Since its inception in 2002, the JALLC's analysis activities have predominantly focused on operations. The majority of our over 100 published analysis reports have covered NATO operations. To support these efforts JALLC regularly deploys analysis teams into operational theatres for data collection with the aim of identifying lessons that can, if acted upon, improve Alliance capabilities. The Libyan crisis is no exception—from start of the transition from Operation ODYSSEY DAWN to the NATO-led Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP), NATO has been proactive in initiating data gathering and analysis activities in order to profit from lessons identified through standing up and running this operation. JALLC has been a key element therein. Our involvement began with support to NATO HQ in gathering lessons from the planning phase of the crisis, followed by assistance to JFC Naples as the Combined Joint Task Force was established. Presently, JALLC is providing analysis support to SHAPE’s study of data from the early stages of OUP. The articles in this edition of The Explorer highlight JALLC’s support to OUP lesson gathering, but indeed cover only a small portion of the overall activity underway to learn from this operation. I am encouraged by the strong focus on lessons reflected in OUP activity.

Peter Sonneby
Brigadier General, Danish Air Force

By LTC Mattias Fieser, DEU A

Early on, JFC Naples recognized the importance of capturing initial observations from their involvement in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP), particularly in the transition from Operation ODYSSEY DAWN. As a result, at the end of March 2011 JFC Naples requested the JALLC to assist in the development of their Lessons Learned capability and in the capture the initial observations from the early phase of OUP with a specific focus on the handover from Operation ODYSSEY DAWN. Furthermore, the JALLC was tasked to look into the preparation and planning phase of OUP as well as the establishment of the Combined Joint Task Force UNIFIED PROTECTOR Headquarters (CJTF UP HQ).

In response to this request, the JALLC sent a team of analysts to JFC Naples and CJTF UP HQ from 05 to 08 April. The purpose of this initial visit was to determine the exact degree of support needed. At the end it was agreed to deliver a report within 30 days addressing the topics above.

Between 12 and 16 April the JALLC team returned to JFC Naples and CJTF UP HQ to conduct data collection. As the team needed to cover a large area of data collection, they were augmented with three subject matter experts from the Command and Control (C2) Centre of Excellence who were, inevitably, charged with conducting data collection related to the C2 element of the analysis.

This time-critical assessment focused solely on initial observations and preliminary findings. A report compiling initial observations was forwarded on 29 April to Rear Admiral Rühle, Knowledge Management Director, JFC Naples.
By Mr John Redmayne

The JALLC supported the NATO International Staff’s Operations Division (IS/OPS) in implementing a formal process to gather the lessons from the political-military planning phase of the Libya crisis and Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP). The initial task was to identify and deploy a suitable tool to support the lessons learned process. After reviewing constraints on such a tool and discussions with the NATO HQ IT support staff, an MS Excel Workbook was selected as most appropriate. The JALLC already had an MS Excel-based observation collection workbook to support the collection of Crisis Management Exercise observations that was ready to be used for OUP after minor customization.

The process to be followed by IS, International Military Staff, and Situation Centre staff to populate the MS Excel Workbook was promulgated by internal memo. The author, a JALLC civilian operations research analyst, worked with the IS/OPS staff to review the NATO decision-making process for Libya in order to assist with the development of initial observations for further analysis at NATO HQ. The first tranche of observations covered the period from the start of the crisis at the end of February 2011 to the release of the NAC Execution Directive for the No-Fly Zone Plus on the 27 March 2011. The MS Excel tool proved successful in allowing the staff to provide their personal observations and insights into issues.

Further study of the observations was done by IS/OPS staff. The author subsequently worked on-site at NATO HQ with that staff to review all the observations, group together those covering similar issues, and provide a check for completeness and logic. The outcome was a NATO HQ IS/OPS action memo containing over 30 lessons identified with actionable recommendations and associated action bodies. These lessons cover a range of issues, including: the NATO Crisis Management Process as documented in the NATO Crisis Response System Manual; use of Crisis Response Measures; and information flow and management procedures within NATO HQ and between NATO HQ and SHAPE. Some of the lessons identified relate to issues that can be addressed internally within HQ NATO whereas others require endorsement by the NAC prior to tasking subordinate committees with the necessary remedial actions.

Gathering Lessons at NATO HQ

By LTC Mattias Fieser, DEU A

In May 2011, SHAPE stood up a Strategic Assessment Team (SAT) dedicated to the strategic-level examination of OUP activities and the capture of observations and lessons identified. The intent of this initiative was to provide immediate feedback to the Commander and to inform the development of doctrine and procedures.

Five focus areas were identified for study with an analysis team assigned to each one. The SAT was tasked to conduct data capture and analysis with the aim of producing a final report at the end of July. To assist in this effort JALLC has been tasked to conduct two of the five analysis requirements and has assigned eight personnel, split up into two teams, to SHAPE. One team is lead by CDR Kleibaum, German Navy, the other team by LTC Vieira, Portuguese Army. The other three teams are made up of personnel mainly drawn from SHAPE.

These five teams met from 30 May to 02 June in Mons for an initial planning and training session. At this meeting the detailed degree of support was discussed and, as most of the SAT were non-JALLC members, SHAPE requested training support for one day in order to bring the teams on the same level of military analytical knowledge. It is expected that this strategic assessment will capture key lessons related to OUP, in particular Command and Control related issues.

SHAPE Strategic Assessment: OUP

JALLC Analysts and SHAPE staff work on OUP strategic assessment issues during the session at Mons.

NATO’s Lead Agent for Joint Analysis

The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) is NATO’s centre for performing joint analysis of operations, training, exercises and Concept Development and Experimentation, including establishing and maintaining an interactive managed Lessons Learned Database.

http://www.jallc.nato.int