In order to help ensure that NATO can efficiently prepare and facilitate a Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) capability, the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) was tasked by HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) to conduct an analysis of key policy and doctrine relating to the JLSG concept, relevant lessons, and observations collected during operations and exercises. The findings are presented in the report published by the JALLC entitled “Enabling Successful Multinational Logistics with NATO's Joint Logistics Support Group.”

The JLSG concept has been in place for a period of approximately ten years, but the JLSG HQ has only been fully executed twice (once during an exercise and once during an operation) and partially implemented on other occasions. Therefore, there are limited numbers of observations, lessons, or best practices relating to the JLSG HQ that cover the full spectrum of JLSG tasks.

In order for a JLSG HQ to operate effectively and meet the logistics requirements of the Nations, the Nations themselves must first fully support it with assets and trained personnel. JLSG HQs must be properly exercised to show off their potential and earn the confidence of the Nations they rely on for support. It is therefore important to recognize that if the JLSG concept is to be reliant on the use of augmentees, then such augmentees must be effectively prepared to carry out their mission.

### Project Overview

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### Six Lessons Identified

The project team collected, reviewed, summarized, and analysed lessons, observations, and best practices from NATO-led exercises and operations, and then reviewed NATO JLSG-related doctrine and guidance including the JLSG Implementation Instruction. From this analysis, the project team determined the extent to which identified JLSG-related lessons, observations, and issues had been addressed by NATO and identified a further six lessons which may be of importance to the further improvement of NATO’s JLSG capability.

**Lesson Identified 1: Harmonize Direction and Guidance**

Relevant NATO doctrine and policy needs to better reflect how the JLSG should work in practice, including how the JLSG HQ is stood-up, how the JLSG Core Staff Element (CSE) provides preparation support to an operation, and how the JLSG CSE is formed.

**Lesson Identified 2: Establish Core Capabilities for the JLSG HQ**

The JLSG HQ CSE may not be sufficiently manned to fully execute its tasks. Increasing the number of JLSG CSE personnel and balancing the CSE-to-augmentee ratio may help ensure that the JLSG can perform in line with expectations.

**Lesson Identified 3: Availability of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Job Descriptions (JD)**

Ensuring all JLSG personnel (including augmentees) have access to all relevant SOPs and JDs, as well as ensuring that those SOPs and JDs are up to date and concurrent with NATO’s logistics environment will, most likely, improve the efficiency and effectiveness of JLSG HQs.
Lesson Identified 4: The Need for a Recognized Logistics Picture (RLP)

Good logistics Situational Awareness (SA) entails a full understanding of theatre logistics needs, coupled with a full understanding of the means to meet those needs. But attaining and maintaining logistics SA is perceived as being challenging. Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) may not be prepared to share the information required to build an RLP, which is key to good logistics SA. Agreeing an RLP baseline/minimum requirement among Nations may improve the exchange of logistics data between NATO and TCNs to the RLP.

Lesson Identified 5: Manning the JLSG HQ

Manning the JLSG HQ is a multi-faceted challenge involving normal manning of NATO PE positions, rapidly releasing personnel from primary responsibilities when needed for the JLSG HQ, and rapidly augmenting the HQ by various means. However, the practical and successful use of modular augmentation from an NFS command helped overcome this challenge and may be a future best practice for JLSG HQ augmentation. Additionally, the project team’s findings indicate that the supplemental use of contractors to fill gapped billets in the JLSG HQ may also be a sensible approach to the manning challenges faced by the JFCs when standing-up a JLSG HQ.

Lesson Identified 6: Train and exercise the JLSG

Activating JLSG HQs when needed relies on available and trained personnel assigned to the HQ upon unit activation. However, shortfalls in availability of personnel and the limited number of training events can limit a JLSG HQ’s ability to successfully execute theatre logistics at the outset of NATO-led operations. Increasing the number of opportunities JLSG personnel (CSE and augmentees) have to train together with other relevant NATO units, and ensuring a JLSG focus during training events, may help improve the JLSGs capability to meet mission requirements.

Building Confidence in the JLSG

During the course of the study, the project team also identified four main issues that could be perceived as potentially undermining the confidence and trust in the JLSG from a national perspective: limited demonstration of the JLSG HQ; limited control and coordination capability; untrained personnel; and unfilled Combined Joint Statement of Requirements. Collectively these main issues have an impact on how the JLSG concept is perceived within NATO and among the Allies. By addressing these issues, there is an opportunity to improve confidence and trust in the capabilities of the JLSG.