ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT**

**INFRASTRUCTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES**

**Roads**

Afghanistan will have a fully upgraded and maintained ring road, as well as roads connecting the ring road to neighbouring countries by end-2008 and a fiscally sustainable system for road maintenance by end-2007.

**Air Transport**

By end-2010: Kabul International Airport and Herat Airport will achieve full International Civil Aviation Organisation compliance; Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad and Kandahar will be upgraded with runway repairs, air navigation, fire and rescue and communications equipment; seven other domestic airports will be upgraded to facilitate domestic air transportation; and air transport services and costs will be increasingly competitive with international market standards and rates.
Energy
By end-2010: electricity will reach at least 65% of households and 90% of non-residential establishments in major urban areas and at least 25% of households in rural areas; at least 75% of the costs will be recovered from users connected to the national power grid. A strategy for the development and the use of renewable energies will be developed by end-2007.

Mining and Natural Resources
An enabling regulatory environment for profitable extraction of Afghanistan’s mineral and natural resources will be created by end-2006, and by end-2010 the investment environment and infrastructure will be enhanced in order to attract domestic and foreign direct investment in this area.

Water Resource Management
Sustainable water resource management strategies and plans covering irrigation and drinking water supply will be developed by end-2006, and irrigation investments will result in at least 30% of water coming from large waterworks by end-2010.

Urban Development
By end-2010: Municipal governments will have strengthened capacity to manage urban development and to ensure that municipal services are delivered effectively, efficiently and transparently; in line with Afghanistan’s MDGs, investment in water supply and sanitation will ensure that 50% of households in Kabul and 30% of households in other major urban areas will have access to piped water.

Environment
In line with Afghanistan’s MDGs, environmental regulatory frameworks and management services will be established for the protection of air and water quality, waste management and pollution control, and natural resource policies will be developed and implementation started at all levels of government as well as the community level, by end-2007.

EDUCATION

Primary and Secondary Education
By end-2010: in line with Afghanistan’s MDGs, net enrolment in primary school for girls and boys will be at least 60% and 75% respectively; a new curriculum will be operational in all secondary schools; female teachers will be increased by 50%; 70% of Afghanistan’s teachers will have passed a competency test; and a system for assessing learning achievement such as a national testing system for students will be in place.

Higher Education
By end 2010: enrolment of students to universities will be 100,000 with at least 35% female students; and the curriculum in Afghanistan’s public universities will be revised to meet the development needs of the country and private sector growth.

Skills Development
A human resource study will be completed by end-2006, and 150,000 men and women will be trained in marketable skills through public and private means by end-2010.
Afghan Cultural Heritage
A comprehensive inventory of Afghan cultural treasures will be compiled by end-2007. Measures will be taken to revive the Afghan cultural heritage, to stop the illegal removal of cultural material and to restore damaged monuments and artefacts by end-2010.

HEALTH

Health and Nutrition
By end-2010, in line with Afghanistan’s MDGs, the Basic Package of Health Services will be extended to cover at least 90% of the population; maternal mortality will be reduced by 15%; and full immunisation coverage for infants under-5 for vaccine-preventable diseases will be achieved and their mortality rates reduced by 20%.

AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Agriculture and Livestock
By end-2010: The necessary institutional, regulatory and incentive framework to increase production and productivity will be established to create an enabling environment for legal agriculture and agriculture-based rural industries, and public investment in agriculture will increase by 30 percent; particular consideration will be given to perennial horticulture, animal health and food security by instituting specialised support agencies and financial service delivery mechanisms, supporting farmers’ associations, branding national products, disseminating timely price and weather-related information and statistics, providing strategic research and technical assistance and securing access to irrigation and water management systems.

Comprehensive Rural Development
By end-2010: Rural development will be enhanced comprehensively for the benefit of 19 million people in over 38,000 villages; this will be achieved through the election of at least a further 14,000 voluntary community development councils in all remaining villages, promoting local governance and community empowerment; access to safe drinking water will be extended to 90% of villages and sanitation to 50%; road connectivity will reach 40% of all villages, increasing access to markets, employment and social services; 47% of villages will benefit from small-scale irrigation; 800,000 households (22% of all Afghanistan’s households) will benefit from improved access to financial services; and livelihoods of at least 15% of the rural population will be supported through the provision of 91 million labour days.

Counter-Narcotics
By end-2010, the Government will design and implement programmes to achieve a sustained annual reduction in the amount of land under poppy and other drug cultivation by the strengthening and diversification of licit livelihoods and other counter-narcotics measures, as part of the overall goal of a decrease in the absolute and relative size of the drug economy in line with the Government’s MDG target.
SOCIAL PROTECTION

Poverty Reduction
By end-2010, in line with Afghanistan’s MDGs, the proportion of people living on less than US$1 a day will decrease by 3% per year and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger will decrease by 5% per year.

Humanitarian and Disaster Response
By end-2010, an effective system of disaster preparedness and response will be in place.

Disabled
By end-2010, increased assistance will be provided to meet the special needs of all disabled people, including their integration in society through opportunities for education and gainful employment.

Employment of Youth and Demobilised Soldiers
By end-2010, employment opportunities for youth and demobilised soldiers will be increased through special programmes.

Refugees and IDPs
By end-2010, all refugees opting to return and internally displaced persons will be provided assistance for rehabilitation and integration in their local communities; their integration will be supported by national development programmes, particularly in key areas of return.

Vulnerable Women
By end-2010, the number of female-headed households that are chronically poor will be reduced by 20%, and their employment rates will be increased by 20%.

Counter-Narcotics
By end-2010, the Government will implement programmes to reduce the demand for narcotics and provide improved treatment for drug users.

ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

Financial Management
By end-2007, the Government will ensure improved transparent financial management at the central and provincial levels through establishing and meeting benchmarks for financial management agreed with and monitored by the international community, including those in the anticipated Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF). In turn, and in line with improved government accountability, donors will make more effort to increase the share of total external assistance to Afghanistan that goes to the core budget.

Domestic Revenues
Afghanistan’s total domestic budgetary revenue – equivalent to 4.5% of estimated legal GDP in 1383 (2004/05) – will steadily increase and reach 8% of GDP by 1389 (2010/11). The ratio of revenue to estimated total recurrent expenditures, including estimated recurrent expenditures in the core and external development budgets, is projected to rise from 28% in 1383 (2004/05) to an estimated 58% in 1389, resulting in a continuing need, in accord with the principles in Annex II, for (1) external assistance to the core budget and (2) increasing cost-effectiveness of assistance that funds recurrent expenditure though the external development budget.
Private Sector Development and Trade
All legislation, regulations and procedures related to investment will be simplified and harmonised by end-2006 and implemented by end-2007. New business organisation laws will be tabled in the National Assembly by end-2006. The Government’s strategy for divestment of state-owned enterprises will be implemented by end-2009.

Financial Services and Markets
Internationally accepted prudential regulations will be developed for all core sectors of banking and non-bank financial institutions by end-2007. The banking supervision function of the Afghanistan Bank will be further strengthened by end-2007. Re-structuring of state-owned commercial banks will be complete by end-2007. State-owned banks that have not been relicensed will be liquidated by end-2006.

Regional Cooperation
By end-2010: Afghanistan and its neighbours will achieve lower transit times through Afghanistan by means of cooperative border management and other multilateral or bilateral trade and transit agreements; Afghanistan will increase the amount of electricity available through bilateral power purchase; and Afghanistan, its neighbours and countries in the region will reach agreements to enable Afghanistan to import skilled labour, and to enable Afghans to seek work in the region and send remittances home
Annex B, Results of the socio-economic development

Health care

**TLO data**

- The number of operational health care facilities has increased from 9 to 17.
- The number of health posts has doubled, bringing the total to 200 in mid-2010. Each post has, in principle, a male and a female health worker, who can provide first aid and medication, and refer patients.
- The number of health care staff has increased from 89 to 124. However, in mid-2010, women still only made up 19% of that number. The number of doctors has gone up from 19 in 2006 to 31 in 2010.
- The number of community health workers has also gone up, from 130 to 300, among them 100 women.
- A midwifery school and a community nursing school have been set up. Fifteen midwives graduated in 2010; a second group of 11 is expected to complete their studies in 2012. The number midwives has increased from 5 to 15.
- The hospital in Tarin Kowt has improved considerably. It has transformed from a district hospital into a provincial hospital. The following departments have been set up: an outpatient clinic, a blood bank, an operating theatre, a mortuary, a cholera wing and a women’s wing. An ambulance has also been bought.
- A drug treatment centre has been set up in Tarin Kowt and a drug-counselling centre in both Deh Rawod and Chora.
- As part of the Dutch Consortium Uruzgan, Healthnet/TPO is active in the area of mental and psycho-social health care, including the treatment of drug addicts, and in public/private cooperation in the sector.
- UNICEF’s efforts in the district of Khas Uruzgan: a large number of smaller projects, including vaccination campaigns, the building of latrines and sanitary facilities.
- Health education for village health care workers and religious leaders: a total of 160 village social workers and 60 religious leaders were trained in Uruzgan to carry out public information programmes in the areas of health and hygiene.
- Economic resilience of handicapped people in Uruzgan: 180 handicapped people have received training; 48 handicapped people have been referred for medical treatment in Kabul/Kandahar; 20 government buildings (including a number of schools) have had wheelchair ramps installed; 3 ‘awareness-raising’ workshops have been held; a long-term strategy has been developed for the improvement of the social and economic position of handicapped people in Uruzgan.
### Comparison of operational medical facilities (AHDS): 2006 and 2010
(from TLO report, 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>July 2006</th>
<th>Existed in 2006</th>
<th>June 2010</th>
<th>New additions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tarin Kowt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>• District Hospital upgraded to a 75-bed Provincial Hospital (with women's wing) with psychiatric unit and TB centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Addition of 50 beds under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1 CHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1 drug treatment centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 69 health posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Midwife training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Community Nursing School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deh Rawod</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>• 2 BHCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1 drug counselling centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 39 health posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chora</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>• 1 BHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1 drug counselling centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 24 health posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khas Uruzgan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>• 2 BHCs (one was built and one health sub-centre was upgraded to a BHC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1 health sub-centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 26 health posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chenartu</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>• 1 BHC was upgraded to CHC, but technically still operates as BHC and the new building is not yet constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chenhar Chineh</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>• 1 CHC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1 BHC under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 17 health posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gizab</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>• 1 BHC under GoA control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 1 BHC under Taliban control but open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 29 health posts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Education

TLO data:
- In 2006 there were 34 schools, and in 2010 there were 166 operational schools (including 7 madrasahs). Twenty-nine of these are girls’ schools and 13 are mixed schools. Fifteen schools have not yet been officially opened and a total of 94 schools and madrasahs were closed.
- 42,772 children go to school regularly, of whom 6,774 are girls. The percentage of children who should go to school is far below the national average of 50%, however. In Uruzgan, only 20% of the children who should be going to school actually do. Moreover, the percentage of girls is only around 6.15%.
- In 2010 there were a total of 1,126 teachers, 67 of whom were women.
Comparison of operational schools: 2006 and 2010
(from TLO report, 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>July 2006</th>
<th>June 2010</th>
<th>New Additions</th>
<th>No school building</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Khas Uruzgan | <12       | 45        | • 1 Elementary (boys)  
• 9 Secondary (7 boys, 2 girls)  
• 2 High Schools (boys) | 35% no school building  
• 5 private home  
• 5 Open Air  
• 3 mosque |
| Gizab | unknown 38 (most in Hazara areas) | 11 under construction | 97% no school building  
• 24 in mosques  
• 6 private homes  
• 5 under open air  
• 2 in tents |
| Tarin Kowt | 9         | 37        | • 16 Elementary (boys)  
• 3 Secondary (2 boys, 1 mixed)  
• 3 High Schools (1 girls, 2 boys)  
• 1 High School burned | 35% no school building  
• 5 in private home  
• 5 under open air  
• 3 in mosques |
| Deh Rawod | < 8       | 17        | • 2 Elementary (boys)  
• 2 Secondary (boys)  
• 2 High School (boys)  
• Two burned (one still operates) | 47% no school building  
• 4 in mosques  
• 3 in private homes  
• 2 under open air |
| Chora | 4         | 12        | • 3 Elementary (2 boys, 1 mixed)  
• 4 Elementary (3 boys, 1 girls; now closed)  
• 7 burned (5 still operate) | 58% no school building  
• 5 under open air  
• 1 in mosque |
| Chenartu | unknown 9 | • 5 under construction | 100% no school building  
• 7 in mosques  
• 2 under open air |
| Char China | 1         | 1         |                      |                   |
| Total | <34       | 159       |                      | 91 (57% no school building) |
Overview of the number of children going to school in 2010 (from TLO report, 2010).

Reg=regularly, Occ=occasionally, TL=total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Boys</th>
<th>Girls</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reg</td>
<td>Occ</td>
<td>TL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarin Kowt</td>
<td>10,499</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>11,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deh Rawod</td>
<td>5,210</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>6,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gizab</td>
<td>4,843</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>5,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chora</td>
<td>3,508</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>4,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chenartu</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>1,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khas Uruzgan</td>
<td>10,816</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>11,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Char China</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>35,998</td>
<td>4,420</td>
<td>40,418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overview of the number of girls going to school (from TLO report).
Annex C, Chronology

2005
22 December: the government decides that the Netherlands will make a contribution to ISAF in southern Afghanistan.

2006
31 January: Afghanistan compact agreed in London: a five-year mechanism for coordinating the Afghan and international assistance efforts.
14 March: the first DTF quartermasters depart.
4 July: the first part of TFU departs.
1 August: ISAF expands its area to southern Afghanistan; TFU begins.
1 October: TFU fully operational. The civilian team from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consists of a political adviser, a development cooperation adviser and a tribal adviser.
October: first training of Afghan National Auxiliary Police begins.
November: first discovery of weapons storage based on information from local population; first detainees apprehended by the Netherlands handed over to the Afghan authorities.
1 November: Major General Van Loon assumes command of Regional Command South (RC-S) for six months.
December: a company of 11 Airmobile Brigade is deployed in Operation Baaz Tsuka in the province of Kandahar as RC South's reserve force.
December: the PRT organises the first Provincial Development Council.

2007
January: Major General Meulman takes on the position of Deputy Commander ISAF (Air) for one year.
19-20 March: TFU and ATF provide assistance during flooding near Deh Rawod.
16 May – 2 June: first major operation in the Baluchi Valley.
1 June: Major General (Marine Corps) Van der Til takes on the position of Director Afghan National Army Training & Equipment Support within ISAF headquarters for over a year.
16-20 June: large-scale fighting near Chora.
July: the newly established 4th Brigade of the ANA is deployed in Uruzgan.
Summer: the civilian team from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is expanded to include a CIVREP.
12 September: Hamdam succeeds Munib as governor of Uruzgan.
October: second major operation (Spin Ghar) in the Baluchi Valley and Deh Rafshan.
30 November: the government decides to extend the contribution to ISAF.

2008
From 2008: the CIVREP assumes primary responsibility for all reconstruction activities and thus assumes formal leadership of the PRT.
January: Major General Eikelboom takes on the position of Director Air Coordination Element within ISAF headquarters until November.
12 January: during Operation Kapcha As, north of Deh Rawod, two Dutch soldiers and two Afghan soldiers are killed and one Dutch soldier is seriously wounded in a friendly-fire incident.
February: major operation (Patan Ghar) around Deh Rawod.
March: major operation (Spin Luggur) around Deh Rawod, Deh Rafshan, Chora and the southern approach to the Baluchi Valley. Two new patrol bases completed for the ANA along the river Helmand.
April: as a result of the new ANA bases, the Dutch patrol bases Volendam and Poentjak are dismantled.
April: visits by representatives of Dutch NGOs to Tarin Kowt in preparation for a number of projects.
April: major operation (Now Ghar) around Deh Rafshan and Khorma.
May: major operation (Zier Tufaan) around Deh Rafshan, Deh Rawod and Chora, which leads to, inter alia, a new ANA base in the Baluchi Valley.
Summer: the CIVREP has two political advisers, three development cooperation advisers and two tribal advisers.
Late July: major OMF attack on Deh Rawod is repelled by TFU and ANA.
1 August: TFU is expanded with Australian, French, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak and Singaporean contributions.
1 August: the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) is disbanded; promising police officers begin training for the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP).
October: major operation (Bor Barakal) around Mirabad.
1 November: Major General De Kruif assumes command of Regional Command South for one year.
November: Peace Jirga in Uruzgan with around 1,000 tribal elders attending.
November: Rear Admiral Borsboom takes on the position of Deputy Chief of Staff for Stability within ISAF headquarters for one year.

2009
January: major operation (Tura Ghar) between Tarin Kowt and Chora (Baluchi Valley).
1 March: The CIVREP and the commander of TFU bear joint formal responsibility for leadership in the province with regard to both military and civilian activities.
March: introduction of TV in Uruzgan.
29 March: all security organisations involved sign the Uruzgan Security Plan.
31 March: international Afghanistan conference in The Hague. The conference is broadcast live in Uruzgan.
April: Task Force 55 begins operations.
2 May: work begins on a paved road between Tarin Kowt and Chora.
7 May: UNAMA office opens in Uruzgan.
21 May: Police Training Centre in Tarin Kowt, funded by the Netherlands, opens.
May: major operation (Mani Ghar) around Deh Rafshan.
June: Operational Coordination Centre – Provincial (OCC-P), the provincial emergency coordination centre in Uruzgan, opens.
16 June: scheduled flights begin between Kabul and Tarin Kowt, subsidised by the Netherlands.
22 July: agreement is signed between the Netherlands and Germany regarding various infrastructural projects.
August: newly constructed premises for OCC-P in Tarin Kowt are completed.
20 August: first round of Afghan presidential and provincial elections.
August: 4th Brigade of the ANA in Uruzgan is augmented with a third battalion.
September: 54 NGOs operating in Uruzgan.

2010
14 April: police post opens at the mouth of the Tangi Valley.
Late April: eleven provincial council advisers take office.
25 May: the Netherlands hands over leadership of the training of the ANA and the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams to Australia.
June: handover of the first outposts to ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP).
July: microcredit provider World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) opens office in Chora.
20 July: Kabul Conference, focusing on reconciliation and reintegration.
1 August: the operational task of TFU is handed over to the American/Australian Combined Team Uruzgan (CTU).

2011
Until end 2011: a POLAD/OSAD will remain in Uruzgan to monitor ongoing projects.
Until April 2013: the programme of Dutch Consortium Uruzgan (DCU) will continue.
Annex D, List of abbreviations

3D   Defence, Diplomacy, Development
ADZ  Afghan Development Zone
AHDS Afghan Health and Development Service
AICSC Afghanistan Independent Civil Service Commission
AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
AIV  Advisory Council on International Affairs
ALC  Advanced Learning Classes
ANA  Afghan National Army
ANAP Afghan National Auxiliary Police
ANP  Afghan National Police
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASGP Afghan Subnational Governance Programme
ATF  Air Task Force
BDC  Business Development Centre
BG   Battle Group
BPHS Basic Packages of Health Services
CAB  Canadian-Dutch Combined Air Bridge
CHOD Chief of Defence
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
CIVREP Civilian Representative
COIN Counterinsurgency
Contco Contingent Command
CSC  Civil Service Commission
CTU  Combined Team Uruzgan
CULAD Cultural Adviser
DCA  Dutch Committee for Afghanistan
DCU  Dutch Consortium for Uruzgan
DEA  Drugs Enforcement Administration
DIP  Defence Investment Programme
DISS Defence Intelligence and Security Service
DTF  Deployment Task Force
EFC  Equal Financial Ceiling
EGF  European Gendarmerie Force
EOD  Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service
EUPEU European Union Police (mission)
EU European Union
EW  Electronic Warfare
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organisation
FEOU Uruzgan Economic Reconstruction Fund
FSE  Forward Support Element
FTP  Fast-Track Procurement
GSE  Growing Sales Exchanges
GTZ  Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HGIS Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation
I-ANDS Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IDLG Independent Directorate for Local Governance
IED  Improvised Explosive Device
IGK  Inspector-General of the Armed Forces
IJC  Intermediate Joint Command
IMG  Inspector of Military Health Care
IO International Organisation
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force
KCT  Commando Corps
KLPD National Police Services Agency
LOTFA Law and OrderTrust Fund Afghanistan
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISFA</td>
<td>Microfinance Investment Support Facility Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRRD</td>
<td>Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRTF</td>
<td>Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTF</td>
<td>Mentoring Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAPWA</td>
<td>National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIST</td>
<td>National Intelligence Support Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSP</td>
<td>National Solidarity Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTM-A</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OM</td>
<td>Public Prosecution Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMLT</td>
<td>Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSAD</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMT</td>
<td>Police Mentoring Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POBB</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRR</td>
<td>Priority Reform and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTC</td>
<td>Police Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post-traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QPEP</td>
<td>Quality Primary Education Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QVP</td>
<td>Quick and Visible Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-S</td>
<td>Regional Command South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDF</td>
<td>Reproductive Health and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNLAF</td>
<td>Royal Netherlands Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTF</td>
<td>Reconstruction Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Special Military Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAF</td>
<td>The Afghanistan Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFO</td>
<td>Task Force Uruzgan</td>
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<td>TLO</td>
<td>The Liaison Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
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