The JALLC Explorer

From the Commander…

I am very proud to present the first edition of the JALLC Explorer published since I assumed command of JALLC. I think this newsletter fills a much needed gap in the JALLC’s public messaging between the content of our website, project FactSheets, our lessons learned training and outreach activities, and our analysis products themselves. As such, I hope and believe that you will find it a useful tool for keeping abreast of JALLC activities and upcoming events. In this issue we offer you a glimpse of two of our recently completed analysis projects. The first, our cover article, looks at our analysis of the challenges facing MARCOM, the NATO Command Structure’s only maritime headquarters, as that command works towards achieving full operational capability. The final report has given COM MARCOM, Vice Admiral Hudson, a valuable intellectual contribution to his staff’s efforts to understand and address those challenges. The second article covers the year-long analysis JALLC conducted on behalf of the Joint Warfare Centre, examining the new SKOLKAN exercise setting for its completeness and comprehensiveness in terms of allowing NATO forces to train for the full range of possible NATO missions. The other two main articles cover how JALLC approaches analysis generally, providing an insight into our daily business as we produce reports like the ones covered here. Overall, I think readers will find this edition of the Explorer to offer a fascinating insight into what JALLC does. Enjoy!

Mircea Mîndrescu
Brigadier General, Romanian Army

Command and Control of NATO Maritime Operations

By Lt Commander André Thouvenel, FRA

Last October, the JALLC initiated a project to support the Headquarters Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) Transformation Program, one of MARCOM’s efforts to reach full operational capability. JALLC identified several required capabilities needed for MARCOM to fulfil its possible missions, and effectively exercise command and control at the operational and tactical levels.

The implementation of the new NATO Command Structure in 2013 carried major implications for NATO maritime command and control. As the sole dedicated maritime body in the NATO Command Structure and as NATO’s principal maritime advisor, MARCOM faced a unique set of challenges associated with the broader geographic responsibility versus the former Maritime Commands located in Naples, Italy and Northwood, United Kingdom. At the same time, MARCOM needs to have the capability to plan and run maritime centric small joint operations.

To conduct the study, JALLC project analysts researched relevant NATO policies, doctrines and standards, and lessons from recent NATO or NATO-led operations and exercises. JALLC analysts also facilitated a series of interviews with staff officers and subject matter experts from strategic commands, Joint Force Commands, NATO Response Force High Readiness Forces (Maritime) and the Maritime Centres of Excellence.

The study, completed in June 2014, took the form of two distinct approaches. A quantitative approach examined defined capabilities requirements from relevant authoritative NATO documents, while a more qualitative approach examined the four main themes of thinking joint and operational while “keeping an eye on the sea”, the preparation for transition to crisis operations, communication and information systems and understanding of the operational environment. The analysis of these themes led to detailed conclusions, recommendations and best practice for NATO Military Authorities and MARCOM to
employ to meet or mitigate adverse effects arising from the four main themes.

The report has garnered positive feedback from key NATO maritime stakeholders and promises to offer valuable insights for Joint Force Commands, High Readiness Forces (Maritime) and other Single Service Commands.

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Lt. Colonel Gordon Gushue Royal Canadian Air Force Branch Head, Lessons Learned Analysis Support LCol Gushue was the JALLC Lessons Learned and Analysis Support Branch Head from July 2012 to July 2014. In this role he oversaw JALLC’s project quality assurance, directed seven serials of the NATO LL Staff Officer Course in Kungsängen, Sweden, and was the OPR for the NATO Lessons Learned Conference from 2012–14. He left the JALLC at the end of July and will retire from the Royal Canadian Air Force in September 2014.

LCol Gushue is from Northern Ontario and joined the RCAF in 1978. He graduated from Royal Roads Military College and Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean. He was a P-3 navigator, an air navigation flight instructor, a squadron commander at the Royal Military College of Canada, an exchange officer with the US Navy in Iceland and a staff officer at JFC Lisbon. LCol Gushue earned an MBA from the Edinburgh Business School.

Lessons Learned News

Forthcoming LL Events

NATO LL Conference in Lisbon: “Learning from Experiences, Strengthening the Alliance” 21 – 23 October 2014

LL Staff Officer Courses at SWEDINT:
- 10 – 14 November 2014
- 02 – 06 March 2015
- 09 – 14 November 2015

Registration is available via the JALLC website

Recent JALLC Reports
- Command and Control of NATO Maritime Operations – 06 June 2014
- The SKOLKAN Setting Comprehensiveness and Complexity – 17 February 2014
- An Examination of the Allied Command Operations Targeting Action Plan – 23 August 2013
- Counter and Anti-Corruption Theory and Practice from NATO Operations – 10 May 2013

FactSheets summarizing JALLC Reports can be found at:

http://www.jallc.nato.int/newsmedia/reports.asp

Read the complete reports and other JALLC publications from the JALLC NS WAN archives at

http://www.jallc.nato.int
JALLC’s Burgeoning Alternative Analysis Capability

By Jacqueline Eaton, JALLC Senior Operations Research Analyst

JALLC must continuously develop its analysis capability to stay relevant. We strive to build our analysis capability in such a way that it will always enable us to appropriately meet our customers’ varying analysis requirements. Ultimately, like the other analysis entities that exist within the NATO Command Structure, our goal is to provide the best possible analytical problem-solving expertise to support the Commanders’ decision making. JALLC’s latest effort in this respect is the implementation of an Alternative Analysis capability, to both complement and augment the Joint Analysis capability already inherent in the Centre.

The Bi-SC Alternative Analysis Handbook defines AltA as: “The deliberate application of independent, critical thought and alternative perspective to improve decision-making.” In essence, AltA is the use of structured thinking techniques to enrich understanding of the problem space, help unstick our thinking and overcome biases known to affect the quality of human decision making. Staff using AltA methods produce better results in a more efficient manner than working alone or in Bunch of Guys Sat Around a Table (BOGSAT) meetings.

In its Detailed AltA Implementation Plan, JALLC has committed to fully train four AltA Facilitators (8% of the staff) who will be sent on the NATO AltA Training Course, held biannually at NATO School Oberammergau. Three staff have already been trained and the fourth will attend the course in November. JALLC has also committed to ensuring all of its analysts and staff officers have knowledge and experience of the AltA techniques most pertinent to their work. JALLC has set up an AltA internal training programme to give staff practical AltA experience in six hands-on sessions each year. Four sessions have been held already in 2014, exposing 28 JALLC analysts to the joys of AltA. Each session simultaneously trains a technique and addresses a current JALLC issue, thus demonstrating concretely the contribution AltA can have both in our projects and to the continuous improvement of JALLC.

Analysis at JALLC

The official definition of analysis as given in AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions in NATO is:

“The study of a whole by examining its parts and their interactions.”

The analysis approach employed by NATO’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) supports NATO’s operational and strategic level lessons learned processes and has been coined “joint analysis”, although a precise formal definition of what joint analysis actually is has proven to be elusive for nearly 11 years! The term was invented to distinguish the analysis that the JALLC does from (operational) analysis carried out by other NATO entities, such as the Operational Analysis Branch at HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT); the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE); and by the Operations Assessment structures within Allied Command Operations. Experience demonstrates that a critical success factor for any lessons learned process is information assurance. In the context of a lessons learned process, information assurance means that the information that is submitted and received from a lessons learned capability needs to be trustworthy: factually correct, logically consistent, well-argued and concisely written. Certainly, perceptions of poor quality quickly degrade the utility of information and knowledge, particularly when sharing information between stakeholders.

Accordingly, and as described in NATO policy and supporting directives, the formal NATO lessons learned process has two well defined and sequential phases: the analysis phase and the remedial action phase.

JALLC analysis is carried out on issues that by their nature are complex, requiring in-depth research and study, that are important to the Alliance and take account of priorities set by the NATO Military Authorities. JALLC analysis provides the in-depth understanding of these complex issues needed to spur organizational learning and improvement.

In short, JALLC’s primary contribution to NATO’s operational and strategic level lessons learned processes is at the analysis phase, with the intent that a JALLC joint analysis provides the information assurance for robust lessons identified that will withstand critical review.
Until 2012, CERASIA was the only major joint crisis response exercise setting used for NATO collective training. Despite the CERASIA setting’s success and applicability, many recognized NATO training needed to evolve to keep pace with emerging threats and redefined missions requirements. As a result, in 2008, the Supreme Allied Command Europe commissioned the creation of a new setting. The SKOLKAN setting made its debut in November 2012 during NATO Response Force Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 12.

In 2013, the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre received tasking from the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, with the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) as a customer, to conduct an analysis of the SKOLKAN setting for the purpose of ascertaining its true robustness, as well as additional factors of merit with respect to development and overall capabilities as a training platform.

JALLC’s analysis noted that SKOLKAN essentially required three settings under the guise of one. Each setting carried the requirement to present the training audience with the full range of future threats and spectrum of potential NATO responses, although no single variant was expected to meet all conditions. When viewed collectively, the JALLC deemed SKOLKAN a robust and comprehensive training vehicle. However, since training audiences only exercise one of the variants, they receive only partial exposure to the full potential of the SKOLKAN setting. Fortunately, enough common elements are shared by all variants to create opportunities for development of “hybrid scenarios”, such as an out-of-area crisis response in a neighbouring region coupled with an Article 5 Collective Defence operation.

The JALLC also determined that the decision to prioritize Collective Defence, and have operations take place within or proximal to NATO territories, restricted the inclusion of some of the predominant conditions present in ISAF or the CERASIA setting. For example, the SKOLKAN setting was found to have less emphasis on operations in areas with diverse ethnic or religious populations, such as cultural differences found between African or Middle-Eastern populations and the NATO forces, or Strategic Distance. However, JALLC’s analysis notes that using both SKOLKAN and CERASIA would provide training on the broad range potential operations and threats faced by the NATO Response Force.

The Final Report was released in January 2014, along with a set of working-level summary sheets, the latter being intended to support JWC in the further development and refinement of future SKOLKAN materials.