Although the JALLC was originally conceived to primarily analyse exercises, changes to the NATO environment and growing NATO involvement in operations resulted in the JALLC's focus shifting to operations and major NATO Response Force (NRF) exercises.
Since its inception, the JALLC has conducted analysis projects in support of nearly every major NATO operation, exercise or event, including International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I), Kosovo Force (KFOR), Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, Operation OCEAN SHIELD, NATO Disaster Relief to Pakistan, the ALLIED ACTION and STEADFAST series of NRF exercises and a number of Multi-National Experiments.
These analysis projects result in production of written products (usually JALLC analysis reports) on a wide range of topics relevant to NATO's transformation. JALLC analysis reports are widely distributed across NATO, including to National Liaison Representatives to Supreme Allied Commander Transformation(SACT) and, whenever possible, to Partner and Troop Contributing Nations. However, due to the nature of the information in the JALLC analysis reports, they are not made available to the wider public. Instead, you can read about the JALLC’s analysis projects in our Project FactSheets which contain a summary of the project and its main findings for public consumption. Find below the available JALLC Project FactSheets.
The JALLC's core products are its analysis project reports. However, the JALLC is occasionally tasked to develop a special product tailored to the customer’s needs. Such products may include the development of a specific database of lessons, or as was recently the case, the JALLC developed a specific application designed to support the review of a specific piece of NATO doctrine.
For more information on the JALLC's capability to design and develop specific/tailored analysis products, please contact us.
JALLC Project FactSheets
Due to the nature of the information in the JALLC analysis reports, they are not made available to the wider public. Instead, you can read about the JALLC's analysis projects in our Project FactSheets which contain a summary of the project and its main findings for public consumption.
The Project Factsheets below provide an overview of the project and its background, a summary of the main findings, and any recommendations.
In June 2016, NATO Heads of State and Government highlighted in their Warsaw Summit Declaration the importance of comprehensive intelligence arrangements and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR) capabilities for NATO's timely and informed political and military decision making.
As head of Allied Command Operations (ACO), responsible for overall command of NATO military operations and the provision of advice to NATO's Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has a distinct requirement for Situational Awareness. The ability of ACO's strategic level HQ, SHAPE, to provide SACEUR with timely and effective Indications and Warning (I&W) and JISR capabilities to enable this is of particular importance in this regard.
Interoperability is critical to every aspect of Communication and Information Systems (CIS) capability development; from initial concept through to operational use. Consequently, CIS IV&V is a prerequisite in achieving the appropriate level of interoperability to ensure the effectiveness of Alliance Forces—and in particular the NATO Response Force (NRF)—across the full spectrum of Alliance operations and missions. In this context, several events are available to NATO and Partner nations that afford CIS IV&V opportunities. Effective coordination and synchronization of these events is necessary to permit the effective exploitation of their outcomes to the benefit of NATO, the Allies, and Partners.
Knowledge Management (KM) is central to Allied Command Operations’ (ACO) mission to prepare for, plan, and conduct military operations to meet NATO's political objectives. KM serves to safeguard against the loss of knowledge, which is especially important in a context where one third of ACO military staff rotate out of their positions every year. KM also supports the creation and acquisition of the knowledge ACO needs to meet current and emergent security challenges.
At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed upon a framework for a new NATO Command Structure (NCS), designed to be leaner and more affordable. In accordance with this new framework, NATO would rely on NATO Force Structure (NFS) HQs, in addition to its traditional use of the NCS, to provide NATO's full Deployable Joint Command and Control Capabilities and thereby meet the Alliance’s declared level of ambition. Doing so would require NFS HQs to be used as Joint Task Force (JTF) HQs for commanding Smaller Joint Operations (Land Heavy).
At the Wales Summit in September 2014, Allied leaders approved a Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to ensure the Alliance will be ready to respond swiftly and firmly to the new security threat environment. In conjunction with the implementation of the RAP, NATO's Exercise Programme was revised to take into account the preparation of higher readiness forces as well as contributing to assurance measures. In the lead up to the Warsaw Summit 2016, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff were interested in determining whether the NATO Exercise Programme was meeting Alliance Requirements from a strategic perspective. In this context he JALLC was tasked to analyse how the NATO Exercise Programme is delivering against Alliance Requirements with respect to Readiness, Responsiveness, Interoperability, Assurance, and Deterrence
During the 2010 Lisbon Summit the Regional Focus (RF) Initiative emerged as NATO's approach to advance the exploitation of regional expertise.
The JALLC conducted analysis in order to provide a thorough evidence-based description of the Regional Focus Initiative’s intent and mechanism in order to ascertain whether a regional dimension is being effectively incorporated into current NATO activities such as the Readiness Action Plan (RAP); probably the most prominent NATO activity with a regional dimension not only today but also for the foreseeable future.The project team identified three key conclusions which relate to the RF Initiative’s Intent, the RF Initiative’s Mechanism, and the RAP-RF Initiative Alignment.
For more than 11 years, under the mandate of several UN Security Council Resolutions, NATO has committed resources and considerable effort to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop the Afghan security forces to ensure the Afghanistan would never again be a safe haven for terrorists.
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Mission in Afghanistan terminated on 31 December 2014. The many challenges that have arisen in Afghanistan have provided fertile ground for NATO to learn, resulting in meaningful lessons to further the Alliance’s transformation. To ensure these valuable lessons would not be lost, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation tasked the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) with the analysis of the strategic lessons from ISAF mission. The goal of this study was to facilitate strategic military inputs to the on-going initiatives that are transforming NATO today
NATO developed the TRIDENT JAGUAR (TRJR) series of exercises, designed to exercise, evaluate, and certify the Graduated Readiness Forces (Land) (GRF(L)) HQs in the Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ role. In May 2015, the JALLC reported on the findings from analysis of the first of the TRJR exercises (Exercise TRJR14). As a follow on to this study, during Exercise TRJR 2015 (TRJR 15), it was NRDC Italy’s (NRDC-ITA) and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps’ (ARRC) turn to be exercised and evaluated in the JTF HQ role. During the exercise they were required to plan and conduct a Crisis Response Small Joint Operation (Land Heavy) (SJO(L)) in a high intensity, complex military civilian, and asymmetric, failing state environment, involving warfighting in the early stages. The exercise was staged at the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), Stavanger, Norway in April and May of 2015.
The JALLC analysed processes and structures used by the HQs during Exercise TRJR15 in order to identify lessons to improve the ability of GRF(L) HQs to perform the role of an NFS Integrated Model (IM) JTF HQ. The identified lessons are intended to support JWC's continuing efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of JTF HQ training.
During the lifetime of the NATO E-3A (NE-3A), the changing security environment and technological developments over the last 30 years have resulted in the NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control (NAEW&C) Force’s role expanding to support a wide range of challenges NATO has faced over the last three decades.
As a result of the JALLC's research into the lessons learned from three decades of NAEW&C Force, the project team observed that the changing strategic environment, technological advances, key events, missions, and operations that took place during this period have impacted and expanded the NAEW&C Force’s role over time to meet the increasing operational requirements. As a result of this expanding role, there have been certain key consequences for the NAEW&C Force, which the project team summarized under six main areas in the JALLC Research Paper.
In October 2014, in response to the decline of NATO assets in the Standing Naval Forces (SNF), NATO's two Strategic Commands, with Allied Command Operations (ACO) in the lead, supported by Allied Command Transformation (ACT), were requested to provide an action plan pertaining to the reinvigoration of the SNF.
The JALLC supported this work by conducting a study into the viability of the SNF in order to identify factors that impact the Allies’ participation in the SNF and to make recommendations on how to improve/change the current SNF model. The analysis of a broad spectrum of areas of improvement for the current SNF Model identified the three keys issues that, if addressed, may indeed serve to improve the current SNF Model.
As ISAF grew during its first years of existence, both in size and in geographic scope, ISAF forces came into ever more and closer contact with Afghan civilians. However, due to a significant increase in the level of violence in Afghanistan from 2006 on, unfortunately the number of civilian casualties (CIVCAS) rose correspondingly. Although exact CIVCAS numbers are unclear, best estimates suggest that the number of CIVCAS doubled over the period 2005 to 2006. This increase in CIVCAS led successive ISAF Commanders (COMISAF) to look at ways to significantly reduce those numbers, resulting in the implementation of a very deliberate and successful strategy, incorporating a range of measures, designed to reduce CIVCAS.
To ensure that NATO benefits as much as possible from ISAF's CIVCAS reduction learning curve, the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) was tasked to carry out an in-depth analysis on how ISAF reduced CIVCAS. The study took input into consideration from NATO's key partners, including International Organizations (IO) and NGOs, that have contributed to ISAF's work in terms of its CIVCAS reduction achievement.
In order to help ensure that NATO can efficiently prepare and facilitate a Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) capability, the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) was tasked by HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) to conduct an analysis of key policy and doctrine relating to the JLSG concept, relevant lessons, and observations collected during operations and exercises. The findings are presented in the report published by the JALLC entitled “Enabling Successful Multinational Logistics with NATO’s Joint Logistics Support Group.”
The JLSG concept has been in place for a period of approximately ten years, but the JLSG HQ has only been fully executed twice (once during an exercise and once during an operation) and partially implemented on other occasions. Therefore, there are limited numbers of observations, lessons, or best practices relating to the JLSG HQ that cover the full spectrum of JLSG tasks.
At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed upon a framework for a new NATO Command Structure designed to be leaner and more affordable. As a consequence, where in the past NATO Command Structure HQs were able to provide NATO's full Deployable Joint Command and Control Capabilities, from 2011, on NATO would also rely on NATO Force Structure (NFS) HQs for such capabilities to meet the agreed NATO Level of Ambition
To identify best practices and capture lessons on implementation of the NFS Joint Task Force (JTF) concept, the JALLC was tasked to conduct a study based on an analysis requirement submitted by the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). This report presents a discussion of the origin of the NFS JTF HQ concept, and observations and a discussion on the implementation of the concept with NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Spain (NRDC-ESP) as the NFS JTF HQ during Exercise TRIDENT JAGUAR 2014 (TRJR14), and provides recommendations for the future development of the JTF HQ concept.
Attack the Networks (AtN) is one of the three pillars of NATO's Counter-Improvised Explosives Device (C-IED) concept. However, despite being recognized as an essential capability for the Alliance, according to the Military Committee, progress to develop the AtN pillar of C-IED has been slow.
An earlier JALLC study on AtN, conducted in 2013, contributed to the revision of NATO's C-IED Action Plan by analysing NATO operational and strategic lessons in order to generate a broader and deeper rationale supporting AtN.
This followon study, jointly requested by the Deputy Assistant General of the Emerging-Security Challenges Division of the International Staff and the Director of the Intelligence Division of the International Military Staff in 2014, was intended to identify the military requirements for a future AtN capability in NATO by analysing "NATO and national AtN military lessons and information collected at all levels, in order to identify the military requirements for NATO AtN."
Exercises and training are an important part of
NATO's transformation and of ensuring that
NATO trains as it fights and fights as it trains. Lessons Identified (LI) and learned during an exercise must be captured and institutionalized within
NATO effectively and efficiently so that the Alliance can obtain maximum benefit from each exercise.
To enhance information sharing in the exercises and training field, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation tasked the Joint Analysis and
JALLC to analyse NATO's Exercise Reporting Process used within the Exercise, Training, Reporting, and Analysis (
EXTRA) Community of Interest (
Exercises and training are an important part of
NATO's transformation and of ensuring that
NATO trains as it fights and fights as it trains. Lessons Identified (
LI) and learned during an exercise must be captured and institutionalized within
NATO effectively and efficiently so that the Alliance can obtain maximum benefit from each exercise.
In this respect, to enhance the information sharing in the training and exercises field, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation tasked the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (
JALLC) to develop and promote the
NATO Exercises, Training, Reporting and Analysis Portal (
EXTRA) Information sharing platform. The
EXTRA Portal is to be the focal point for sharing exercise and training related knowledge and lessons.
Transformation is critical to enhance the Alliance's credibility in the face of today's international security environment. The diversity of Alliance operations spanning the last twenty years, constant global economic pressures, and current events highlight an ever present need for
NATO to be prepared and equipped with effective capabili-ties, facilitated through a multinational and comprehensive Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) mind-set.
Strategic concepts and initiatives, and other strands of work within
NATO - such as Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative - are instruments through which the Alliance is transforming in an increasingly uncertain future threat environment. Such transformation is the essential ingredient to ensure and enhance the Alliance's readiness and combat effectiveness, thereby driving to-wards achieving the end state.
In response to the rapidly growing cyber threat targeting both
NATO and Allied networks, Heads of State and Government at the 2010 Lisbon Summit took the decision to bolster
NATO's cyber defence efforts. Significant progress has since been made in this respect, but it is important to recognize the emerging challenges to cyber defence that
The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (
JALLC) was tasked by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (
SACT) to conduct a study analysing Cyber Defence Situational Aware-ness and Information Sharing within
NATO in order to improve the ability of the
NATO Command Structure (
NCS) to respond to Cyber Threats and share Cyber Defence lessons...
The evolution of
NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (
BMD) Command and Control (
C2) doctrine has been rapid. Although a
BMD capability has existed for several years, it was only at the Summit in Lisbon in 2010 that the Alliance decided to develop a
BMD capability. Within just two years from the date of that summit, at the Chicago Summit in 2012, the Alliance was able to declare an Interim
Taking this rapid evolution into consideration, and recognizing the fact that
continues to evolve its
capabilities at a fast pace two further levels of capability are already foreseen it makes sense in terms of the timeline of
evolution to pause and review related
NATO Command Structure Review resulted in the creation of
HQ Allied Maritime Command (
HQ MARCOM mission is broader than those of the former Maritime Commands (
MC) at Naples and Northwood, encompassing the requirement to serve as Maritime Component Command under a Joint Task Force and also to be capable of planning and running a maritime-heavy small joint operation (
SJO(M)), all the while serving as
NATO's principal maritime advisor.
MARCOM requested an analysis to support his progress towards Full Operational Capability (
FOC) by identifying the required capabilities that need to be available for
MARCOM to effectively exercise Command and Control (
C2), at the operational and tactical levels.
JALLC support was approved by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation in order to ensure
NATO can deliver desired outcomes in line with both
NATO's maritime strategy and supporting maritime concepts, and the Alliance's level of ambition...
From 2008 until 2012, CERASIA was the only major, joint, crisis response exercise setting used for
NATO collective training. Despite the CERASIA success and practical applicability, it was recognized that
NATO's training and response preparation needed to evolve to keep pace with emerging threats, redefined
NATO missions, and the evolution of the
NATO Command Structure.
SHAPE issued Direction and Guidance to develop a new, semifictitious setting, geographically superimposed on the Scandinavian/Baltic region of northern Europe ("high north") -SKOLKAN- and emphasized that, among other things, both Article 5 Collective Defence and Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO) were important training contexts it must be able to present...
JALLC, Harvard Medical School and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative are cooperating on a long term project, the overall aim of which is to infer elements of a strategic framework for health system strengthening in crisis-affected fragile states. Such health system strengthening depends on an effective comprehensive response by all participating actors particularly among the actions of the humanitarian & development and security communities ...
The Allied Command Operation (
ACO) Targeting Action Plan (
ATAP) was published early in 2012 to resolve a variety of joint targeting lessons identified during Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (
OUP). However, after the
ATAP was published, progress on implementing the
ATAP recommended solutions stalled.
SHAPE J2, owner of the
ATAP, looking for ways to expedite implementation of the plan, requested a study that would advise on possible improvements.
JALLC was tasked by the
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, at the behest of
SHAPE, to examine the
ATAP's content, staffing and management to determine if the plan was complete and achievable, and designed and managed effectively...
NATO has probably faced greater change in the last decade than it did in its previous 50+ years of existence. For example, the number of Allies in the Alliance has increased by nearly 50%, the NATO Response Force (NRF) has been created, and the NATO Command Structure radically restructured. All of this change has happened in an environment of falling defence budgets, meaning NATO really has had to do more with less.
In 2012, to celebrate JALLC's tenth anniversary, Commander JALLC decided that a review of the knowledge contained in the some 130 JALLC analysis reports and the 1500 submissions to the NATO Lessons Learned Database was called for.
As a result of exposure to corruption in operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan,
NATO has come to understand that corruption in post-conflict states can threaten force protection and affect mission success. In October 2012, in response to a request from Commander International Security Assistance Force (
JALLC was tasked to analyse Counter-and Anti-Corruption (
CAC) efforts in post-conflict states and to gather lessons and best practices on
CAC. The purpose of the study was to inform
COMISAF of the effects of corruption on operations, and what is being done and can be done to minimize those effects.
Extract of the Report
(27 June 2013)
JALLC project team collated, reviewed and analysed
CAC lessons and best practices from International Security Assistance Force (
ISAF), previous conflicts and stabilization missions together with many papers produced by academia, governments, International Organizations (
JALLC team then identified the most significant and applicable of these lessons and best practices, drew conclusions and made recommendations, in the context of
ISAF and for future
NATO operations ...
Information generated during an operation is critical to a reliable assessment of any operation; both during the conduct of operations and after their completion. Collection of information, conversion of information into records, and the transfer of those records to the NATO Archives, are all important parts of
NATO’s Record Handling process. Despite a revised
NATO Records Policy and the new Directive on Management of Records Generated on Operational Deployment,
NATO Archivists, who form part of the
NATO International Staff, had concerns about whether there had been significant improvement within the
NATO Command Structure when it came to the handling of records relating to operational deployment. Also, the
NATO Archivists were looking for recommendations to further improve
NATO’s records processes, structures and tools. The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (
JALLC) was tasked by the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, at the request of the International Staff, Director of the Information Communication Technology Management, to analyse the capability of the Allied Command Operations (
ACO) and the
NATO Command Structure (
NCS) to apply the relevant policies and directives and make recommendations to improve
NATO’s Records Management (
RM) process ...
During the spring of 2012, a "Food for Thought" Paper was distributed by Canada and the Netherlands that describes the Lessons Identified as a result of their redeployment of fighting forces from Afghanistan. The
NATO Logistics Committee, on behalf of the
NATO Military Committee (
MC), sponsored this report to assist
ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (
TCN) preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan. The need to share lessons from redeployment was discussed at the April 2012 meeting of the
MC, where the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (
SACT) stated that he would task the
JALLC to collect, collate and summarize lessons about redeployment.
This report summarizes the inputs from 24 nations and organizations that responded to the
SACT letter inviting them to share their lessons from their experience relating to redeployment from national,
NATO or other multinational operations ...
The Public Diplomacy Division (
PDD) of the
NATO International Staff identified the need to improve the way the effectiveness and impact of
NATO's public diplomacy activities are evaluated so that they could more objectively report on the effectiveness of
NATO's public diplomacy and enhance their public diplomacy activities. In April 2012, the
JALLC was tasked by the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, at the request of the
NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, to develop a comprehensive public diplomacy evaluation framework. The
JALLC researched and analysed various methods and approaches to evaluating the effectiveness and impact of public diplomacy and public relations used by both
NATO and non-
NATO organizations. The Public Diplomacy Evaluation Framework (referred to as the Framework) was then developed. The Framework is a theoretical construct for a total approach to public diplomacy evaluation comprised of ...
During Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (
NATO forces' performance with regard to avoiding damage to cultural property in Libya was well received by academia and in the media. Staff at
HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (
SACT) Strategic Plans and Policy Branch believed that
NATO's successful efforts at Cultural Property Protection (
CPP) in Libya could form the basis for strengthening
NATO's approach to
CPP for future operations. The
JALLC was subsequently tasked, through the 2012 Programme of Work, to analyze how
CPP was conducted and successfully addressed during
OUP and make recommendations for incorporating the resulting lessons into
NATO's operational planning and execution.
Initial research into what cultural property is in terms of
CPP was undertaken by the project team. This included investigating
NATO's and the Nation's
CPP related international legal responsibilities, as well as which international organizations have an interest in
CPP in order to identify contacts for further
CPP related data collection.
The conclusions from this study were used to create a set of recommendations for the further institutionalization of
Over the past few years of
NATO enlargement, new member Nations have identified the challenge of having a separate Ministry of Defence (
MoD) and General Staff (
GS). Some Nations expressed interest in receiving data on how these bodies could be merged or restructured to create more efficiency and suggested a collective approach for further analysis. At the 2011 Chiefs of Transformation Conference (
COTC), it was agreed that
NATO would provide support to the Nations in this respect as a matter of priority for Allied Command Transformation. The
JALLC was tasked with the following Analysis Requirement: collect information and analyse Nationsâ€™ views or experience in merging (or not) their respective
Media monitoring (
MM) and Media Analysis (
MA) are important for effective communication and information activities during operations. During Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, existing MM and MA capabilities were increased with outsourced services to meet the needs of the operation.
SHAPE requested the
JALLC to analyse the suitability of existing
MA capabilities to support future operations. The Analysis Requirement was "What are the current
MA capabilities within
NATO and to what extent are the services they provide suitable to meet the possible requirements of future operations?".
The conceptual model for the study compared current
MA capabilities with possible requirements of future operations, allowing the project team to identify where an appropriate balance or imbalance (representing a weakness or surplus strength) existed.
MA capability and requirement data was gathered by collecting survey data from a sample of
HQs. The survey results were analysed to identify statistical evidence of
MA strengths and weaknesses. Additional data was also collected which provided an understanding of possible causes of those identified strengths and weaknesses. The
JALLC also analysed a two-week sample of
MM products to validate the survey results and determine the extent of duplication in
NATO Security Committee published the Supporting Document for Information & Intelligence Sharing with Non-
NATO Entities (
NNE) in 2009 granting greater authority and providing special guidance to facilitate partnering with
NNE. This Supporting Document was augmented within the
NATO Command Structure with a Bi-
SC Handbook that provides guidance for implementing the new provisions for sharing authorized in the Supporting Document.
The representatives to the Bi-
SC Information and Intelligence Sharing (
I&IS) Task Force foresaw the need to further examine the success of the Supporting Document and Handbook in meeting the Strategic Commanders' needs when partnering and operating with
NNE. The Supreme Allied Commander Transformation tasked the
JALLC to examine progress and give recommendations for further improvements to
NATO's ability to share information with its partners...
Combined training events are planned and conducted to achieve goals that individual training events cannot, allowing participants to benefit from shared or pooled resources contributed by the entities executing the training.
NATO recognizes that cooperation with the United Statesâ€™ military, the largest force provider to the
ISAF mission, provides mutual benefits for both parties in training future
HQ staff members and similar collaborations could be applied for other missions.
JALLC conducted an analysis into the complexities of a combined training event executed by the
NATO Command Structure and another entity outside that structure, such as a
NATO Nation's training body. The analysis was performed by examining the planning and execution of the
ISAF Training Event 12-1 / Unified Endeavor 12-2 (
TE 12-1 and
UE 12-2) at the Joint Multinational Simulation Center in Grafenwoehr, Germany, which took place from 18 March to 06 April 2012. The project had the following Analysis Objectives...
JALLC, Harvard Medical School and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative are cooperating on a long term project, the overall aim of which is to infer elements of a strategic framework for health system strengthening in crisis-affected fragile states.
In November 2011, the
was tasked by the Supreme Allied Command Transformation to produce an analysis report on Lessons Identified during Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR from national military perspectives. When this tasking was assigned, each of the Headquarters involved in the
chain of command for
had either already published its own report of lessons or was in the process of preparing one. As a result, this study is a complementary report that is focused on the ongoing Lessons Learned process conducted by Nations during
collected the observations and lessons identified relevant to
from all of the nations that contributed forces to the Combined Joint Task Force UNIFIED PROTECTOR, developing a summary of national perspectives and identifying observed practices and procedures that enhance
NATO's interaction with nations and partners supporting future
more on Operation Unified Protector Lessons from National Military Perspectives
Operation ALTHEA is part of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy support to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
DSACEUR is the Operation Commander and, under the Berlin Plus arrangement, he requested, via
JALLC's assistance to provide analysis support to Operation ALTHEA.
The analysis requirement was to "Examine the Operation ALTHEA in-theatre Command and Control (
C2) architecture in order to inform the Operation Commander's decision-making process and ensure effective alignment of in-theatre
structures to deliver the revised tasks...
read more on Operation ALTHEA
As stated by the
Secretary General in his 2011 Annual Report, “NATO's Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (
OUP) was one of the most remarkable in
NATO's history. It showed the Alliance's strength and flexibility. European Allies and Canada took the lead; the United States provided critical capabilities; and the
command structure unified all those contribu-tions, as those of our partners, for one clear goal.”
NATO's in-tervention to enforce
Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 was swift,
was brought to a successful conclusion exactly seven months later on 31 October 2011.
acted in full accordance with the
mandate and consulted closely throughout with other International Organizations and other in-ternational partners...
read more on Operation Unified Protector Lessons for the Alliance
The success of NATO operations, as described in SHAPE's Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), is predicated on an Operations Assessment capability at each level of Allied Command Operations that can determine pro-gress toward an operation’s objectives and make recom-mendations to decision-makers. In late 2010, SHAPE ex-pressed concern over possible shortcomings in ACO's As-sessment capability created by the variations in Assessment structures and manning at the different levels in ACO and, to assuage this concern, requested JALLC to analyze the Op-erations Assessment capability in ACO.
As reported by
ISAF and in other Alliance operations and missions, the current
NATO-wide Crisis Response Operations Urgent Requirements (
CUR) process does not seem to adequately meet operational needs. It is widely considered to be inflexible and unable to meet the tempo of
NATO-led operations and to be falling short of delivering capabilities when needed, to the right level, and to a measurable degree of performance.
JALLC was tasked to analyze the
CUR approval process, with emphasis on meeting
ISAF operational needs, in order to make recommendations to improve the performance of the
CUR approval process (the Requirement Identification and Requirement Authorization stages). The project had the following analysis objectives ...
more on CUR
Counter Piracy (
CP) operations are being conducted off the Horn of Africa and in the Indian Ocean by many separate naval forces operating under a variety of command arrangements.
NATO's involvement began in late 2008 under a
remit to protect hu-manitarian assistance vessels and expanded during 2009 to be-come Operation OCEAN SHIELD (
OOS) with the task to combat piracy and build regional capacity to combat piracy.
DSACT observed considerable confusion, duplication of effort and poor coordination among
forces. Out this concern arose a
task with the following analysis requirements ...
read more on Conter-Piracy download the Couter-Piracy report extract
The Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (
JALLC) has released a Report on Information Exchange in a Joint Headquarters.
analysis that examined the information flow in a
characterized it as a complex system of three systems: Operational Reports & Returns; the formal information flow system under the Information Management (
IM) regime; and informal information exchange. This previous
analysis concentrated on the first two systems. The intent of the analysis carried out during STEADFAST JUNO (
SFJO) 10 was to complete this work and address the third system: informal information exchange
Three specific risks linked with information exchanges were identified by the analysis team in
10 which present a potential threat to the efficient function of the
Unavailability of information.
Potential for misinterpretation of information.
Potential for data to be hidden as a result of information overload
These risks are representative of potential risks that could exist in any headquarters in
In the report you'll find recommendations for the need
of Directives, more Cross-JFC IM
In the Political Guidance following
NATO's new Strategic Concept, Allies have expressed a desire for a simple set of defence measurements to foster politi-cal will to improve defence capabilities. The Nations already report key input and usability metrics that give an overview of their financial commitment to defence as well as the potential uses of their defence capabilities. However, although Allies report data regarding how they allocate their resources and where they use their defence capabilities, there are no agreed output meas-ures to summarize this data. In response to a tasking from the Secretary Gen-eral, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation tasked
to provide the
Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning with a proposed set of output metrics to meet the need expressed in the Political Guidance. ... read more on Defense Metrics
After a fratricide incident in Afghanistan in 2006, the Strategic Commands (
SC) established a Bi-
SC Analysis Lessons Learned (
BALL) Team to conduct a study focusing on fratricide prevention.
SACT formed a Team the following year charged with implementing the rec-ommendations from this report. In 2009 the
SCs published a further, final report highlighting 19 issues influencing fratricide prevention; each issue addressed the implementation status of one or more asso-ciated corrective actions recommended from the initial report.
was tasked to analyze the fratricide prevention issues raised in the 2009
Report in order to identify any unresolved
read more on Fratricide Prevention
Police Operational Mentoring Liaison Teams (
POMLT) are teams of up to 20 military and civilian police who deploy to Afghanistan to work with Afghan National Police (
ANP) in the field, helping to build their skills as a profes-sional police force.
specific pre-deployment training in 2010 at two training centres, the US-run Joint Multinational Readiness Center (
JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany, and the French Centre National d'Entrainement des Forces de Gendarmerie (
CNEFG) in St Astier, France.
was tasked to analyse ways to improve
Pre-deployment Training (
POMLTs deploying to
ISAF. The task was requested by Joint Force Command (
JFC) Brunssum. The agreed Analysis Objectives were ... read
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The Strategic Commands identified a need to increase efficiency and streamline Intelligence efforts. Arising from this a
task was developed to examine
Intelligence Structures, working groups, bodies and functions. Agreement was then reached to amend the project to cover Intelligence structures and processes within Allied Command Operations (
ACO), with a view to providing input to a report by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (
SACEUR) to the Director General,
The requirement was to analyse the roles and responsibilities of
Intel structures, within
JFC Knowledge Centres, their basic processes, workflows and how they interact, and the role of the intelligence Fusion Centre, with the aim of optimizing the Intelligence processes to support operations ...
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This report proposes that now is the right time to open a new chapter in civil-military medical interact ion whereby civilian and military actors are seen as complementary in achieving long-lasting peace and stability and the comprehensive approach becomes a reality in this field. Central to achieving this is the creation of medical comprehensive approach mechanisms between
and other organizations. Specifically, a new Joint Civil-Military Medical Coordination Board should be established to support civil-military medical coordination at the strategic level.
download here the Medical Civil-Military Interaction report